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Abstract 
Following a series of high profile miscarriages of justice linked to questionable expert 
evidence, the post of the Forensic Science Regulator was created in 2008 with a remit to 
improve the standard of practitioner competences and forensic procedures. It has since moved 
to incorporate a greater level of scientific practice in these areas, as used in the production of 
expert evidence submitted to the UK Criminal Justice System.  Accreditation to their codes of 
practice and conduct will become mandatory for all forensic practitioners by October 2017.  
A variety of challenges with expert evidence are explored and linked to a lack of a scientific 
methodology underpinning the processes followed.  In particular, the research focuses upon 
investigations where malicious software (‘malware’) has been identified.   
 
A framework, called the ‘Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework’ (MATEF), has 
been developed to address this lack of methodology to evaluate software tools used during 
investigations involving malware.  A prototype implementation of the framework was used to 
evaluate two tools against a population of over 350,000 samples of malware.  Analysis of the 
findings indicated that the choice of tool could impact on the number of artefacts observed in 
malware forensic investigations as well as identifying the optimal execution time for a given 
tool when observing malware artefacts. 
 
Three different measures were used to evaluate the framework.  The first of these evaluated 
the framework against the requirements and determined that these were largely met.  Where 
the requirements were not met these are attributed to matters either outside scope or the 
fledgling nature of the research.  Another measure used to evaluate the framework was to 
consider its performance in terms of speed and resource utilisation.  This identified scope for 
improvement in terms of the time to complete a test and the need for more economical use of 
disk space. Finally, the framework provides a scientific means to evaluate malware analysis 
tools, hence addressing the Research Question subject to the level at which ground truth is 
established. 
 
A number of contributions are produced as the output of this work.  First there is confirmation 
for the case for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware forensics.  Second, the 
MATEF itself, as it facilitates the production of empirical evidence of a tool’s ability to detect 
malware artefacts.  A third contribution is a set of requirements for establishing trusted 
practice in the use of malware artefact detection tools.  Finally, empirical evidence that 
supports both the notion that the choice of tool can impact on the number of artefacts 
observed in malware forensic investigations as well as identifying the optimal execution time 
for a given tool when observing malware artefacts.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Term Description 
Admissible Refers to an exhibit or testimony that is permitted as evidence in a court. 
Analysis script The component of the MATEF used to analyse Tool Log Files. 
Application Program 
Interface 
A set of functions and procedures that allow software developers to write code 
to access the features or data of an operating system, application, or other 
service, such as connecting to the Internet. 
Artefact A change in data that arises as a result of an action performed on a computer, 
such as the creation of a file. 
Assembly language Low level instructions that perform limited stepwise operations on device's 
memory locations. 
Asymptotic 
significance 
A computationally less intensive method of calculating the significance value, 
valid for large samples. 
Bare metal platform An environment where the operating system is installed on physical machine 
hardware (like a regular desktop computer).   
Bi-modality A distribution containing two peaks. 
Binary file A computer file that is not a text file. Binary files typically contain either data 
or executable code. 
Binomial sign test A nonparametric test similar to the Wilxocon signed rank test. 
Black box testing A behavioural software testing method in which the internal structure and 
algorithm of the item being tested is not known to the tester. 
Command-line 
interface 
A terminal based means to send commands to and receive output from a 
software program. 
Cybercrime Criminal activity that is focused upon or makes use of the Internet or a digital 
device. 
Cybersecurity The field of security concerned with protecting computers, networks, programs 
and data from unauthorized access or attacks. 
Cyberspace The realm within which electronic communications occur. 
Debug A process of located faults in software. 
Demilitarised zone  A network located outside an organisation's main firewall typically containing 
servers accessible to the Internet. 
Dependent t-Test A statistical test that compares the means of two related groups of data. 
Digital forensics The analysis of artefacts located on electronic devices and networks as part of 
an investigation, typically for court. 
Disassembly The process of examining a binary executable file to produce assembly 
language instructions. 
Distributed Denial of 
Service attack 
A form of attack whereby unauthorised access to multiple devices is gained 
with a view to using these to coordinate multiple requests to a target device and 
thereby render it inaccessible to others.  
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Dual-tool verification The process of comparing the output of one tool with another. 
Dynamic Link Library A binary file containing commonly used code used by applications, such as 
code to display an open file dialogue window.  
Dynamic malware 
analysis 
The process of analysing malware behaviour by executing the binary file in a 
controlled environment. 
Effect size A measure of how easy it is to observe a given effect. 
Emulation platform Similar to a Virtualisation platform, this is an environment where all of the 
hardware is emulated in software, allowing for the Host and Guest 
architectures to be different. 
Expected value The value expected as the result of the counting artefacts of a given type, e.g.: 
count of open ports 
Expert evidence Evidence that requires an expert to produce and interpret the evidence in a 
manner that meets a court's admissibility requirements. 
Familywise error A type of error introduced as a result of combining the results of multiple 
independent statistical tests. 
Forensic Science 
Regulator 
The office created in 2008 by the U.K. Government to oversee all forensic 
science provision within the U.K. criminal justice system. 
Hash The value returned from a hash function, which calculates a value of fixed size 
from any size of data. 
Internet simulator The component of the MATEF used to simulate Internet services such as email 
and web servers. 
Interval data Data with the same properties as Ordinal data, but the size of any difference 
can be determined. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 
test 
An implementation of a Normality test. 
Malware Short for malicious software and typically disrupts, gathers sensitive 
information from or gains unauthorised access to computer systems. 
Malware artefact 
database 
The database component of the MATEF used to store malware artefacts. 
Malware forensics The analysis of malware as part of a digital forensic investigation. 
Malware library A folder structure housing the entire malware binary population available to 
the MATEF during testing. 
Malware source The source component of the MATEF used to acquire malware binaries. 
McNemar test A nonparametric test similar to the Wilxocon signed rank test that only 
supports nominal data. 
Message Digest 5 A form of hash where a specific algorithm is used to verify data integrity. 
Normality test A form of statistical test used to determine if a dataset can be modelled by a 
Normal distribution. 
Nominal data Data that can only be categorised or assigned a label/name. 
Nonparametric tests The converse of a parametric test whereby no assumptions are made that 
sample data comes from a population that follows a probability distribution 
based on a fixed set of parameters. 
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Observed value The value obtained as the result of the count of artefacts of a given type, e.g.: 
count of open ports 
Oracle The component of the MATEF used to estimate the ground truth value of 
expected artefacts. 
Ordinal data Data with the same properties as Nominal data, but can also be ordered or 
compared, based on ranking or size. 
Packer Software that compresses an original binary file (typically malware) to render 
the original code and data unreadable. 
Parametric test A type of statistical test that assumes that sample data comes from a population 
that follows a probability distribution based on a fixed set of parameters. 
Port An interface of a computer.  Each port has a number that is typically associated 
with a specific means of communication, e.g.: Internet browsers typically use 
port 80. 
Portable Executable 
file format 
A standard binary file format containing executable code that is recognised by 
the Windows operating system. 
Prefetch Files created to speed up the launching of applications on a Windows 
computer.   
Process An instance of a computer program that is being executed.  
Ratio data Data with the same properties as Interval data, but the factor/ratio of any 
difference can be determined. 
Registry The Registry is a hierarchical database that stores low-level settings for the 
Microsoft Windows operating system 
Registry key Part of the structure used to store data in the Windows Registry.  Similar to 
folders on a disk. 
Repeatable The closeness of agreement between independent test results obtained under 
the same conditions by the same operator within a short interval of time. 
Reproducible The closeness of agreement between independent test results obtained under 
the same conditions by the different operators in different locations with 
different equipment. 
Restore point A backup feature of the Windows operating system that allows the user to 
revert a computer's state to that of a previous point in time. 
Reverse engineering The process of examining a binary executable file and identifying the 
commands and algorithm used to determine how it operates. 
Sandbox A virtual space in which new or untested software or coding can be run 
securely. 
Shapiro-Wilk test An implementation of a Normality test. 
Standard error A measure of population dispersion, meaningful only to data distributed 
symmetrically about a mean. 
Standardised test 
statistic 
The test statistic expressed in units of standard deviation 
Static malware 
analysis 
The process of analysing malware through the examination of the binary file 
without executing it. 
0 - Glossary of Terms  Page 13  
 
Test control script The script used by the MATEF to manage the test process.  Typical tasks 
include starting and reverting VMs. 
Test environment The virtualisation platform in which malware binaries and tools under test are 
executed on the MATEF. 
Test statistic The ratio of systematic to unsystematic (or effect to error), if the null 
hypothesis is true. Arbitrary for unknown distributions. 
Tool log files Log files generated by tools under test. 
Trojan defence A defence offered by a defendant whereby an alleged offence was performed 
as a result of some form of malware (or third-party) that gained control of their 
computer. 
User Access Control  A security feature of the Windows operating system that prevents unauthorized 
changes to your computer. 
Validation The process of generating independent evidence that a method, process or 
device is fit for purpose.  Answers the question "Is it the right method, device, 
etc.?" 
Verification Confirmation through comparing with an independent source that a method, 
process or device is fit for purpose.  Answers the question "Are we doing it 
right?" 
Virtual machine An environment where the operating system (called a Guest) is installed in an 
environment controlled by software (called a Hypervisor) running on an 
operating system on a physical machine (called a Host).  
Virtualisation platform An environment that uses a virtual machine. 
Wilcoxon signed rank 
test 
A nonparametric test equivalent to the Dependent t-Test. 
Wrapper A short item of plug-in code containing tool specific parameters. 
 
  
0 - List of Abbreviations  Page 14  
 
List of Abbreviations 
Acronym Meaning 
API Application Program Interface 
CFReDS Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets 
CFTT Computer Forensics Tool Testing  
CJS Criminal Justice System 
CLI Command-Line Interface 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CPS Crown Prosecution Service  
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CSV Comma Separated Value 
DC3 Department of Defence Cyber Crime Centre  
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
DFTT Digital Forensic Tool Testing  
DLL Dynamic Link Library 
DMZ Demilitarised zone  
DNS Domain Name System 
FSR Forensic Science Regulator 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IRC Internet relay chat  
MATEF Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework 
MD5 Message Digest 5 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office  
PE Portable Executable 
PMS Program Manager Script  
RAM Random Access Memory 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
SWGDE Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence  
UAC User Access Control  
VM Virtual Machine 
VMM Virtual Machine Manager  
 
Chapter 1  - Introduction  Page 15  
 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
The biological virus has been mankind’s constant companion throughout history. Unseen by 
the naked eye and adaptable to its environment, a virus can be harmful, hostile and very 
capable of defending itself.  The battle to eradicate it is a never-ending arms race between 
mankind and the virus.  
Unlike its biological counterpart, computer viruses are man-made but share many of the 
characteristics and challenges in their handling and study. As with the biological variety, 
computer viruses can be hostile in nature and hazardous to handle for analysis purposes.  
Although often termed computer virus, the more definitive term is malicious software (a.k.a. 
malware).   This is due to fact that the infiltration and distribution techniques they use have 
evolved beyond those used by biological viruses and that they are typically synthesised with 
hostile intent. 
Despite the numerous and conflicting (British Computer Society, 2011) anti-malware reports 
routinely published by vendors, the exact number of species is unknown and is subject to an 
increasing number of variants (Smith, 2014) which makes obtaining an accurate assessment 
of the threat level at any one time difficult.  Smith (2014) argues that estimates of exact 
numbers of infections are dependent on either statistics reported by security and anti-malware 
vendors or the monitoring of Internet traffic.  The former is subject to issues of sample sizes 
and bias while the latter has data attribution issues, whereby Internet traffic monitoring logs 
don’t always contain the information needed to attribute network activity to specific malware.  
Aycock (2006) argues the single biggest problem is that there is no industry-wide agreement 
on what constitutes a threat. He also points out the figures quoted in reports are only for the 
known instances of malware and that it is impossible to known how many unknown threats 
are in the wild.   
Despite these ambiguities, Baker et al. (2011) identify malware as a cybersecurity issue; they 
report almost two-thirds of critical infrastructure companies admit to finding malware on a 
monthly basis designed to sabotage their systems.  Hence, although there are ambiguities 
surrounding the quantification and classification of malware, it is recognised that malware 
remains a key vector for cybersecurity attacks.  This is supported by Hunton (2012) who cites 
the revelation from the Cabinet Office (2010) that cybersecurity is one of the highest priority 
national security risks to the UK.  Such is the scale of concern of this threat that in 2011 the 
UK Government published a Cybersecurity strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011).  In 2016 The UK 
Government reaffirmed its position in their updated strategy that the cyber threat continues to 
be a “Tier One risk to UK interests” (Cabinet Office, 2016). 
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Underpinning a nation’s commerce and military sectors, the strategy goes on to argue that the 
increasing use of cyberspace “means that its disruption can affect nations’ ability to function 
effectively in a crisis”. 
The impact of this reaches beyond national security matters and into domestic law 
enforcement capability.  Burd et. al. (2011) recognise that national security and law 
enforcement agencies have historically evolved their capability along differing paths.  They 
go on to argue that the increasing sophistication of cybercrime now supports a need to bridge 
the capability gap between them.  
The need for law enforcement to increase their capability followed comments reported in 
Computer Weekly (Grant, 2010) when the then Metropolitan Police commissioner, Paul 
Stephenson is reported to have declared that the skills available to his cyber investigators 
were “thin compared to the skills at the disposal of cyber criminals”.   The National Audit 
Office corroborated this viewpoint and asserted it could take 20 years to address the cyber-
security skills gap (2013). Hunton (2012) admits that law enforcement is in a position where 
in terms of the specialist knowledge needed to investigate the evolving cybercrime domain, 
demand is in excess of capability.  Similarly, Runciman (2011) identifies malware related 
cybercrime as a specific area where law enforcement need to be better resourced.  
It is not uncommon during cybercrime investigations to discover malware.  The presence of 
malware on a computer will either be intentional or unintentional on the part of the suspect.  
In the case of the former, the suspect may have either created the malware or obtained it from 
a third party, possibly with a view to committing an offence, such as DDoS attack or 
unauthorised access to a computer system.   
For the latter case, the suspect may be an actual or potential victim of crime in that if 
executed, the malware will likely perform one or more actions, such as granting unauthorised 
access to their computer, exfiltrating personal data or using their computer to attack or access 
a remote computer without authorisation. For an individual under investigation, a common 
tactic is to claim the alleged illegal activity was performed as a result of some form of 
malware (or third-party) that gained control of their computer (Bridges, 2008).  This is 
referred to as the Trojan defence.  
Regardless of the intentions of the suspect in possessing malware on their computer, both 
civil and criminal forensic practitioners have a duty to identify the capabilities of any 
malware found as part of an investigation.  In the UK, the forensic practitioner is reminded of 
their responsibility of their duty to the court under both the Civil Procedure Rules (Ministry 
of Justice, 1999) and the Criminal Procedure Rules (Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
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To undertake this duty, the forensic practitioner is reliant on their tools, skills and knowledge 
of malware to detect, identify and study the behaviour of any identified malware.  As a result, 
the forensic practitioner aims to form an opinion on the impact any identified malware has on 
an investigation.  
1.1 Justification 
The terms malware and forensics are increasingly being combined to describe the emerging 
field malware forensics.  The original motivation for this thesis arose from the realisation that 
digital forensic practitioners were conducting malware forensic investigations in a largely 
anecdotal manner. 
Court proceedings involving malware that is not properly investigated inevitably become a 
candidate for miscarriages of justice, as the court would be forming a judgment without being 
fully informed of the facts. 
An investigation involving malware, however, is just one example of where the expert’s 
opinion, findings and associated methodologies are subject to an increasing level of scrutiny 
due to recent problems with expert evidence.  These are examined in more detail in the 
sections that follow.  
1.1.1 The Trojan defence 
Separating user actions from those of malicious software is the fundamental objective when 
investigating the Trojan defence. The impact of this defence is illustrated by the following 
cases. As a result of a criminal investigation, malicious software, described as a Trojan horse 
was found alongside a number of indecent images of children on the computer belonging to 
Karl Schofield. A forensic expert at the trial of R v Schofield [2003]1 concluded that it was 
the Trojan horse and not the actions of the defendant that led to the pictures being 
downloaded (GetReading, 2003).  Similarly, in R v Green [2003] the defendant was acquitted 
for downloading indecent images of children after it was argued that the material could have 
been placed there by one of eleven items of malware (described as Trojan horses) found on 
his computer.  A few months later in R v Caffrey [2003], the defendant was also acquitted as 
he successfully argued that it was the actions of a Trojan horse that launched a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack from his computer on the Port of Houston, Texas. 
                                                      
1 For all legal case citations, see Table 0 1 
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Similarly, Amero (2007) and Fiola (2008) both involved a defence citing malware as the 
cause of all or part of their alleged actions. More recently Welham (2010) reported on the 
case of Chris Singam who was acquitted of making and possessing indecent images of 
children as a result of a “virus that meant he could not have known indecent images of 
children were being sent to his computer.”   In cases such as these, the Defence will typically 
argue in terms of possibilities (and hence introduce reasonable doubt) while the Prosecution 
focus on likelihoods (and how low such likelihoods are in their personal experience).  Brown 
(2015) highlights the Trojan Defence as one of several tactics used by counsel to raise doubt 
as to the authenticity of the electronic evidence presented to court.  On the matter of malware 
behaviour, neither side present anything other than anecdotal evidence to support their stance.  
A more comprehensive review of these and other cases covering 2003 to 2013 is provided by 
Bowles and Hernandez-Castro (2015) who highlight “clear and obvious mistakes” with 
regard to Trojan Defence cases over a 10 year period.  
From a sceptic’s perspective, the Trojan defence is not an issue; conventional artefacts are 
sufficient to determine if the identified actions were performed by malware, or intentionally 
by the user (Carvey, 2009).  However, anti-forensic measures (commonly adopted by 
malware) are cited as a risk to this practice (Kessler, 2007), (Casey, 2002).  There is also an 
argument that sceptics will place too much trust in their own anecdotal experience of repeated 
confirmation that malware was not the cause of illegal activity found on a computer.  
 
1.1.2 Unfounded trust in repeated confirmation  
When asked about the possibility that malware has been used to perform certain types of 
operations (such as downloading child abuse images), some digital forensic experts defer to 
their own anecdotal experience and assert arguments based on the fact that they have “yet to 
see an example” of such behaviour by malware (McLinden, 2009).  Others have made 
greater, albeit non-scientific, attempts to reach out to the practitioner community to locate any 
instances of such malware and reported that they “haven’t seen a single case” (Douglas, 
2007).  Arguments such as these can be convincing in court but are based on inductive 
reasoning derived from repeated confirmation.  Hence it is possible for this statement to be 
proven incorrect the moment a single instance of malware downloading child abuse images is 
identified.  Whilst inductive reasoning is useful to use a small number of observations to infer 
a larger theory or generate a hypothesis, it cannot be used to test scientific theory.  This 
means the use of repeated confirmation is not scientific in its approach.    
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Similarly, the results from mainstream digital forensic tools have been accepted “based solely 
on the reputation of the vendor” (Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev & Dinolt, 2009).  Repeated 
confirmation, such as this, does not prove anything.    Criminals are reported to have 
exploited this viewpoint to hide contraband material (McLinden, 2011). It may be argued that 
anecdotal arguments are sufficient for legal proceedings and accepted by Courts.  However, 
some see this simply as the result of the Court’s naivety in the area of forensic science (Saks 
& Faigman, 2008).  Such naivety, it could be argued, has led to the discovery of problems 
with some expert evidence. 
1.1.3 Recent problems with expert evidence 
Recent high profile miscarriages of justice have been attributed in part to flawed expert 
evidence (Law Commission, 2011).  The Solicitors Journal (2011) cites the Law 
Commissioner, Professor David Ormerod, as saying that judges are “in the unsatisfactory 
position of having no real test to gauge the unreliability of expert evidence”.  
The case of R v Clark [1999] concerned the circumstances surrounding infant cot deaths.  
Professor Sir Roy Meadows made a number of claims that had “no statistical basis” (Royal 
Statistical Society, 2001). As a paediatrician (not a statistician), Meadows was testifying 
outside of his expertise.  Similar claims were made by Meadows in the subsequent trials of R 
v Cannings [2002] and R v Patel [2003].  All of these convictions were quashed at subsequent 
appeals and the Law Commission reviewed the admissibility of expert evidence for use in 
criminal trials (Law Commission, 2011). The report called for a move to incorporate a greater 
level of scientific principles and provenance in expert evidence.   
1.1.4 Lack of scientific principles 
One of the challenges in applying greater levels of scientific rigour to expert evidence derived 
from forensic science is the view that forensic science is an oxymoron, lacking the scientific 
principles enjoyed by established scientific disciplines (Kennedy, 2003). Some disciplines 
such as forensic otoscopy (Mohurle, Khutwad, Kunjir & Bhosle, 2016), which seeks to 
identify humans based upon their ear impression, have little formal research and no research 
agenda.  A view taken when such disciplines are applied is that there is a correlation between 
“dubious forensic science and wrongful convictions” (Cooley, 2004). Cole (2011) echoes this 
view and points to a lack of sufficient studies in some disciplines of forensic science, such 
that little can be inferred about their accuracy.  
This absence of a body of knowledge, established through accepted scientific methodologies, 
has led to criticism of practitioners being rhetorical in their application of substance or 
methodology (Saks & Faigman, 2008).  Saks & Faigman go on to state that scientific 
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principles, such as rigorous empirical testing, inductive methodologies and reporting of error 
rates are all absent from many of the “non-science forensic science” disciplines. 
Without this scientific pedigree, many of the specialties within forensic science taken into the 
courtroom face the risk of being labelled as junk science (Huber, 1993).  Epstein (2009) cites 
fingerprints, handwriting and firearms as three examples of such science. He goes on to 
promote the exclusion of such evidence from trials. Other examples include voice 
identification, footprints, bite marks, tool marks, blood spatter and hair comparison (Edmond, 
Biber, Kemp & Porter, 2009).  Broadly speaking, all of these specialties concern themselves 
with applying individualization to link an artefact to a suspect. 
Computers are meticulous keepers of time and they record times and dates for a multitude of 
events that take place on them. Specialities such as computer forensics and malware forensics 
utilise this intrinsic auditing feature to determine the provenance of identified artefacts.  It is 
ironic that these specialties themselves also do not have any such scientific provenance.    
The lack of a scientific footing for malware forensics has a greater impact for the discipline 
than it does for computer forensics.  The availability of both undergraduate and post-graduate 
qualifications in computer forensics provides an opportunity for practitioners to engage with 
their discipline on an academic and scientific footing.  Although included as modules on 
some courses, there are no such equivalent academic qualifications for malware forensics.   
This absence of both a scientific and academic foundation identifies a number of risks for 
evidence tendered in criminal proceedings. Malware is designed to obfuscate its true 
intentions and hinder attempts to analyse it (Wagener, Dulaunoy & Engel, 2008).  There is 
therefore a level of uncertainty associated with any conclusions drawn from malware 
analysis.  This uncertainty can be used to raise reasonable doubt about the true nature and 
intentions of malware. 
There is also uncertainty in the ontology of the field.  Aycock (2006) argues there is no 
universally accepted definition of terms such as virus.  This is echoed by Bureau and Harley 
(2008), who suggest the expectations of end users are too high. They go on to suggest it is too 
impractical to classify malware by names.  Mundie and McIntire (2013) also identify issues 
with inconsistent vocabulary amongst anti-malware vendors and members of the 
cybersecurity community.  
The complexity of the subject matter and the specialist skills required to study it (e.g.: reverse 
engineering & assembly language) may make the specialty less accessible to practitioners. 
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Lawyers seeking to undermine evidence produced from malware analysis currently have a 
rich choice of attack vectors they can use to introduce reasonable doubt concerning its 
validity.  The lack of scientific provenance, the skillset of the practitioner, the absence of 
academic programmes to give credibility to conclusions drawn and the hostile nature of the 
subject matter itself which seeks to obfuscate analysis.  Even one of the most fundamental 
requirements of digital evidence, the ability to repeat and hence corroborate the findings of 
the expert, is open to challenge.   
1.1.5 Reproducibility flaws 
An established tenet of science is that hypotheses are supported by reproducible experiments 
(Beckett, 2010).  To meet the requirements of scientific reproducibility, these hypotheses 
need to incorporate Popper’s concept of falsification (Popper, 1968), the idea that a 
hypothesis can be proven to be false, thereby advancing one’s knowledge of the subject.  
Typically a null hypothesis is formed and controlled tests are performed to identify the 
circumstances under which it can be proven to be false.  The concept of reproducibility also 
applies to evidence prepared for criminal proceedings. 
Practitioners tendering digital evidence must expect to defend their findings and disclose 
enough detail to enable an opposing expert to verify and possibly provide an alternative 
explanation for an artefact.  One technique used by practitioners to mitigate against any such 
challenges is to compare the findings of one tool with those of another tool. 
This technique is promoted as a tenet of forensic computing (Beckett, 2010).  Practitioners 
refer to this technique as dual-tool verification.  One forensic provider states “Dual-tool 
verification can confirm result integrity during analysis” (Forensic control, 2011).  This is a 
bold claim and is open to challenge if a third tool or manual inspection of the raw data 
identify a discrepency.  Another provider makes the less radical claim that the forensic 
software products EnCase and FTK “allow for a dual-tool approach for the verification of 
findings” (Cy4or, 2009).  As before, no scientific studies or supporting evidence are cited.  A 
third example is a freelance forensic investigator also states on his website in relation to tool 
validation, “I don't validate my tools - I validate my results. Generally I do this with dual tool 
verification” (Drinkwater, 2009).  This statement is contradictory as a second tool is used to 
check the results of another. 
This form of verification falls short of the scientific practice of verification.  Even if the 
definition of verification is limited to a simple comparison, there is no documented record of 
the notion that two tools can make the same error (Beckett & Slay, 2007). This could arise, 
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for example, by using the same underlying Windows API call.  Under these circumstances, 
the designs of both tools are subject to the same erroneous assumption (Sommer, 2010).  
Dual-tool verification cannot confirm a result, but it can corroborate it on a statistically 
insignificant scale.  The main benefit in applying a dual-tool approach is in identifying 
discrepancies in results (Turner, 2008), thereby highlighting the need for closer analysis.  An 
example of this is in the trial of Casey Anthony [2011] who was charged with the murder of 
Caylee Marie Anthony in Orlando, Florida.  During this trial a discrepancy was identified 
between two Internet history tools used to produce expert testimony.  As a result of this 
discovery, the developer of one of the tools corroborated the tool’s output by reverting to the 
underlying raw data and interpreting the data manually (Wilson, 2011).  Although good 
practice, this step is not without bias on the part of the developer towards defending his code 
and commercial product.  Ideally, an independent party unaware of the expected outcome 
should have undertaken this step.  
The acceptance of a tool or methodology sanctioned by others is common practice in both 
legal and scientific circles.   In judicial processes, legal precedent can be cited from prior 
cases where techniques have been admitted into proceedings.  Scientific work advances by 
citing and carefully extending through hypotheses a previously established body of 
knowledge.  The difference arises in how these precedents are determined and hence 
accepted. 
1.1.6 Acceptance of fact 
Kritzer (2009) argues scientific and legal inquiry differ in how they persuade and hence 
accept propositions.  He argues that the scientific tenet of general acceptance and peer review 
is advanced through repeated attempts to falsify a hypothesis. Truth, he continues, in a 
scientific context is complex and elusive and can only be approached by a process of 
eliminating falsehoods.  This differs to truth as applied within the legal context, which is 
revealed through the adversarial process.   
In accepting a given truth, the legal enquirer values certainty, whilst the scientist values doubt 
and scepticism, argues Marsico (2004).  He goes on to state that if justice is blind, then it will 
“blindly follow evidence presented as truth”. Judges, he continues, whose role should be 
limited to evaluating the admissibility of evidence, are actually empowered to evaluate the 
credibility of scientific evidence.  It can be argued that this power combined with the trust 
given to an expert’s testimony has contributed to the problems identified in section 1.1.3. 
The Daubert test in the USA, developed from Daubert v Merrell  [1993], seeks to provide a 
framework to assist the judiciary in evaluating scientific evidence.  Critics of this system 
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argue that it is flawed, as it is reliant on the existence of a “scientific community” when there 
is none for computer forensics (Marsico, 2004).  
Beckett (2010) identifies the Latin terms Ad populum “appeal to the people” and consensus 
gentium “agreement of the people” to describe arguments that are flawed on the basis that 
they are believed by a large number of people.  Citing Appel and Pollitt (2005), Beckett 
questions whether the consensus of the community can be trusted with a largely non-graduate 
educated scientific community in law enforcement. 
Similar consensus gentium arguments are adopted by the vendor community who promote the 
acceptance of their software as it holds a vast market presence.  In their Legal Journal (2011) 
Guidance Software state they have evaluated their forensic software product (named EnCase) 
against the Daubert test.  In addressing the general acceptance criteria of this test, they argue 
that with more than 30,000 licensed users their product is generally accepted.  
Van Buskirk & Liu (2006) argue that statements such as these lead to a tendency within the 
judicial system to presume forensic software is reliable.  In their discussion, they identify 
issues, which they argue are indicative of reliability issues with the software.  In response to 
this, Limongelli (2008) of Guidance Software defends the reliability of the software by citing 
Williford v State of Texas [2004], where it was concluded by the court that the EnCase 
software is reliable.  However, closer examination of this case reveals that this conclusion 
was made on the basis of the anecdotal testimony of a single police officer and therefore not 
based on a generally accepted scientific process.   
Limongelli goes on to cite Sanders v State [2006], where it was concluded that once the 
scientific reliability of a specific methodology is determined, “other courts may take judicial 
notice” of the result.  The impact of such a decision within the jurisdiction where it applies is 
that this forensic product is prone to being accepted without due consideration to the impact 
of changes in the software version or bugs and/or errors that arise due to the environment 
where it is applied. 
However, Carrier (2002) distinguishes between acceptance of a tool and acceptance of a 
procedure.  He argues that in the absence of any published procedure detail, the choice of 
forensic tool from the limited range available will likely be based on non-procedural factors 
such as interface and support.  He concludes therefore, that the size of the user community is 
not a valid measure of procedural acceptance. 
Sommer (2010) identifies how, through the application of Part 33.6 of the Criminal Procedure 
Rules (2015), just two individuals (the opposing experts in a case) can accept novel scientific 
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evidence as “sufficient” for the case without committing to a more “universal” finding.  This 
procedure is one example of the practice where for the purpose of addressing specific matters 
at hand, practitioners “ignore the evidence of falsification” (Saks & Faigman, 2008).  A more 
conservative view on this is offered by Beach (2010) who suggests falsification is not treated 
by practitioners operating within the legal arena in the same way as scientists as the concept 
of truth differs between the  science and legal profession.  Within the bounds of a single case, 
truth is deemed static and not open to be re-evaluated.  Denning (2005) argues this acceptance 
of untested theories is a wider problem within the computer science community as a whole, 
citing a study by Tichy (1998) that found approximately 50% of computer science papers 
published prior to 1995 had proposed models or hypotheses that were untested. 
  
1.1.7 Emerging statutory requirements 
In response to these miscarriages of justice, a UK Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) was 
appointed in 2008 with a remit to manage standards applicable to both scientific processes 
and individual competence (Sommer, 2011).  The FSR is also responsible for developing 
guidelines for validating new developments. 
The following year a European Union Council Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA 
(European Union, 2009) was passed on the subject of “accreditation of forensic service 
providers carrying out laboratory activities” relating to DNA and fingerprinting provision 
which declared that: 
“Member States shall ensure that their forensic service providers carrying out 
laboratory activities are accredited by a national accreditation body as 
complying with EN ISO/IEC 17025” 
The FSR took this decision and broadened it to encompass all forensic service provision 
within the UK in their ‘Codes of Practice and Conduct’ (Forensic Science Regulator, 2011).  
This document aligns itself to the laboratory standard BS EN ISO/IEC17025:2005 (ISO, 
2005).  The UK Government has since sought to put the Codes of Practice on a statutory basis 
and provide investigative powers to the FSR for quality failures (Home Office, 2013).  By 
October 2017 all digital forensic service providers (including those based within UK police 
forces) are required to be accredited (House of Commons, 2016). 
In addition to the above, a survey for the Chatham House report entitled Cybersecurity and 
the UK's Critical National Infrastructure (Cornish, Livingstone, Clemente & Yorke, 2011) 
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found that the participants agreed that for cybercrime: “Any analyses carried out must be 
subject to validation for appropriateness, completeness and accuracy.” 
1.1.8 Summary 
Given the reasons for the appointment of a Forensic Science Regulator and approaching 
statutory standards, it can be argued that the issues identified currently undermine the trust 
that can be placed in findings tendered in criminal proceedings. 
The production of electronic evidence therefore requires the use of reliable tools and 
competent operators.  This research explores both areas and focuses on the trust placed in the 
tools used. 
1.2 Research Question 
The previously identified miscarriages of justice, emerging regulatory controls, ethical 
considerations and a desire to promote awareness of the need to test the limits of tools and 
their results have led to the formulation of the following question in the context of malware 
forensics:  
Can a systematic basis for trusted practice be established for evaluating malware 
artefact detection tools used within a forensic investigation? 
In order to address this question fully, it is helpful to formulate a series of specific, more 
focused, sub-questions: 
1. To what extent is there a case for a lack of trusted practice? 
2. What are the requirements for evaluating malware artefact detection tools? 
3. Do the conditions under which tools and malware operate have an effect on 
the ability to observe malware behaviour? 
4. Are observations of malware behaviour impacted by the practitioner’s choice 
of tool? 
5. What factors can be used to evaluate the performance of the methodology 
and hence identify areas of improvement. 
Commencing with the first question above, the definition of trusted practice used within this 
research is derived from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (2015), who state that expert 
evidence must be reliable, in other words trustworthy.  They go on to describe a characteristic 
of reliable expert evidence as having a “scientific basis”.  Furthermore, they also stipulate that 
reliable evidence should be such that it can be “reviewed by others”, i.e.: is repeatable and 
reproducible.  Hence the trusted practice in this context is deemed to be one that produces 
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evidence through a scientific methodology.  Repeatability and reproducibility are just two of 
several hallmarks of the scientific method.  Others include falsifiability, whereby a hypothesis 
is testable; controllability such that a single variable can be manipulated; and unbiased 
(Peisert & Bishop, 2007).  These are listed in Table 1-1. 
# Scientific method attribute 
1 Repeatability 
2 Reproducible 
3 Testable hypothesis 
4 Controllable 
5 Unbiased 
    Table 1-1 : Attributes of the scientific method 
It is helpful therefore, to establish to what extent there is a case to answer for a lack of trusted 
practice.  Consequently, current practice within the field of digital forensics, and more 
specifically within cases involving malware, is reviewed.  
Furthermore, given the focus of the research question is the evaluation of software tools, then 
the current practice and requirements for this are also reviewed (question 2 above).  To 
address any doubt that may be introduced as a result of operating such tools in a malware 
environment (thereby impacting on the trust placed in them), a study to explore the effect of 
different operating conditions is also undertaken (question 3 above).  By subjecting different 
tools to such scrutiny, the practitioner will be able to compare the observations reported by 
different tools, thereby informing their decision in the choice of tool to use (question 4 
above).  Finally, the methodology identified to address the above questions should itself be 
subject to review and critical reflection to identify areas of improvement (question 5 above). 
The principal themes of the research question are the concepts of trusted practice, tool 
evaluation and forensic investigation.  Therefore, these elements inform the underlying 
direction of the research and together with the sub-questions above, have been used to derive 
a series of research goals, see Table 1-2.  The chapters that address these goals are shown in 
the right-hand side of the table. 
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Goal Sub-questions Description See Chapter 
1 1 Determine if there is a problem with a lack 
of trusted practice in malware forensics 
2 
2 2 Identify the requirements for a solution 3 
3 3,4,5 Develop a methodology for evaluating 
malware artefact detection tools 
4 
Table 1-2 : Research Goals 
 
1.3 Research Contribution 
By achieving the goals listed above, the key contributions of this research are: 
1. Confirmation for case for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware forensics  
2. A set of requirements for establishing trusted practice in the use of malware artefact 
detection tools 
3. An extensible framework to increase the level of confidence in the use of tools 
applied to malware analysis 
4. Empirical evidence identifying the optimal execution time for a given tool when 
observing malware artefacts 
5. Empirical evidence that the choice of tool can impact on the number of artefacts 
observed 
6. Empirical evidence of the performance of this framework. 
7. A systematic methodology for practitioners to specify operating parameters (such as 
how long the tool must be run for) when obtaining new or unfamiliar tools. 
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The following have been identified as potential beneficiaries of this research: 
Table 1-3 : Potential beneficiaries of the research 
 
 
  
Who Perceived benefits 
Practitioners • Road map of current state of research in field 
• Framework to empirically evaluate tools 
• Quantifiable means to compare tools 
• Ability to make informed decisions on choice of tool 
for malware analysis 
• Ability to customise test environment to evaluate a tool 
under different conditions 
Academics • Identification of key research groups and areas for 
academics seeking to undertake a further research 
• Supporting data for any subsequent research 
• Identification of risks/caveats in the research field 
Criminal Justice  
System 
 
• Cite gaps through authorities in field  
• Empirical data to validate methodology 
• Inform on the admissibility of evidence 
Public • Potential to reduce miscarriages of justice 
Software vendors • Identify gaps supported by authorities in field 
• Framework to test products against 
• Provide scientific underpinning to products 
Forensic Regulator / 
Standards bodies 
• Identify gaps supported by authorities in field 
• Empirical data to validate methodology 
• Methodology to inform testing/evaluation of tools 
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1.4 Research strategy 
The research process selected for this thesis largely follows the five-stage Action Research 
process (Cottrell, 2014, p. 102).  Cottrell states this research method is a valid approach that 
can be undertaken by “practitioners into an area related to their own work”.  The following is 
a brief description of each of the steps involved in Action Research as employed in this 
research.  
a. identifying a research question (diagnosing).  This process was largely exploratory in 
nature, where the research problem was articulated from gaps in available literature, 
regulatory requirements, presentations, blogs and discussions with peers within the 
digital forensic community and criminal justice system, etc. This step sought to 
answer research sub-questions 1 and 2 (see Section 1.2).  
b. developing an action plan (action planning).  This initially involved the development 
of a realistic timeline for each task that would eventually lead to answering the 
research questions identified in (a) above.  Much of the development stage concerned 
identifying the components of the framework and determining how they would 
interoperate (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). 
c. implementing the plan (action taking).  This stage involved the instantiation of the 
framework through the development of the code that forms the components identified 
in (b).  In parallel to the code development, links were established to the malware 
source and online malware analysis providers to determine how the code would 
interface to their systems (see section 4.3). 
d. gathering and analysing the data (observing). Data in (c) above was collected and 
analysed to provide empirical evidence to test the research hypothesis. Steps (b), (c), 
and (d) all contribute to providing an insight into the solutions of research sub-
questions 3, 4 and 5 (see Section 1.2). 
e. reflecting on the findings of the investigation (evaluating).  The results of step (d) 
were used to further draw a conclusion on the significance of the contribution this 
thesis makes to tool evaluation in a malware forensic context.  
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1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 surveys related literature and identifies the relatively small amount of groundwork 
that has begun to emerge to establish digital forensics on a scientific footing.  However, there 
is little empirical research to underpin malware forensic practice, which is based upon 
anecdotal and ad-hoc processes.  The chapter closes with a review of tool evaluation methods. 
Chapter 3 examines the gap between the state of the art in malware forensic practice and the 
technical, legal and regulatory requirements of such a process operating within the Criminal 
Justice system of the UK.  The chapter closes with a series of requirements reflecting the 
disparity between current and required practice. 
Chapter 4  opens with the aims of the design and proceeds to identify the main components of 
the framework to address the previously identified gap.  The latter half of the chapter 
examines the implementation of the framework and proposes a testing and analysis strategy. 
Chapter 5  reports on the results of a series of experiments conducted using the implemented 
framework.  An analysis and discussion section follows where it is found that the both the 
length of execution time and choice of tools impacts on the number of artefacts observed. 
Chapter 6  evaluates the framework from a number of different perspectives.  Early on in the 
chapter, an evaluation against the requirements and aims is undertaken. Performance is also 
evaluated, looking at the speed and resource utilisation.  How well the framework addresses 
the research question is also evaluated.  The chapter closes by identifying the limitations of 
the framework and then leading into further work proposals.  
Chapter 7  presents the conclusions of the research and in doing so, offers a critique of the 
thesis itself.  The contributions are identified before the chapter closes with a summary of the 
proposed further work.   
Chapter 2  - Literature search  Page 31  
 
Chapter 2  Literature search 
 
Chapter 1 outlined a number of issues that undermine the trust placed in forensic evidence.  A 
greater confidence in the tools used in practice is required as the discipline moves towards 
increased regulation (see section 1.1.7).   
In order to understand the context of where these tools are used and help identify the steps 
needed to address the trust issue, this background chapter is divided into three principal 
sections.  The first of these provides a review of digital forensic practice and identifies a 
relatively small amount of groundwork that has begun to emerge to establish digital forensics 
on a scientific footing.  The second section argues that there is even less empirical research to 
underpin malware forensic practice, which is based upon anecdotal and ad-hoc processes.  
The chapter closes with a review of tool evaluation methods. 
2.1 Digital Forensic practice workflow 
Digital forensic practice is a relatively young field and like any fledging field of study, it has 
attracted a number of attempts to model it.  Pollitt (2007) provides a useful summary of 
several early process models.  Among these the 2001 Digital Forensics Research Workshop 
(DFRWS) was one of the first significant initiatives to define the discipline by academics and 
practitioners alike.  With over 300 citations in 15 years (Google, 2016a) it resulted in a six-
stage process describing the entire lifecycle of a computer forensic investigation (Palmer, 
2001).  Carrier’s abstraction model (Carrier, 2003) is also widely cited (Google, 2016b);  it 
uses abstraction layers to form a model for digital data being examined during forensic 
analysis at a high level.   Alongside the input and output data of each layer, Carrier argues 
there is also a ‘Rule Set’ that defines the interpretation of the layer together with a ‘Margin of 
Error’, see Figure 2-1. Carrier provides an example of binary input data that has an ASCII 
mapping rule set applied to it.  The output of this would be the alphanumeric representation of 
the data.  This, he argues, could then be fed into another layer.  If the data were the contents 
of an HTML document, then the alphanumeric characters would become the input along with 
the HTML specification as a rule set to produce a formatted document as an output.  Carrier 
(2006) subsequently used abstraction layers to model a digital forensic investigation using 
finite state machine theory. 
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Figure 2-1 : Abstraction layer inputs and outputs, adapted from Carrier (2003) 
 
Carrier’s model has been criticised by Flandrin et al. (2014) as being too complex to 
implement as an “extensive digital forensics knowledge of the internals of the tool” would be 
needed but most tools used are closed source. 
More recently, Raghaven (2012) has provided a series of taxonomies that summarise the field 
from different perspectives, including attempts at modelling the forensic process.   
Kaur & Kaur (2012) suggest that despite the variety of models proposed, many of them are 
ad-hoc and hence have not been adopted by the practicing community.  However, they do not 
elaborate on why they deem them to be ad-hoc.  Brown (2010) suggests the lack of adoption 
by the community may be the result of the need for practitioners to adapt their workflow to be 
“general enough to be useful in an array of situations” and the fear of being challenged in 
court for not following a Standard Operating procedure (SOP). Vincze (2016) describes how 
this remains an open problem by citing Casey (2011a) and Pollitt (2010), pointing out that 
“after decades of discussion, the debate continues”.  This echoes the view that to date that an 
adopted comprehensive digital investigation process model simply “does not exist” 
(Montasari, Peltola & Evans, 2015). 
Despite this claim, Kent et al. (2006) previously published a report on behalf of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in which a four-stage process model was 
presented.  The fact that a standards body has produced the model may bridge the gap 
between the academic and practitioner community and therefore increase the likelihood of it 
being adopted in practice.  It is perhaps for this reason that Zareen et al. (2013) give more 
emphasis to this model in terms of coverage over others and describes this model as an 
“established” procedure “accepted the world over”, see Figure 2-2.   
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Figure 2-2 : NIST Digital Forensic procedure, adapted from Zareen et al.  (2013) 
In the United Kingdom, there is a move to adopt the ISO 17025 Standard (ISO, 2005), which 
is incorporated into the Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016).  
Given the lack of consensus within the community it is not a surprise to note that the 
Regulator has laid down no formal model or recommended methodology for the discipline.  
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) published their updated standard operating 
procedures for conducting digital forensics investigations in February 2016 (OLAF, 2016).  
These guidelines are aimed at OLAF staff and agencies operating on their behalf.  
Furthermore, their focus is somewhat high level and designed to help ensure compliance with 
data protection provisions in the context of digital forensic operations.  The only other 
guidelines applicable to practice in the UK are the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital 
Evidence (Williams, 2012).  This document provides a recommended methodology for the 
acquisition of digital evidence, but not for the process as a whole.   
Kipling (2012) again echoes the lack of a standardised methodology for conducting a digital 
forensic investigation. However, unlike others, she extends this observation to the absence of 
a methodology for “searching for malware”.  She argues that existing methodologies focus on 
the defendant’s “actions on the computer to prove intent”, i.e.: mens rea.  This corresponds to 
the Analysis stage of the NIST procedure (see Figure 2-2) where the overall objective is to 
label evidence as either exculpatory or inculpatory.  Kipling points out that methodologies 
that focus on user activity are too limited in their scope where malware is involved. There is a 
requirement to differentiate the actions of a user with those of malware and to take into 
account anti-forensic measures such as tampering with file timestamps that may have 
occurred.   Approaches to this requirement will be explored in the next section.  
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2.2 Forensic analysis in a malware environment 
Malware analysis is typically undertaken by security researchers and generally seeks to 
answer one or more of four questions: can it be detected (Huda et al., 2016); can it be 
classified (Daly & Burns, 2010); can its behaviour be understood enough to comprehend its 
objective(s) (Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011); or can it be neutralised (Morales, Sandhu & Xu, 
2010).  The strategy taken to analyse malware is largely divided into static or dynamic 
analysis (Egele, Scholte, Kirda & Kruegel, 2012), whilst others adopt a hybrid approach of 
both (Shijo & Salim, 2015).  Egele et al. also identify three platforms for implementing such 
analysis; namely bare metal, virtualisation and emulation, see Figure 2-3.  
 
Figure 2-3 : Malware analysis - Aims & strategies 
A bare metal platform is one where the operating system on which the analysis is to be 
performed is installed on physical machine (like a regular desktop computer).  Malware 
analysis performed on a bare metal platform is the most authentic, as it most closely reflects 
what would happen on a computer, once infected with malware. 
On a virtualisation platform the privileged state of the physical machine (akin to root 
permissions access to hardware resources) is not directly accessible to a virtual machine 
running on the platform.  A Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) manages access to these 
resources.  Furthermore, both the host and guest machines must have same underlying 
instruction set architecture, such as the Intel based x86 or x64 instruction set (Intel, 2016). 
An emulation platform allows for the host and guest architectures to be different.  This means 
that a guest computer that uses a different underlying instruction set architecture, such as an 
older Apple Mac based PowerPC , could be hosted by a computer running the Windows 
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operating system.  Also, the host machine has full control over what the guest can see, so the 
analysis tools can remain undetected from the malware.  However, some malware can detect 
the side-effects of emulation, such as the features of an imperfectly emulated CPU (Egele, 
Scholte, Kirda & Kruegel, 2012).  These three implementation strategies are covered in more 
detail in section 2.2.4. 
From a forensic investigation perspective, the review of the literature has uncovered little 
published material documenting the procedure for conducting a malware forensic 
investigation or indeed for evaluating the tools to do so. The use of malware forensics is cited 
by Kim et al. (2014) who present a model to investigate fraud using “malware forensic” 
techniques.  General acceptance of the term is demonstrated by the fact that it is emerging 
within other sectors, such as education.  Techniques such as gamification are being deployed 
to teach malware forensics as part of a wider digital forensics course (Pan, Schwartz & 
Mishra, 2015).  Shosha et al. (2013) present an automated approach to reconstruct forensic 
actions from low-level code and determine a suspect program’s behaviour using a state 
analysis approach.  Their approach uses finite state machine theory and claims to be 80% 
effective at identifying the actions of malware. However, their evaluation of this approach is 
unclear; but seems to be reliant on the ability to reverse engineer the malware to determine 
how closely the predicted actions follow the underlying code.  Furthermore, no account for 
the changeable nature of malware appears to have been considered. 
This changeable nature issue is address by Provataki and Katos (2013) whose malware 
forensics framework extends the functionality of the Cuckoo sandbox (Cuckoo Foundation, 
2016) and provides a means to execute malware multiple times across different environments 
to gather an overall picture of it’s modus operandi.  The framework is designed to provide 
damage assessment following a malware breach and includes empirical results.  However, its 
purpose is to evaluate malware behavior and not to evaluate the tools used to study such 
behavior. 
Published strategies for performing malware analysis in support of law enforcement are few 
and far between. Ianelli et al. (2007) offer a discussion on the topic and suggest that the 
presence of malware can be addressed by examination of the network traffic logs.  However, 
this suggestion assumes that such logs are more likely to be found in a corporate than 
domestic environment.  Hence, a suspect accused of committing an offence via their home 
router will typically have far fewer logs and/or detail to assist their defense than in a 
commercial environment with what would likely be more sophisticated logging available.  
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Malin et al. (2008) present one of the few books on malware forensics, more recently split 
into separate Windows (2012) and Linux (2013) editions.  Carvey (2012) also provides some 
coverage of the topic across two chapters from an investigative perspective, as part of a more 
general digital forensics discussion.  Each of these texts presents a collection of tools and 
techniques to address various aspect of analysis, but none attempt to develop and evaluate a 
general-purpose framework for malware analysis. 
Notwithstanding this lack of a framework, Malin et al. does suggest five broad phases to a 
forensic investigation involving malware that is clearly aimed at the practitioner.   
• Phase 1 : Forensic preservation and examination of volatile data 
• Phase 2 : Examination of memory 
• Phase 3 : Forensic Analysis: Examination of hard drives 
• Phase 4 : Static analysis of malware 
• Phase 5 : Dynamic analysis of malware 
Malin et al. take the view that, “within each of these phases formalized methodologies and 
goals are emphasized”.  Taking Phase 4 as an example they present a file profiling 
methodology as a static analysis approach to studying malware, see Figure 2-4.  However, 
they offer no provenance on the methodology, no evaluation against any alternatives, nor any 
argument why this particular approach was selected. 
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Figure 2-4 : Steps in the File Profiling Process, adapted from Malin et al. (2008) 
Despite these shortcomings (and in the absence of viable alternatives), this structure was used 
as a starting point to divide up the discipline into different topics, as applied to evaluating the 
tools used in a forensic investigation involving malware.  The remainder of this section has 
been divided into subsections to consider the viability of each of these phases to the aims of 
the Research Question in section 1.2.  Phases 1 and 2 are quickly dismissed as not being 
viable, given the challenges and resources available within the context of the PhD.  A 
crowded research space, such as Farely (2015) who presents a method to perform automated 
forensic analysis of malware and Kim et al. (2014) who use automated malware forensic 
techniques to detect financial transaction anomalies, dismisses Phase 3, whilst Phase 4 is 
similarly dismissed on the grounds that such tools are unlikely to be used owning to the 
additional skills (such as assembly language and reverse engineering) needed to interpret their 
results.  A lack of support for a command-line interface and hence scripting capability also 
led to issues with automation of such tools.  This contributed to the decision to discount 
implementing this phase in the approach to this PhD.  The final phase proposed by Malin et 
al. is a more viable option for this PhD and is therefore given greater coverage in section 
2.2.4.  
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2.2.1 Phases 1 and 2: Preservation, volatile data and memory 
Arguably there is some overlap between some of the phases of this approach.  For example, 
elements of what you might expect to be in the preservation of volatile data (such as 
recording network port activity in Phase 1) would also be present in the dynamic analysis of 
malware, where the malware file is executed and studied (Phase 5).  Similarly, purists may 
argue that an examination of memory (Phase 2) should encompass both volatile data (secured 
in Phase 1) and paged memory, hibernated code or even crash dumps, all of which are to be 
found on storage media (Phase 3). 
Given these overlaps and the ephemeral nature of RAM data, the first two phases of the 
approach identified by Malin et al. have been excluded, on the basis that it is more 
challenging evaluating tools to meet the aims of the Research Question in section 1.2.  In 
addition, the nature of RAM acquisition brings challenges to the repeatability and 
reproducibility of its acquisition, thereby falling short of a scientific method, as defined in this 
research (see Table 1-1).  Furthermore, Malin et al. present the first phase very much from an 
incident response (as opposed to a forensic investigation) perspective. 
The remaining three phases are therefore all plausible candidates for the focus of this 
research.  What follows if a brief review of each of these. 
 
2.2.2 Phase 3: Forensic Analysis Examination of hard drives 
The third phase is aligned to a conventional digital forensic examination workflow and 
according to Malin et al., is concerned with the use of more established forensic analysis 
tools, such as EnCase.  Thus, temporal analysis of artefacts in the form of timelines can be 
generated.  
Malin et al. present an anecdotal methodology for this phase (see Figure 2-5) that they state 
“provides the greatest chance of finding the majority of evidence relating to malware on a 
computer”.  With no supporting evidence to back up this claim, it is presented very much as 
practitioner guidelines, rather than a scientifically tested and evaluated process.  Furthermore, 
no discussion on the order of the process steps shown in Figure 2-5 is presented, leaving the 
reader uncertain of any dependencies and thus the impact of changing this order.  Some steps 
(such as searching for known malware) would need to take place before others (such as 
inspecting an executable), whilst steps such as reviewing user accounts would not. 
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Implementation 
The steps presented by Malin et al. in Figure 2-5 can largely be completed using dedicated 
forensic analysis software, such as EnCase or SleuthKit.  As Malin et al. point out, there are 
steps in this phase where the practitioner is obligated to use tools not designed for forensic 
use:  
“The increasing use of malware to commit and conceal crimes is compelling more digital 
investigators to make use of malware analysis techniques and tools that were previously the 
domain of antivirus vendors and security researchers”.  
This practice of filling the void left by the dedicated forensic tools by using tools not designed 
for use in a forensic context is also recognised by Beckett (2007).  It presents an opportunity 
to challenge the integrity of the evidence produced using such tools.  
Tool evaluation opportunities 
To consider the inclusion of tools from this phase to be evaluated as part of this research, the 
ability to apply a high degree of automation to use of the tool was considered.  To form 
generalisations from statistical analysis, a high level of automation is required to gather 
sufficient quantities of data. Some tools/tasks are difficult to automate, as they require a 
degree of human interpretation.  For example, due to the transitional portfolio of software that 
is available to install, any scripted process to “Review Installed Programs” as indicated by 
Malin et al. in Figure 2-5 is likely to be quickly out of date.  Furthermore, attempts to 
evaluate tools that “Inspect Executables” face similar challenges in that where the files being 
inspected are malicious they will nearly always be obfuscated and designed to misdirect any 
analysis.  Bayer et al. (2006) point out that malware authors deliberately write their code to 
“thwart both the disassembly and code analysis”; others have presented similar views 
(Wagener, Dulaunoy & Engel, 2008) (Sikorski & Honig, 2012).   
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Figure 2-5 : Uncovering malware trace evidence, adapted from Malin et al. (2008) 
Furthermore, referring to Figure 2-5, the tasks to automate the various review steps, such as 
scheduled jobs or log files and applications set to start automatically on boot, can all easily be 
scripted within tools such as EnCase. However, it is much harder to automate any 
interpretation of the results to differentiate between the suspicious and the benign. 
Consideration was given to evaluating anti-malware scanners, which could conceivably be 
easily automated.  This idea was abandoned due to the level of work underway by other 
groups, such as Harley (2012) who discusses standards for testing anti-malware products; 
Košinár et al. (2010) who discuss an anti-malware testing methodology; as well as Shijo and 
Salim (2015) who present a combination of both static and dynamic analysis techniques to 
detect malware.  Harley (2012) also takes the view that not all of these groups are proficient 
in scientific testing methodologies.  The testing itself, he contends, is largely carried out 
and/or interpreted for wider dissemination by non-specialists.  Potter and Day (2009) present 
a discussion on the effectiveness of anti-malware testing (but provide no empirical data to 
support their position). This is in contrast to Sukwong et al. (2011) whose empirical study of 
six anti-malware products applied two stages of evaluation: file signature and behavior 
analysis.  Corregedor and Von Solms (2012) meanwhile, compare nine commercial anti-
malware products, which they evaluate against a series of requirements as part of a 
framework.  They conclude all nine products tested have several vulnerabilities that need to 
be addressed.  Ford and Carvalho (2014) share the concern for the lack of science in the 
testing anti-malware products by stating this deficiency actually “harms the industry”.  
In conclusion, the best opportunities for tool evaluation in this phase are limited to anti-
malware tools, but this area is somewhat crowded with a number of active research groups.  
Therefore, attention is turned to the fourth phase, the static analysis of malware.  
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2.2.3 Phase 4: Static analysis of malware 
Malin et al. describe the fourth phase as being the static analysis of malware.  The steps they 
identify for this phase are illustrated in Figure 2-4.  As previously stated, they do not provide 
any evaluation of these steps nor suggest any alternatives.  Similar criticisms can be levied 
against the process proposed by Elisan (2015) who defines static analysis as the process of 
collecting information from the file while it is not running.  From an investigative 
perspective, this is largely a metadata analysis that is akin to a forensic examination of the 
paper, ink, fibres and postmark of a physical suspect letter.  Elisan provides a breakdown of 
the “basic steps and techniques” that are needed to conduct an “effective static analysis”:   
• ID assignment 
• File type identification 
• Antivirus detection 
• Protective mechanisms identification 
• Portable Executable (PE) structure verification 
• Strings analysis 
• Static code analysis 
As with Malin et al., there is a lack of clarity on any dependencies that may (or may not) be 
present in this process.  A detailed comparison of these two approaches is outside the scope of 
this literature review, since the focus is on identifying the opportunities to evaluate the tools 
involved. 
Implementation 
A study by Namanya et al. (2015) evaluated three static analysis tools, namely Mastiff, Pyew 
and PEframe.  They identify these as being the “most popular open source malware static 
analysis tools”, though no supporting data or citation is provided to back up this claim.    
The framework offered by Kipling (2012) provides a methodology to determine if malware is 
or was on a system, from “Indicators of Compromise” (i.e.: artefacts) left behind. Although 
Kipling explicitly states the approach is aimed only at “finding malware”, many of the tools 
she cites (listed in Appendix C of her dissertation) can be used to inform the investigator 
about the behaviour and/or intentions of the malware. 
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Tool evaluation opportunities 
Static analysis is frequently hindered by the use of packers that encrypt a malware binary 
(Raphel & Vinod, 2015).  Hence, one of the first steps required during static analysis is to 
unpack the malware to produce a ‘plain text’ version of the file that can then be analysed.  
This can be done manually, but requires skill (and patience) in low-level assembly language, 
as well as a familiarity with the Portable Execution file format.   
Tools are available to simplify this process, but as Lyda and Hamrock (2006) point out, 
unpacking tools may inadvertently execute the packed code (so precautions need to be made 
in the event the file is malicious) and that many of the unpacking tools are poorly written and 
break due to bugs and errors. 
Furthermore, there are some forms of malware that do not unpack completely as an anti-
forensic measure (Royal, Halpin, Dagon, Edmonds, et al., 2006). Coogan et al. (2009) present 
a solution for unpacking code that has been secured using both custom and commercially 
available packers without executing the malware.  
In addition, it could be argued that findings, such the inclusion of network related dynamic 
link libraries (DLLs) could simply be circumstantial and may not mean that the file under 
analysis is or ever was capable of contacting the Internet, for example.  Malin et al. (2008) 
take this one step further and warn that string information, for example, can often be planted 
to “throw digital investigators off track”.  Knowledge of these caveats have the potential to 
undermine a case that advocates that malware was the cause of the Actus Reus during a trial.   
Regardless of the authenticity of the data examined, Provataki and Katos (2013) provide an 
important observation, particularly applicable to a forensic practitioner perspective.  They 
point out that while static analysis as a process has the potential of completely uncovering a 
malware’s inner structure and characteristics; it also requires extensive expertise, manual 
effort and time to perform.  This, they argue, might not always be feasible to perform due to 
extremely sophisticated obfuscation methods and multilayered packing mechanisms 
embedded within the malicious code.  As a consequence, the likelihood of this approach 
being used by Law Enforcement is arguably, quite small.  Consequently, the requirement to 
evaluate such tools is also small.  Furthermore, the required expertise and manual effort 
reported by Provataki and Katos (2013) inhibit the ability to automate the process and 
determine their reliability.  Executing the malware overcomes many of these issues in that it 
is unpacked and will typically (but not always) create artefacts on the disk and/or network 
that can be observed. 
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2.2.4 Phase 5: Dynamic analysis of malware 
Malin et al. describe their fifth phase as being the dynamic analysis of malware.  They define 
this as “executing the code and monitoring its behavior, including its interaction and effect on 
the host system”.  The definition offered by Egele et al. (2012) extends the interpretation of 
Malin et al. from monitoring to the act of verification of actions as they describe dynamic 
analysis as being “techniques that execute a sample and verify the actions this sample 
performs in practice”.  
The act of executing the malware offers significant advantages over static malware analysis.  
One such advantage is the increase in the speed of analysis (Provataki & Katos, 2013).  As 
argued by Seifert et al. (2007), this is likely to be as a result of how dynamic analysis 
simplifies and automates the analysis process.  Ross (2010) adds that dynamic malware 
analysis does not require specialist skills such as “an extensive understanding of assembler”.  
Elisan (2015) also suggests that such an approach “reveals most of its functionalities”.   
In contrast to Elisan, Provataki and Katos (2013) argue that the behaviour of a malware 
binary may vary subject to the conditions under which it was run and so only a portion of the 
malware’s behavior may be exhibited.  Sikorski and Honig (2012) pick up on this point 
declaring that “not all code paths may execute” when running malware.   
Implementation 
Dynamic malware analysis can be implemented using one of two broad approaches, namely 
transition and state based logging (Liao & Langweg, 2014), see Figure 2-6.  For this 
discussion, they will be referred to as Process states and Snapshots, respectively. 
 
Figure 2-6 : Transition vs State logging, adapted from Liao and Langweg (2014) 
State-based logging periodically samples the state of the system, gathering a much less 
granular record of changes than possible with transition-based logging. Transition-based 
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logging monitors for specific events which are typically more easily recorded. Both 
approaches require deciding in advance on the level of granularity to be recorded. 
Liao & Langweg point out that transition based logging has an advantage over state based 
logging in that if an incident occurs between two snapshots then the trace information for this 
incident will not be missed, as each change would be recorded as a new process state.  An 
example of this would be a file that is created after the initial snapshot, which is then deleted 
before the second snapshot is created. 
Malin et al. refers to these two approaches as Active (Transition based) and Passive (State 
based) monitoring, see Figure 2-7.  
 
Figure 2-7 : Active vs Passive monitoring, adapted from Malin et al. (2008) 
These two approaches follow on from a series of guidelines that Malin et al. recommend be 
followed as part of a dynamic malware process: 
1. Establishing the Environment Baseline  
2. Pre-execution Preparation  
3. Executing the Malicious Code Specimen  
4. System and Network Monitoring  
5. Environment Emulation and Adjustment  
6. Process Spying  
7. Defeating Obfuscation  
8. Decompiling  
9. Advanced PE Analysis 
10. Interacting with and Manipulating the Malware Specimen  
11. Exploring and Verifying Specimen Functionality and Purpose  
12. Event Reconstruction and Artefact Review  
Chapter 2  - Literature search  Page 45  
 
Thus the tools that would apply here would be largely designed to monitor changes to a 
computer system, either in real-time or as a comparison of before and after snapshot (Egele, 
Scholte, Kirda & Kruegel, 2012). 
Unlike previous phases, tools used for dynamic malware analysis also require an environment 
within which to operate.  Referring to Figure 2-3, the implementation strategies available for 
this are bare metal, virtualisation and emulation.  
Bare metal implementations such as Tomlin’s ‘Litterbox’ cited by Willems et al.  (2007) run 
the malware directly on physical hardware to achieve the most realistic conditions possible.  
However, such approaches are resource intensive and parallel processing is limited to the 
number of physical machines available.  Furthermore, the throughput of analysis is limited to 
the time it takes to restore the system to the pre-infection state (Grégio, Afonso, Filho, Geus, 
et al., 2015).  An interesting study named BareBox (Kirat, Vigna & Kruegel, 2011) seeks to 
address these limitations by restoring the entire physical memory of the target operating 
system with a clean one without rebooting the system.  However, according to Grégio et al. 
this approach fails to detect more privileged actions such as drivers loading.  A more efficient 
approach is to use virtualisation instead, as it requires fewer physical machines and can 
achieve greater scalability and throughput.  Furthermore, the time to reset a machine for a 
subsequent analysis is shorter.  
Virtualization is a process that involves simulating parts of a computer's hardware to a point 
where a guest operating system can run unmodified.  Most operations still occur on the real 
hardware for efficiency reasons.  However, both the guest and host operating systems must 
share the same architecture, with the host providing any required backwards compatibility, 
such as a 32-bit operating system hosted by a 64-bit operating system of the same instruction 
set family (Boley, 2014).  As Boley points out, this differs to emulation where the CPU, 
memory and other devices are all emulated in software and have no direct access to the host’s 
hardware.  
Until recently, a criticism of performing malware analysis on a virtual machine (VM) was 
that some malware is VM aware and so would not run in the same way as it would on a 
physical machine Krister (2009).  Martignoni et al. (2009) warned that as a result of using 
“synthetic” environments results would “very likely” be incomplete.  Chen et al. (2008) 
exploited this by implementing fake artefacts on a virtualised guest, thereby protecting it. 
However, following an empirical study comprising of 200,000 malware samples taken from 
2012 to 2014, Wueest (2015) argues that only a small number of these cases detected it was 
running within a VM. 
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This section has explored the process of dynamic malware analysis.  When applied to a digital 
forensic investigation, the Research Question (section 1.2) seeks to establish a methodical 
approach to elevating the level of trust placed in the tools used to perform this analysis.  
Hence a means to evaluate the tools is required. The next section will consider the elements 
that make up the tool evaluation process. 
2.3 Tool evaluation 
Given that forensic practitioners can be called to give evidence under oath of their findings 
and their interpretation of such findings, it is not unusual for practitioners to seek to evaluate 
their tools before trusting them.  However, recall from section 1.1 a variety of problems 
impacting on this trust, including the ad-hoc nature of this process and the need to more 
formally evaluate tools to meet the requirements of the FSR.   
Therefore, this section looks at the definition of tool evaluation, taking into account the 
overarching goals of the research.  It opens with a high level tour of the literature to highlight 
the main approaches and give context to the topic.  Following this, the criteria that can be 
used to determine what successful evaluation ‘looks like’ is discussed.  The benefits, risks and 
challenges of such an activity are also included, as well as a discussion on who is best placed 
to perform the evaluation.  Finally, the section concludes with a more detailed review of 
evaluation methodologies proposed by others.  
2.3.1 What is tool evaluation? 
The evaluation of software is an established process that is embodied in two fundamental 
scientific concepts in software engineering referred to as “Validation & Verification” (V&V), 
succinctly defined by Boehm (1989) to mean: 
• Verification: Are we building the product right? 
• Validation: Are we building the right product? 
It has become common practice for organisations to integrate these models into the normal 
working processes as part of their software development life cycle.  Beckett (2010) cites the 
US Department of Health Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2002) and the Independent 
verification and validation facility for NASA (Asbury, 2015) as just two examples. 
Organisations that develop software will typically have documented procedures in place to 
maintain quality standards within the software development lifecycle from unit testing 
through to product testing. Beckett goes on to argue that despite an increase in the use of 
programming methods (such as agile and eXtreme programming) that incorporate testing as 
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part of the development lifecycle, no evidence of a published testing model could be 
identified for any forensic software product. This follows an earlier publication where Beckett 
& Slay (2007) argued that the evaluation of tools is “widely undocumented, and not proven 
publicly, except through rhetoric and hearsay on the bulletin boards of individual tool 
developers”.  This is in conflict with the repeatability and reproducibility attributes of the 
scientific method (see Table 1-1). They go on to suggest that one reason for this might be the 
difficulty, cost and resource challenges this poses.   
Flandrin et al. (2014) agree with this lack of published material on digital forensic tool 
evaluation, arguing that most of what is published tends to focus on methodologies rather 
than the tools used.  Furthermore, as a result of the literature review, no material at all has 
been identified regarding the evaluation of tools used to investigate malware. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2016a) defines the term ‘evaluate’ as, “To ‘reckon up’, 
ascertain the amount of; to express in terms of something already known”.  The American 
centric Merriam-Webster dictionary (2017) defines the term as, “to determine or fix the value 
of; to determine the significance, worth, or condition of usually by careful appraisal and 
study”.  Both of these definitions make reference to quantifying a value. 
However, simply knowing the value of something related to malware artefact detection tools 
may be insufficient for their use in a legal context. Garfinkel et al. (2009) points out that in 
the USA the legal test that determines the acceptability of a forensic tool is that it must 
“reflect the data accurately”.  Rule 1001(3) of the US Federal Rules of Evidence sets out this 
requirement for accuracy, but does not offer a definition for the term. 
Until its repeal in 1999 by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999) the United 
Kingdom took a similar stance using Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(1984) that stipulated that electronic evidence will not be admissible if it is “inaccurate”.   
This repeal effectively places digital evidence on the same footing as any other form of 
evidence, meaning it is presumed to be valid and thus may be admitted unless evidence to the 
contrary is provided (Lloyd, 2014).    
However, by October 2017 all practitioners operating within the Criminal Justice System in 
the United Kingdom will need to abide by the Forensic Science Regulator’s ‘Codes of 
Practice and Conduct’ (House of Commons, 2013).  These codes include the requirement that 
“measurement based methods” must be “accurate”.  This requirement supports the argument 
of Flandrin et al. (2014) that it is the method and not the tool that must be accurate.  Accuracy 
is defined in the same document as:  
Chapter 2  - Literature search  Page 48  
 
“The closeness of agreement between the mean of a set of results or 
an individual result and the value that is accepted as the true or 
correct value for the quantity measured.” 
Others argue that accuracy is not the only means by which to evaluate digital forensic tools.  
Ayers (2009) includes accuracy amongst seven metrics that are available to measure the 
“efficacy and performance” of digital forensic tools: 
• Absolute speed the time required by the tool to complete a task. 
• Relative speed compares the average processing evidence rate against the rate to read 
data from the original media. 
• Accuracy is the proportion of correct results. 
• Completeness represents the proportion of evidence found from the pool of evidence 
available in the forensics image. 
• Reliability measures how often the tool is likely to fail during an investigation. 
• Auditability defines if the results are fully auditable. 
• Repeatability measures the proportion of tests where the process employed was 
exactly as specified. 
Aside from the connotations of influence and bias in the term “efficacy”, there are 
ambiguities in these definitions provided by Ayers (2009).  For example, it is unclear what is 
meant by “fail” under the term “Reliability” whilst “Repeatability” is defined in terms of the 
similarity of processes, rather than the results.   In addition, neither of the definitions for these 
two terms aligns to the definitions based on the scientific method recognised by the CPS 
(2015), making them unsuitabile for this research.  Furthermore, Flandrin et al. (2014) point 
to the lack of clarity on the meaning of  “correct results” under the metric “Accuracy”.  
Liao & Langweg (2014) offer a review of process activity tracking systems from a forensic 
analysis and forensic readiness perspective.  Classifying the tools reviewed in terms of their 
implementation strategy (e.g.: kernel vs. user space monitoring), they claim to evaluate the 
tools in terms of soundness, completeness, timeliness, and cost of process activity tracking.  
Unfortunately, there is little detail in terms of the results for such analysis included in their 
review. 
One of the more quantifiable attempts to evaluate software tools is offered by Saleem et al. 
(2012) who use ratios of completeness of expected and observed artefacts coupled with 
statistical analysis to evaluate mobile phone acquisition software. This approach is 
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problematic when applied to malware artefact analysis, as the random nature of malware can 
mean that more artefacts are observed than were expected.  This results in ratios (used by 
Saleem et al. to calculate p-values) greater than 1. 
Where tools are used in a live environment, additional metrics related to the impact such a 
tool has on the systems, such as memory footprint, locally changed files, network or registry 
keys should also be considered (Sutherland, Evans, Tryfonas & Blyth, 2008).  Lempereur et 
al. (2010) argue that the metrics considered by Sutherland et al. are “inconsequential” and 
suggest the memory of two virtual machines run in parallel be compared instead, where one 
virtual machine is monitored and one is not.  
Boehm’s V&V concepts (stated above) were formally incorporated into the IEEE 1012-2004 
standard (IEEE, 2005) and subsequently the ISO 17025 (ISO, 2005, p. 17025).  Evaluation by 
V&V can be categorized into two groups: White box testing and Black box testing (Liang, 
2010).  White box testing is appropriate if the individual conducting the test has access to the 
source code.  However, as Liang points out this is not the case for mainstream forensic 
software tools, which are closed source.   
To overcome this problem, Black box testing can be employed to test the functionality of 
such products against expected outcomes.  The Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) 
programme (NIST, 2003b) have developed a series of specifications containing assertions of 
functionality that can be used to evaluate both software and hardware products.   
Forensic processes can be complex in nature and not easy to automate or otherwise define in a 
prescriptive enough way (Ayers, 2009).  Consequently, the processes defined by the CFTT 
project are quite limited in scope, with much of the work focusing on acquisition methods.  It 
is perhaps of little surprise then that much of the literature reflects this with independent 
testing of EnCase imaging (Byers & Shahmehri, 2009), a comparison of the imaging 
functionality of three tools (Cusack & Liang, 2011) and mobile phone acquisition (Kubi, 
Saleem & Popov, 2011). 
A more concerted effort to define the functionality of digital forensic tools is offered by the 
Defence and Systems Institute at the University of South Wales in a series of papers by 
Wilsdon and Slay (2005, 2006), Beckett & Slay (2007), Guo et al. (2009) and Guo & Slay 
(2010c, 2010a, 2010d, 2010b).  Through these publications, this group has attempted to map 
out the functionality of basic forensic processes, such as keyword searching.  However, not 
one of these publications actually implements their proposed framework to evaluate any tools.   
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What seems clear here is that there is no clear consensus in the literature on what tool 
evaluation is in a digital forensic context.   Furthermore, no mention at all has been found to 
defining the concept in a malware analysis context. A way forward from this dilemma might 
be to consider what criteria a digital forensic tool, in particular one used for malware analysis, 
can be assessed against.  
 
2.3.2 What criteria are tools evaluated against? 
The criterion against which digital forensic practice is measured is based on best practice 
guidelines and the international standards that have been produced.  A review of these follows 
below. 
Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) 
The Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) project at the National Institute for Science and 
Technology (NIST, 2003b) has undertaken a number of tests against carefully crafted 
specifications authored by them.  The testing methodology used is developed by a steering 
committee of law enforcement & NIST staff (NIST, 2003a).  Considered by some to be 
rigorous (Liang, 2010), the project has been credited with identifying at least one issue that 
might otherwise have been undisclosed by the vendor concerning the last sector on hard disk 
with an odd number of sectors that was not acquired using the tool dd.  Although 
subsequently found to be a Kernel and not a software tool issue (Flandrin, Buchanan, 
Macfarlane, Ramsay & Smales, 2014), it highlights both the benefits of a thorough testing 
regime and the risk of misinterpreting the results. 
Validity 
One of the biggest drawbacks of the CFTT project concerns its validity.  Critics of the project, 
argue that it is largely focused on acquisition (Guo & Slay, 2010a), (Newsham, Palmer, 
Stamos & Burns, 2007) and Sommer (2010) who points out the tests completed by CFTT are 
but a “tiny subset” of the functionality that needs to be tested.   Dykstra & Sherman (2012) 
agree, adding that in a climate of ever increasing cloud based forensics none of the enterprise 
versions of products (that include remote forensic capabilities) have been tested.  
Furthermore, it is not just the tested functionality of the CFTT project that is considered to be 
too narrow; Guo & Slay (2010c) point to inadequately sized test spaces, where there is a need 
for large reference sets to cater for possibly “thousands” of possible scenarios to validate just 
a single function. 
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Beyond concerns over the scope of what is tested, there are also challenges of validity 
surrounding the timeliness of the test specifications and the tests themselves.  For example, 
the data acquisition specification is in draft and is over ten years old (NIST, 2005).  The 
document states it’s scope is to cover “ATA, SCSI, USB, or Firewire interfaces”.  Therefore, 
no provision is made for more recent technology, such as Solid State Disks.  Furthermore, 
Flandrin et al. (2014) point out that many of the tests performed take too long to publish and 
so are on older, depreciated versions of software. 
Commercial vendors of products tested by the CFTT project seek to minimise the impact of 
this issue.  In 2011 Guidance Software Inc. (GSi), who produce of the forensic 
imaging/analysis application named “EnCase”, stated that the CFTT project demonstrates, 
“rigorous and comprehensive testing” of EnCase 3.20 (Guidance Software Inc., 2011).  The 
test results date from 2003 and the current release is of this product is v7.12.  GSi point out 
that “no substantial changes” to the imaging functionality of the product has taken place since 
v3.20 of the product.  Clearly, there is a potential challenge of bias here that contravenes the 
scientific method (see Table 1-1).  In addition, critics would argue that the meaning of 
‘substantial’ is unclear here.  Furthermore, the software for this functionality may have 
changed little over time, but the hardware it is interacting with has changed significantly.   
 
Field maturity 
The fledging nature of the digital forensics field and its rapid evolution has led to an ad-hoc 
development of the CFTT project.  According to Beckett (2010), the field has not been 
mapped out sufficiently prior to undertaking the project.  
 
Test results 
The overall aim of the CFTT project is to provide feedback to “improve tools” and for users 
to make “informed choices” in selecting a tool (NIST, 2003b).  However, it could be argued 
that the problem with assertion based tool evaluation (as advocated by the CFTT project) is 
that the outcome is either a pass or fail.  Such tests do not inform the reader if it was a bare 
pass or a substantive one (Peisert, Bishop & Marzullo, 2008).  Saleem et al. (2012) make the 
same observation and adds that no “comparative study is conducted to help an investigator in 
selecting a better tool”.  Furthermore, Byers & Shahmehri (2009) point out that results are 
reported without any deeper analysis as to why a given test has failed. 
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Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence  (SWGDE)  
Unlike NIST who developed specifications, plans and assertions, SWGDE have developed a 
more relaxed approach to forensic tool testing by producing test guidelines and templates 
(Liang, 2010).  
However, a significant problem with this approach is that their test results are only available 
to US law enforcement agencies.  Flandrin et al. (2014) point out that this decision is contrary 
to the principle tenet of information sharing in science.  Hence, it could be argued that this 
lack of reproducibility (see Table 1-1) has rendered any results obtained from such tests to be 
non-scientific.  Ironically, the decision also runs contrary to SWGDE’s own advice, 
advocated in one of the few documents they have released publically, where they call for test 
results to be repeatable (SWGDE, 2012). 
Aside from the matter of reproducibility, the reasoning demonstrated by the group may be 
subject to challenge.  SWGDE (2008) have openly stated that in computer forensics “false 
positives are non-existent”.  However, the forensic product EnCase has previously been 
subject to a software bug that resulted in data in the first 4GB of unallocated clusters being 
duplicated (creating false positives) through to the last unallocated cluster (Sanderson, 2008).  
In another example, the Linux version of the EnCase imaging tool (named LinEn) was found 
to “insert sectors into the image that were not present on the drive” (Byers & Shahmehri, 
2009). 
Department of Defence Cyber Crime Center (DC3) 
As with the SWGDE, the DC3 circulate the results of their tool testing only to a closed group 
of individuals and not the wider scientific community, thereby once again rendering the 
scientific validity of such tests open to challenge on the grounds of reproducibility, see Table 
1-1.  A list of tools reportedly tested is published, which include commercial forensic tools 
such as EnCase.  The list of reported versions for this tool includes 7.09.02, 7.08, 7.06, 
7.05.02.03, 6.19.7, 6.18.0.59, 6.15.0.82, 6.13.0.43, 6.11 (DC3, 2016).  This is more 
comprehensive and up to date than the list published by CFTT.  Without access to the results 
or even the testing methodology employed by DC3, the approach is of little value to this 
research project.  
Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) Codes of Practice and Conduct 
As indicated in section 2.1, the United Kingdom is moving to adopt the BS EN ISO/IEC 
17025:2005 Standard (ISO, 2005), referred to hereafter as “the Standard”.  This Standard is 
incorporated into the Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016).   
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Traceability of reference data sets (FSR: 22 | Standard: 5.6)  
Becket (2010) refers to section 5.6.3.2 of the Standard, stating there is a “need” for forensic 
practitioners to demonstrate that “certified reference materials” have been used to evaluate 
their tools.  This is not quite accurate as the same section of the Standard states this should be 
done “where possible”. A small number of attempts over the years have been made by the 
scientific community to address this lack of standardised test data.  However, none of the 
following datasets have been labeled certified. 
To bridge the gap between the tests produced by the CFTT project and the needs of 
practitioners, Carrier developed a series of Digital Forensic Tool Testing (DFTT) images 
(2010).  The datasets are quite old and mostly date from 2003-2005, with one entry for 2006 
and a final entry in 2010.  The approach taken by Carrier is to fabricate the data with 
documented features.  A limitation of this is that variations that arise in normal operation are 
not present in the data (Casey, 2011b). 
A more comprehensive series of test images is provided by NIST for their Computer Forensic 
Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) project (NIST, 2016).  Different groups have developed the 
datasets and the supporting documentation is incomplete in some cases (Casey, 2011b). 
It is argued by others that both the DFTT and the CFReDS projects may be useful for 
teaching but less so for tool testing as not all functionality can be tested and their static nature 
means they cannot be extended (Flandrin, Buchanan, Macfarlane, Ramsay & Smales, 2014). 
Garfinkel et al. (2009) developed an extensive collection of both fabricated and real data, 
captured from physical devices purchased second-hand from around the world.  This material 
is intended to be used for “computer forensics education research” (Digital Corpora, 2017) 
and so is not intended for tool testing.  As before, Casey warns that the supporting 
documentation is incomplete in some cases. 
Further to the cited limitations above, none of the datasets above are specifically known to 
contain malware.  Hence they have not been included in this research.  
Estimate of uncertainty (FSR: 20.18 | Standard:5.4.6) 
In addition to the traceability of reference material, section 20.18 of the Standard states that a 
review of the uncertainty of measurement shall be made when procedures are modified (or 
initiated).  Also, section 25.2.1 (c) states that practitioners who provide reports to the CJS 
should be able to demonstrate the impact that a given measurement uncertainty has on a given 
conclusion.  
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Furthermore, Beckett argues that both the SWGDE and NIST test methodologies “ignore” 
this “critical” element of ISO17025.  He argues that both groups do not provide an estimation 
of uncertainty of measurement.    
Validation of software (FSR: 20.2 | Standard:5.4.5) 
Gallop and Brown (2014) argue that even if forensic labs achieve ISO 17025 accreditation as 
a minimum standard, it is insufficient to service the needs of the CJS. They further argue that 
the FSR is taking a “light touch” to the matter of accreditation.  Qualifying terms such as, 
“where possible” (see above) perhaps evidence this.  They conclude that the FSR Regulator 
“may not be sufficiently stringent” to sufficiently quality assure all forensic science activity. 
Marshall (2010) takes the view that to comply with ISO 17025, an organisation must be in a 
position to demonstrate that their tools, procedures and methods are fit for purpose.  To 
achieve that, he goes on, validation and verification would need to be applied.   Furthermore, 
he argues that validation and verification need clear requirements, which are not properly 
documented anywhere.  
Marshall is also the editor for the more recent ISO 27041 standard (ISO, 2015) which 
proposes using verification, validation and acceptance for evaluating digital forensic software.  
The standard seeks to overcome the problem of digital forensic software developers not 
releasing (or even producing in the first place) formal requirements specifications that would 
facilitate validation testing (Casey, 2012).  The standard places the onus on the developers of 
forensic software to provide evidence that their tools meet the prerequisite requirements set 
by accredited digital forensic laboratories.  Whoever sets the requirements, Flandrin et al. 
(2014) warns that the evolving nature of the field is such that the time to define the 
requirement for a single function “need to be counted in years”. 
With so many issues surrounding the criteria against which forensic software tools would be 
validated, it is worth taking a moment to consider the benefits that stand to be gained as a 
result of such a process. 
 
2.3.3 Benefits of evaluation 
As discussed in section 1.1.2, courts are moving away from a default position of trusting 
expert evidence.  The practice of naïvely accepting anecdotal assertions from experts on tool 
reliability is effectively discouraged by the FSR.  Furthermore, evaluating forensic tools 
should help to minimise flawed technical evidence, as identified in section 1.1.3, providing a 
mechanism for a sitting judge to assess reliability of expert evidence. 
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Providing a more scientific footing for the evaluation of forensic tools, especially if they are 
developed over time, could give evidence of a tool’s reliability.  If such evidence were shared 
amongst the community, this would contribute to a body of knowledge for that tool.  
Moreover, as discussed in section 1.1.5, a clear methodology and record of test results would 
also facilitate the repeatability of a tool’s behaviour under a given set of circumstances. This 
would assist in enhancing the scientific credibility of the tool from the CPS’s perspective, see 
Table 1-1. 
Whilst some testing has been documented for existing forensics tools, nothing has been 
identified for tools used for investigations involving malware. Such tools will be required to 
meet the statutory requirements just as much as conventional forensic tools.  A mechanism to 
evaluate such tools in accordance with the ISO 17025 standard would contribute to 
addressing this gap. 
It has been argued that international standards, such as ISO 17025 which underpin the 
statutory requirements set by the FSR, promote market efficiency and expansion, foster trade, 
encourage competition and lower barriers to market entry (Guttman, 2009).  These 
commercial benefits are perhaps less applicable within the Criminal Justice System, but are 
more relevant between forensic service providers competing for contracts with law 
enforcement agencies.  What is perhaps more important for digital forensic practice as a 
whole, is the need to minimise miscarriages of justice resulting from poor working practices. 
Implementing a tool evaluation strategy is not without its risks and challenges.  The next two 
sections will consider these in brief. 
 
2.3.4 Risks to tool evaluation 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2016b) defines the term risk as being the exposure to “the 
possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation 
involving such a possibility”.  It could be argued here that the loss incurred amounts to 
anything that undermines the credibility of the results.  Perhaps the most significant of these 
is the risk of misinterpreting the true cause of an identified error in a tool’s output.   
Flandrin et al. (2014) cites a test report produced by NIST (2002) that indicated that the data 
acquisition tool dd had been unable to acquire the last sector from a disk containing an odd 
number of sectors.  It transpired subsequently that the cause of this anomaly was not a fault 
with the tool, but with the kernel of the Linux operating system where the test was performed.  
Mitigating against this type of risk is not easy.  For example, consider the possibility of 
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apparently perfect test results arising from a fault in a tool running on such a kernel, whereby 
the last sector acquired was a duplicate of an earlier sector.  The additional sector erroneously 
captured by the tool would cancel out the effect of the missing sector dropped by the kernel 
bug. 
Even if such a risk is mitigated, it is imperative that the individual conducting the test has 
specialist skills to ensure the tests are conducted in a scientifically valid and repeatable 
fashion to ensure consistency (Pan & Batten, 2009).  Lyle (2010) argues that many of the 
procedures followed by practitioners contain errors made that are systematic, rather than 
statistical in nature.  Furthermore, this argument is readily extended to include the reporting 
on the results of the test, which would typically require sufficient statistical skills.    
Deliberate attempts to invalidate the results obtained from tools are an objective for anti-
forensics.  Anti-forensics is the use of techniques to invalidate the findings of a forensic 
investigation.  Hence anti-forensics techniques are a risk to the validity of tool evaluation.  
Shanmugam (2011) considers the impact of such techniques and using a combination of the 
CFTT and DFTT frameworks, he develops a technique to apply what he terms “meta-
forensics” to recognise and thus counter anti-forensic techniques. 
Even if all of the above risks were mitigated, there remain a number of challenges to be faced 
for the evaluation of forensic tools, particularly when applied to a malware investigation 
context.  
2.3.5 Challenges of tool evaluation 
Bias 
The Forensic Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (Forensic Science Regulator, 2016) 
incorporate the principles of the ISO 17025 Standard (ISO, 2005). Section 5.4.5.3 of the 
Standard states that the range and accuracy of values “shall be relevant to the customers' 
needs”.  Hence an element of systematic bias is introduced into the implementation of the 
Standard, thereby opposing one of the attributes of the scientific method (see Table 1-1).  
This drawback is recognised in the Standard as a “balance between costs, risks and technical 
possibilities”.  Section 5.4.5 of the standard outlines the requirement for the testing laboratory 
to perform validation on “non-standard methods, laboratory-designed/developed methods, 
standard methods used outside their intended scope, and amplifications and modifications of 
standard methods”.  The pace of change of the technology surrounding digital data is such 
that this requirement would apply to almost any forensic investigation performed, as tools that 
have yet to be updated are applied to more recent (and untested) forms of the data under 
analysis.   
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Pace of change 
Although this pace of change is high, it is perhaps not as extreme as the rate at which 
malware evolves (Rieck, 2008), (Ashford, 2010).  One report (G Data Software AG, 2016) 
suggests that on “average” a new malware sample is identified at the rate of approximately 
one every six seconds.  Although the report does not make clear what is meant by “average”, 
it can be argued that few if any applications and technologies (such a new social media 
platforms) that need to be analysed for forensic artefacts evolve at such a rate.  It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the tools used to analyse such malware could become deprecated 
equally as quickly. 
It is not just the tool’s capability that may be wanting; with a constantly developing field, 
another challenge faced by the profession is that the testing of such tools typically lags behind 
the current release of a given tool (Flandrin, Buchanan, Macfarlane, Ramsay & Smales, 
2014).  Part of the reason for this maybe the length of time it take to formally publish results 
from such tests (Sommer, 2011).  Another reason may be the sporadic nature of the field’s 
evolution.  
Ad-hoc evolution 
Some consider that the digital forensics field advances in a reactive and not a proactive 
manner and that it is conducted not to develop the field but to “quell criticism over a 
technique’s accuracy” (Cooley, 2004).  Others who suggest that it is crime that drives the 
field and not scientific enquiry echo this viewpoint.  Hence, they argue, digital forensics 
“follows the trend rather than leading it” (Raghavan, 2012). 
Reproducibility 
 
A tenet of a scientific method is that it is reproducible (see Table 1-1).  Wilson & Slay (2006) 
argue that the use of reference sets is “critical” to effectively evaluate a tool’s “correctness”.  
Garfinkel et al. (2009) agree and point out that without reference data sets such 
reproducibility is not possible, as others cannot validate the techniques developed and tested.  
In terms of sourcing the data for such data sets, they go on to warn of the problems of using 
real data, citing issues of privacy, copyright and other legally protected material.  To 
circumvent this issue, Garfinkel et al. offer both real and fabricated data for the teaching, 
research and the evaluation of tools. 
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Closed source issues 
However, Beckett & Slay (2007) argue the validation of the discipline is non-trivial and 
requires a structured framework that the ISO 17025 Standard does not address.  To illustrate 
this point, they highlighted the use of closed-source tools requires a subjective judgment on 
the part of the individual undertaking the test to produce a test plan that is sufficient on both 
coverage and depth to identify any validation issues.  Casey (2012) argues that this results in 
practitioners and tool testers making “educated guesses about how a given tool works”.  It is 
perhaps for these reasons, argue Beckett & Slay, that the definitions within the Standard 
describe only the outcome and not the tools or methodology taken to achieve it. 
2.3.6 Who does the evaluating? 
The question of who performs the evaluation of software for use in a digital forensic 
environment is addressed by the FSR in their Codes of Practice and Conduct in section 20.2.1 
which states that the forensic laboratory (provider), vendor or another provider may perform 
the validation: 
Validation should be conducted prior to implementation of the method. 
This may be performed by the provider, manufacturer or another 
provider. 
What follows is a brief review of each of these groups. 
The software vendor 
The closed-source nature of commercial forensic software may be one factor that has led to 
practitioners relying too much on software vendors testing their own software (Flandrin, 
Buchanan, Macfarlane, Ramsay & Smales, 2014).  However, this practice does not ensure the 
practitioner is compliant with the ISO 17025 standard, as the local environment under which 
the software and any equipment is used can impact on the results (Beckett & Slay, 2007).   
 
An interesting response to this is the emerging ISO/IEC 27041 (ISO, 2015) standard 
(discussed in section 2.3.2 above) which sees the forensic laboratories setting the 
requirements that software vendors must provide evidence of satisfying through testing.  In 
principle this makes sense, however a vendor would not be able to test any given software 
tool in every conceivable environment the product may be used in.   
 
In addition, section 21.1.3 of the FSR’s Codes of Practice and Conduct states that “User 
acceptance testing shall be performed prior to software and/or related equipment being placed 
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in service”.  Hence, compliance with the Codes of Practice and Conduct would still require a 
minimum level of testing to be performed by the Practitioner/Forensic laboratory. 
 
Furthermore, although multiple vendors would be required to meet the same standard under 
this scheme, the design, methodology and conditions of any testing they perform would very 
likely be different from one vendor to another.  There is therefore a risk that two similar 
products have not been tested under the same conditions.  Hence this poses a threat to the 
scientific validity in terms of reproducibility, see Table 1-1. 
 
Clearly, as a software developer, it would be unreasonable to expect a vendor to produce and 
ship code without any form of testing.  Hence, argues Dow (2007), the practitioner would be 
dependent on the vendor to a degree to undertake some form of testing.  The exact level of 
testing, he continues, would be subject to a level of cost needed to keep the tool affordable, 
thereby imposing practical limits in testing that can be done.  Dow concludes with a warning 
that a vendor testing their own product is subject to a conflict of interest and would be likely 
to be reticent to reveal problems.  Hence, the scientific validity in terms of bias could be 
impacted by this approach, see Table 1-1.  For these reasons, a more independent body would 
be a preferred solution. 
 
Independent body  
One approach to overcome the problem of inconsistent test conditions, is for the testing to be 
centralized and made accountable to one or a small number of independent testing bodies, 
such as CFTT, Underwriters Laboratory (2016) or the Common Criteria (2016).  The CFTT 
project was instigated with this purpose in mind, but as stated in section 2.3.2, is subject to a 
number of challenges, rendering it not viable for law enforcement agencies.  Dow (2007) 
points out that the funding for testing by such organisations is unclear and hence the viability 
of their ongoing testing commitment is uncertain.  Furthermore, Dow argues that until an 
official and funded resource is available practitioners have no choice but to do testing 
themselves.  However, practitioner based testing also poses a number of challenges as well. 
Practitioner 
When operating within the criminal justice system, it is the practitioner who tenders evidence 
and is therefore ultimately accountable for the reliability of such evidence.  Hence good 
practice dictates that as a practitioner you would test a new (or an established, yet unfamiliar) 
software tool on a known dataset to be satisfied that your conclusions are sound.  Such testing 
should be “regression testing” (Beckett, 2010) to account for any bug fixes or enhancements 
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made to the software.  This requires significant resource on the part of the practitioner.  One 
way to alleviate this pressure might be to centralise the test results within a team or 
organisation.  However, given practitioners are accountable for their own work (Fab4, 2011) 
and following a Supreme Court Judgment in the USA where they are now subject to being 
sued for professional negligence (Supreme Court, 2011), it is unlikely that many practitioners 
would feel comfortable relying on the work of others to underpin their evidence.  
Nevertheless, practitioners are busy people with heavy caseloads and the time for developing 
and executing extensive tests on tools would be a significant challenge for most of them 
(Dow, 2007).  Flandrin et al. (2014) agrees, adding that most practitioners have a limited 
number of resources.  As a result, they are not in a position to “test all tools along with all 
versions”.   
2.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has briefly outlined current digital forensic practice and the elements of the 
regulatory requirements salient to this research.  The lack of publications on the impact of 
applying this to a malware investigation has also been highlighted, noting in particular the 
lack of a viable method for evaluating tools used in a forensic investigation involving 
malware.  A critique of the tools and techniques available to study malware as part of an 
investigation was explored and concluded with a discussion on how such tools can be 
evaluated to meet the criteria laid down by the Forensic Regulator. 
Evaluating tools against criteria set by the Forensic Science Regulator has several benefits.  
To start with, the approach proposed by this research would benefit from an established 
credibility, as it would potentially meet both the Regulator’s Codes of Practice and the 
underlying requirements of the ISO 17025 standard.  In addition, conformance to established 
evaluation criteria would arguably make the approach more familiar and easier to adopt into 
working practice.  Finally, alignment with the ISO 17025 standard would potentially make 
the approach scalable, as the validation process of the incoming ISO 27041 standard is 
“compatible” with ISO 17025 standard’s validation process (Marshall, 2011). 
Alongside the benefits this chapter also considered the risks in section 2.3.4.  The complexity 
of these risks means that not all of these identified risks will be addressed by this research.  
Alongside the benefits of speed, the use of automation would help to minimise the risks 
associated with a practitioner’s lack of skills in the fields of statistics and scientific research.  
The interpretation of results from a tool can also, of course, be impacted by the presence of 
any anti-forensic measures present in the malware.  Full mitigation against these measures is 
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complex and outside the scope of this research.  However, large scale testing and statistical 
reporting again offer a means to identify errors in the data, resulting from causes such as this. 
The challenges to evaluating tools were explored in section 2.3.5 and explored issues of bias, 
pace of change, the ad-hoc evolution of the field, reproducibility issues and the use of closed 
source tools.  To address the issue of bias in practitioners who may strive for a required level 
of accuracy, this research will report its findings with a stated level of statistical confidence 
and leave the rounding process for the consumer of the report.  
To counter the challenge concerning the pace of change, it is important the approach offered 
by this research has a relatively short test time. Hence, by providing the practitioner with an 
automated solution to evaluate a tool against a large bank of malware in a relatively short 
space of time the impact of changes in the technology can be minimised.  To address the 
reproducibility concerns, it is proposed that the Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation 
Framework (MATEF) together with the test data of binary malware files (as implemented, 
discussed later in section 4.3.2) be made available to the academic community. 
This chapter has identified varying criteria used to evaluate tools with particular focus on the 
FSR’s Codes of Practice and Conduct. The following chapter synthesises malware forensic 
practice with the FSR requirements, legal requirements and technical recommendations to 
develop a single set of requirements for tools used in a malware forensics environment.  
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The previous chapter included a review of existing malware forensic practice and determined 
that there is little published research into the area.  Hence there is little support for any trust 
placed in such practice, see the first research goal of Table 1-2.  The chapter went on to 
identify the five-phase malware analysis model of Malin et al. (2008).  In this discussion, it 
was argued that despite the ad-hoc nature of the model, this was the most viable starting point 
for this research.  Furthermore, the fifth phase of this model (dynamic malware analysis) was 
selected as the basis for this research, as the use and analysis of the tools within this phase 
was deemed the most achievable within the constraints of the research.   
Given the lack of a scientific methodology to perform malware forensics, this chapter draws 
its attention to identifying the requirements of such a methodology in order to subsequently 
design a solution (see second research goal, Table 1-2). The approach taken is to start with 
identifying the themes that are apparent from the research question.  Hence the chapter opens 
with a section (3.1) that explores these themes before moving on in the next section (3.2) to 
determine the existing requirements; thereby providing a context.  These themes and 
requirements are then synthesised in the next section (3.3) to formulate a set of proposed 
requirements, designed to address both the research question and the existing requirements.  
The chapter closes with a discussion (see section 0) on the analysis and design methodology 
chosen. 
3.1 Interpretation of the Research Question 
To recap, the Research Question in section 1.2 stated: 
Can a systematic basis for trusted practice be established for evaluating malware 
artefact detection tools used within a forensic investigation? 
Three broad themes were apparent from this question, namely trusted practice, tool evaluation 
and forensic investigation. 
Trusted practice 
The first of these, trusted practice stems in part from the unfounded trust placed in tools.  The 
review of the current state of the field highlighted that a largely non-scientific and anecdotal 
approach is adopted by some practitioners who either rely upon repeated confirmation to 
establish truth and/or accept the results of digital forensic tools solely on the reputation of the 
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vendor (section 1.1.2).  Furthermore, this lack of trust is compounded further by problems 
with expert evidence and that the practice of withholding test results from the scientific 
community by groups such as SWGDE and DC3 do little to instil confidence in trusted 
practice (section 1.1.3). 
Turning from what a lack of trust looks like to how it is defined in this research, recall from 
section 1.2 that the definition of trusted practice applied in this research is derived from the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (2015), who state that expert evidence must be reliable and 
hence have a “scientific basis”.  As a result, five attributes of the scientific method were 
identified, i.e.: Repeatability, Reproducibility, Testable hypothesis, Controllable and 
Unbiased, see Table 1-1.  For a malware analysis tool to be evaluated in a manner that 
addresses the Research Question, the extent to which the evaluation methodology meets these 
five attributes of the scientific method should be assessed. 
Malware tool evaluation 
The second theme apparent from the research question was that of malware tool evaluation.  
One of the contributions of this research is to address the lack of material published on 
evaluating tools used to analyse malware (see section 2.2).  Specifically, there is currently no 
definition or criterion to describe tool evaluation in a malware context (see section 2.3.1). 
An important element of evaluation is to identify what exactly is to be evaluated.  Therefore, 
the sections that follow identify and develop the requirements and consider how best to meet 
them.  Furthermore, consideration has been given as to how this evaluation is reported.  The 
assertive pass/fail reporting of the CFTT (see section 2.3.2) lacks the granularity to 
distinguish between tools that pass a test with a narrow or comfortable margin.  Hence, it is 
not possible for the practitioner to choose the better of two tools evaluated in this way. 
To evaluate every aspect of malware analysis tools was outside the scope of this research. To 
keep things focused, consideration was only given to tools that identify malware artefacts that 
hence assist in the understanding of malware behaviour (see section 2.2) as part of a forensic 
investigation.   No documentation has been found to map out the functionality of tools used 
for investigating malware for this purpose.  Furthermore, no framework has been identified to 
systematically test such tools.  
Forensic investigation 
The final theme identified from the research question was forensic investigation.  Therefore, 
the trusted practice identified above relates to work undertaken within the criminal justice 
system, which carries with it various implications.  For example, the processes applied to 
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undertake investigations are subject to legal requirements.  For instance, steps should be taken 
during an investigation to ensure that malware is not permitted to gain unauthorised access to 
resources or to exfiltrate personal data.  Furthermore, the output of such an investigation is 
subject to legal admissibility requirements.  A lack of scientific principles and provenance in 
expert evidence could lead to expert evidence being deemed inadmissible (Law Commission, 
2011).  
Therefore, another implication for operating within the criminal justice system is the growing 
need to operate within regulatory requirements (see section 1.1.7).  The current regulatory 
requirements are the Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016).  
Not all police forces are committed to meeting the required standards, leading the Forensic 
Science Regulator to warn that the “integrity of the criminal justice system in England and 
Wales is under threat due to the quality of forensic science work” (Toner, 2017). 
3.2 Existing requirements  
The legal and regulatory implications outlined in the previous section can be managed by 
identifying the requirements to operate both lawfully and in a manner that maintains a 
minimum standard of quality.  A minimum level of quality would in turn help to instil a 
greater level of trust in the evidence produced.  To implement these requirements, controls in 
the form of technical measures are needed.  Hence the remainder of this section is divided 
into three sub-sections to explore the technical, legislative and regulatory requirements 
associated with the forensic analysis of malware behaviour.   
3.2.1 Technical recommendations  
A review of the literature determined that little published or otherwise formal requirements 
for a technically valid malware analysis lab have been proposed (see section 2.2).  The closest 
there is to such a requirement is the phased series of guidelines offered by Malin et al. (2008), 
presented in section 2.2.  However, Malin et al. recommend “flexibility and adjustment of the 
methodology” to cater for the needs of each case under investigation.  Hence it is difficult to 
stipulate that a specific series of processes should be followed to perform malware analysis.  
Nevertheless, several recommendations that could be applicable to almost any malware 
forensics investigation were identified.  The first of these is the use of virtual machines.  
Virtualisation 
The use of virtual machines (VMs) is recommended by Ligh et al.  (2010) who also stipulate 
that such software should be updated frequently to minimise the risk of exploits being used to 
enable the malware to break out of the virtual environment onto the host.  They also advise 
Chapter 3  - Malware tool evaluation requirements  Page 65  
 
that shared folders on the host be either disabled or read-only.  They further suggest that 
access to resources such as a network or removable media be disabled.  Sikorski & Honig 
(2012) agree suggesting that VMs should be configured to be a ‘host only’ network, meaning 
the virtual network on which they reside should be isolated from the physical network on 
which the host resides.  Szor (2005) points out the need to reset a test system to a clean state 
and hence promotes the VMs for their speed at resetting.  The use of VMWare (VMWare, 
2016) is cited by Szor as a good choice for this, though little mention is made of any other 
virtualisation solutions other than a passing mention of Microsoft’s Virtual PC.   
Binu and Kumar (2011) evaluate two alternative virtualisation solutions, based on the 
hypervisors KVM (https://www.linux-kvm.org/) and Xen (http://www.xenproject.org), 
concluding Xen to be superior in terms of performance and stability.  
Network service provision 
Isolating malware from a network or even the Internet could limit the behaviour exhibited. To 
counter this, it is a good idea to provide the malware with as many services as possible that it 
is likely to rely upon, such as SMTP, HTTP and DNS.  Wagener, Dulaunoy & Engel (2008) 
reply upon trapping DNS queries from malware using a local DNS server.  Sikorski & Honig 
(2012) suggest the use of INetSim (Hungenberg & Eckert, 2016) to simulate a broader range 
of network services. Palkmets et al. (2014) also deploy INetSim but additionally provide a 
route to the Internet via an onion router network. 
Although the exact services needed would be dictated by the malware that is executed, a 
simpler requirement would be to provide as many services as possible. 
Resource Monitoring 
Given the provision of network services highlighted above, Malin et al. (2012) advise that 
network monitoring be put in place to observe any attempts by the malware to resolve DNS 
queries or to connect to remote IP addresses.  They also advise monitoring the access made to 
processes, files, API and the Windows Registry.  As a starting point to identify monitoring 
tools, Liao & Langweg (2014) review a number of systems for both Windows and Linux 
environments, designed to perform monitoring in a variety of ways. 
Szor (2005) also recommends monitoring file, registry, network, system calls and process 
monitoring, but warns that only a combination of monitoring and detailed disassembly will 
reveal the entire functionality of malware.  This warning is not applicable to this work, as the 
scope of the research does not include malware analysis; what is in scope is the evaluation of 
the tools used to do such analysis, see section 1.2. 
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Vulnerable environments 
Similar to the provision of a networked environment, Szor (2005) also argues that many 
malware threats are vulnerability dependent and so failure to provide a suitable fertile 
environment could lead to a failure in the malware activating.  To this end, Szor advises that 
unpatched, older versions of software be used.  Arguably, this could be extended to include 
recent but not current versions of operating systems as well.  
Malware handling procedures 
Malware is like a hazardous substance and needs careful handling to avoid unwanted 
contamination of an organisation’s production/corporate network.  Szor (2005) warns that 
some analysis tools can result in the unexpected execution of malware as part of the analysis.  
Tools such as PEiD (Aldeid.com, 2017) which detect packers used to obfuscate malware and 
IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2015) used to disassemble/debug binary code both execute the binary 
under analysis as part of their normal operation.  Szor adds that the source of some tools also 
means that either the website they are obtained from or even the tool itself can be laden with 
malware. 
3.2.2 Legal Requirements 
The primary focus of this research is UK practice, hence the requirements directly applicable 
to this jurisdiction are considered over and above those of other jurisdictions.   The legal 
requirements surrounding tools used to evaluate malware can be divided into two broad areas.  
The first is the legislation concerning the risks associated with handling the tool’s test data 
(ie: malware).  The second concerns the admissibility requirements of the output produced by 
the tool under evaluation. If submitted as evidence to the Criminal Justice System, the tool’s 
output must adhere to these strict criteria. 
Handling malware 
To evaluate malware analysis tools the test data used should ideally be real malware.  Further 
to the technical recommendations identified in section 3.2.1, the handling of malware is also 
subject to legal restrictions that impose tight controls on the handling of such malware. 
Without appropriate precautions to limit the reach of the malware, execution of such malware 
could result in unauthorised access to a system, thereby breaching the Computer Misuse Act 
(1990).  Furthermore, such malware may also scan the local network and harvest personal 
data with a view to the exfiltration of this data to a third party.  Such behaviour may land the 
data controller of the victim network liable under the Data Protection Act (1998).  Even with 
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these controls in place, there are also requirements in place for the material produced from a 
software tool to qualify it as admissible evidence. 
Admissibility 
For the output of a malware analysis tool to be to be tendered as evidence, the output itself 
needs to be admissible.  As mentioned in section 2.3.1 digital evidence is presumed to be 
valid and thus may be admitted unless evidence to the contrary is provided (Lloyd, 2014).  
Superficially, this may seem to suggest that there is no need to prove the validity of the data 
produced by a software tool used to analyse malware.   
However, Lloyd goes on to argue that the general precept on the ‘hearsay’ rule is that 
evidence must relate to actual knowledge rather than what has been told to a witness (which, 
argues Lloyd, can be a human or machine).  Hence any data produced by a computer could be 
deemed hearsay and (in line with section 129 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) can only be 
admissible if proven to be accurate by a suitably qualified expert.   
Lloyd further argues that because of R v Shepard [1993] AC 380, this heavy standard of proof 
is reduced when a person familiar with the expected output of a computer is available to give 
evidence.  However, it could be argued few persons would be familiar with the expected 
output of a tool used to analyse malware, which typically produces random artefacts.  Hence, 
such tools perhaps should not be used without relevant expert testimony.  This makes it 
important to test these tools in a robust way that can demonstrate their reliability so that the 
expert testimony is more credible. 
Reliability 
Guidance on expert evidence from the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) (2015) states that 
expert evidence will be admissible under common law where: 
• It will be of assistance to the court 
• The expert has relevant expertise 
• The expert is impartial 
• The expert evidence is reliable 
The first of these requirements concerns the forming of a judgement on the relevance of the 
evidence tendered, whilst the second and third concern a judgement on the expert.  The last 
requirement concerns both the evidence and the manner in which it was produced.   
Recall from the section 3.1 that in this guidance the CPS state that reliable expert evidence 
must have a “scientific basis” and that five attributes of the scientific method were identified, 
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i.e.: Repeatability, Reproducibility, Testable hypothesis, Controllable and Unbiased, see 
Table 1-1.  Therefore, for a malware analysis tool to be evaluated in a manner that addresses 
the theme of trusted practice in the Research Question, the extent to which the evaluation 
methodology meets these five attributes of the scientific method should be assessed. 
The fast evolving nature of the IT field make it particularly susceptible to challenges on the 
reliability of evidence produced using fledgling techniques. Despite these concerns, in R v 
Clarke (RL) [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 Lord Justice Steyn concluded that it would be “entirely 
wrong to deny to the law of evidence the advantages to be gained from new techniques and 
advances in science”.  Subsequent to this ruling, the CPS produced guidance on the use of 
novel evidence that is based on the judgement of R v Lundy ([2013] UKPC 28) and is set out 
in Table 3-1: 
# Guideline  
1 Whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested 
2 Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication 
3 The known or potential rate of error or the existence of standards 
4 Whether the theory or technique used has been generally accepted 
          Table 3-1 : R v Lundy Guidelines 
These guidelines have been woven into regulatory requirements that are slowly becoming 
mandatory for forensic practitioners who wish to submit evidence to the Criminal Justice 
System in the UK. 
3.2.3 Regulatory Requirements 
Regulation is still within its infancy within the UK, hence the Codes of Practice and Conduct 
(2016) of the Forensic Science Regulator have yet to be fully implemented.  The Codes state 
that “irrespective of whether the provider is public, police or commercial” all digital forensic 
providers will be required to demonstrate they are accredited to ISO/IEC 17025 and the 
Codes of Practice by October 2017.  This deadline applies to imaging, data recovery using 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) products, extraction and analysis of data. 
Some of the regulatory requirements are linked to legal guidance.  As previously stated, the 
Codes contain the guidelines set out in R v Lundy ([2013] UKPC 28).  Guideline 1 (see Table 
3-1) can be linked to section 20.1.5 of the Codes  which states that for novel techniques the 
provider “should have validated the method, product or service”.  The second guideline from 
Table 3-1 concerns peer review which is addressed by section 20.16.1 of the Codes.  Section 
25.2.3(e) of the Codes address the fourth guideline on the level of peer acceptance for a 
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technique.  However, the third guideline concerning the rate of error is not addressed either 
by the Codes, the associated draft guidance tailored to the validation of digital forensic 
methods (Forensic Science Regulator, 2015) or the underlying ISO/IEC 17025 standard.  Part 
of the reason for this may be a lack of understanding of the term, a lack of sufficient training 
in statistics and the scientific method, or even the concern that “current methods will be 
exposed as lacking an empirical basis” (Christensen, Crowder, Ousley & Houck, 2014). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Forensic Science Regulator warns against validating 
only a tool rather than the method it is part of in section 13.3 of their Consultation document 
(2015).  However, as reported in 2.3.1, what little that has been published to date focuses on 
methodologies and not tools.  This leaves a gap in the validation process, which forms the 
basis of this research.  Hence, the focus of this research is to provide a framework to evaluate 
the tools as part of a wider method evaluation. 
The following section examines technical, legal and regulatory requirements oulined in this 
and the previous two sections to synthesise a set of proposed requirements. 
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3.3 Proposed requirements  
Recall from Chapter 2  that studies concerning the impact of regulatory requirements on 
malware forensic practice are lacking.  In particular, there is a clear need for a methodology 
to evaluate tools used in digital forensic investigations involving malware (see section 2.4).  
This section will explore strategies for satisfying the Research Question in light of the 
existing requirements identified in section 3.2.   
The Research Question (see section 1.2) requires that a level of trusted practice be 
established.  Fundamentally, trust can be considered to involve “willingly acting without the 
full knowledge needed to act” (Duranti & Rogers, 2012).  In the context of the Criminal 
Justice System involving expert evidence, this arguably translates to a Court coming to a 
decision on the reliability of a given piece of such evidence based upon two forms of trust.   
The first of these is the trust in the interpretation or impact of the evidence provided to the 
court.  This trust is placed upon the expert presenting the evidence.  To assist the court in its 
deliberations, the expert provides an interpretation on the meaning and impact of the evidence 
tendered. The outcome of such deliberations ultimately considers the bearing such evidence 
has on the case as a whole.  Given this and that such trust is based upon the expert’s 
knowledge and skills as well as their ability to communicate these effectively, this form of 
trust is outside the scope of this research. 
The second form of trust is that placed on the reliability of the evidence tendered.  Since the 
repeal of section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, any evidence produced by 
a computer is presumed to be reliable; hence it is therefore admissible (CPS, 2014), see also 
section 3.2.2.  However, the motivations for this research identified in section 1.1.1 indicate 
this trust has been undermined.  The Forensic Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct 
(2016) provide an independent vehicle to instill a level of assurance in such trust.  Hence as a 
requirement, trusted practice has moved from inherent and internal to external in nature. 
Forensic investigation also forms an element of the Research Question and therefore, given 
the motivation for the research sits within the Criminal Justice System (see sections 1.1.1 and 
1.1.3), is subject to externally set admissibility requirements (see section 3.2.2) and regulatory 
requirements (see sections 1.1.7 and 3.2.3). 
The Research Question also requires the evaluation of tools for malware artefact detection.  
However, this is not currently subject to externally set criteria.   For example, both sections 
20.2 (validation of methods) and 20.8 (validation of measurement-based methods) of the 
Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016) make no requirement for accuracy.  The latter of these 
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two sections does state the results must be “consistent, reliable, accurate, robust and with an 
uncertainty measurement” but this does not specify the level of accuracy required.  
This differs to fields such as engineering where the specification drafted by the client might 
require a component to have a property that is within a tolerance of a given specified value.  
Hence, the evaluation of tools for malware artefact detection is an internally set requirement. 
From the body of existing requirements in section 3.2, candidate requirements were 
considered for inclusion in the proposed requirements list based on the methodology 
illustrated in Figure 3-1. This procedure is analogous to the ‘Quality Gateway’ process used 
by requirements engineers to assess whether individual requirements identified for a system 
should be included in the final requirements specification (Robertson & Robertson, 2012) 
 
Figure 3-1 : Proposed requirements assessment methodology 
 
By separating requirements as either external or internal, it facilitated the process of 
identifying those requirements that were more easily defined. The sections that follow will 
examine these external and internal requirements in more detail.  
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3.3.1 External requirements 
The rationale applied to selecting what requirements to include started with the inclusion of 
what were deemed to be mandatory requirements, as indicated in section 3.2.2 (Legal) and 
3.2.3 (Regulatory).  Hence the requirements described in these sections were included in the 
proposed list. 
Beyond these mandatory requirements, the technical recommendations outlined in section 
3.2.1 were all included in the proposed list for a variety of reasons.  The reasoning applied to 
each of these was as follows. 
Use of Virtual Machines (VMs) were included as these were cited in Section 2.2.4 as having 
several benefits for malware analysis.  In addition, by hosting these on a Linux-based host in 
an isolated network, the risk of malware escaping from the VM and migrating elsewhere is 
minimised (Pearce, Zeadally & Hunt, 2013).  Furthermore, an implementation using VMs 
allows the testing environment to be scaled up to run multiple tests simultaneously.  This 
means that larger quantities of data can be generated quickly.   
Simulated network services were also included in the proposed requirements, as it is 
relatively easy to implement through open source software and provides the benefits outlined 
in section 3.2.1.   Specifically, implementing simulated network services will provide an 
environment that maximises the observable activity of malware. 
For similar reasons, the use of a vulnerable operating environment, as recommended in 
section 3.2.1, was included in the proposed list of requirements.  As with the network service 
provision, this would provide a more fertile environment for malware to operate. 
As indicated in Section 2.2, the research focuses on the evaluation of tools used to perform 
dynamic malware analysis.  Of the two broad approaches to dynamic malware analysis 
(transition based and state based) identified in section 2.2.4, transition based logging was 
selected as it has the advantage of capturing more trace information, such as a file that is 
created and subsequently deleted between two machine states.  Therefore, the tools that will 
be evaluated will be those that follow the Active Monitoring approach presented by Malin et 
al. (2008), see Figure 2-7. 
Finally, the safe handling of malware recommendations cited in section 3.2.1 were included 
in the proposed requirements largely because these recommendations are aligned to the 
conditions of use for the VM environment available for this research. 
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The above external requirements are summarised in Table 3-2 below: 
# Requirement Rationale 
1 (Legal) Handling of malware and what it may access 
should be controlled. 
See section 3.2.2 above 
2 (Legal) Output of tested tool must be admissible. See section 3.2.2 above 
3 (Legal) Malware analysis tool output must be 
reliable 
See section 3.2.2 above 
4 (Regulatory) Novel methods must be validated See section 20.1.5, Forensic 
Science Regulator (2016) 
5 (Regulatory) The theory/technique should be peer 
reviewed or published 
See section 20.16.1, Forensic 
Science Regulator (2016) 
6 (Regulatory) Method should be a generally accepted See section 25.2.3(e), Forensic 
Science Regulator (2016) 
7 (Technical) Use a VM See section 3.2.1 above 
8 (Technical) Network service provision See section 3.2.1 above 
9 (Technical) Use vulnerable environment See section 3.2.1 above 
Table 3-2 : Proposed external requirements 
Alongside the above externally set requirements, several internally set requirements were 
developed to facilitate the achievement of the externally set requirements.  
3.3.2 Internal requirements 
The internally set requirements were governed by the research gaps identified by the 
Research Question (see sections 1.2 and 3.1). 
Pass/fail thresholds 
Part of the evaluation of a software tool could be to assign a pass or fail threshold to a tool 
following a test, but this was rejected because it is not required by any external requirement.  
Furthermore, such a requirement is not part of the Research Question, see section 1.2.  In 
addition, the general-purpose nature of the framework would be to apply different tools to the 
framework for testing, however each type of tool may have a different threshold level, 
making meaningful pass/fail comparisons difficult. 
Also, given that there are no published pass/fail rates on any metric for any tool used for 
malware analysis that have been identified to date, deriving and justifying such a threshold 
would be difficult to defend and therefore a risk to the validity of the research.  One 
manifestation of this could be that due to the lack of official guidance on the matter, the 
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acceptance threshold could vary between users.  Another could be that if the level of the 
threshold were to change over time, the framework’s relevance would quickly become dated.  
Black box testing 
Moving beyond the setting of thresholds to evaluate a software tool, the matter of how the 
tool is evaluated was considered to identify associated evaluation criteria.  The use of black 
box testing (as discussed in section 2.3.1) is more viable than white box testing.  This is due 
to the closed source nature of most of the software tools that are used by forensic practitioners 
and the time (and skills) that would be required to review source code.  
Malware lab requirements 
Having previously established that the research is to focus upon the more viable approach of 
evaluating tools used for dynamic malware analysis (see section 2.2.4), an initial requirement 
was to consider the construction of the lab used to perform the analysis.  As discussed in 
section 3.2.1, there are no existing formal requirements for a technically valid malware 
analysis lab.  Malin et al. (2008) offers some high level advice in terms of the environment 
itself, stating that a virtualised lab should be used (giving little consideration to alternatives). 
Elisan (2015) goes further and anecdotally suggests a malware lab used for dynamic analysis 
of malware should consider: 
a) Analysis on both bare metal and virtual machines (VMs) 
b) Observe how the malware behaves on different operating systems 
c) Implement ‘malware friendly’ measures such as: 
i. Assigning administrator rights to the default user account 
ii. Disabling auto updates 
iii. Disabling User Access Control (UAC) 
iv. Setting the Internet browser to the minimum security level 
v. Install commonly exploited software 
vi. Creating honeypot files, eg: salaries.xls 
d) Isolate the lab from the main network  
The first of these (item [a]) was not fully adopted for this framework, as bare metal 
implementations are resource intensive and parallel processing is limited to the number of 
physical machines available (see section 2.2.4).  Furthermore, the throughput of analysis is 
limited to the time it takes to restore the system to the pre-infection state.  Instead a VM only 
approach is taken, as the resource for this is already in the research environment available.  
Furthermore, the ability to manage this remotely and in shorter timeframes renders a VM only 
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approach more practical for this research.  The use of both platforms will be subject to further 
work (see section 7.4).  The impact of this decision is that there is a risk to the validity of the 
results.  This is, argues Martignoni et al. (2009), because when the malware is executed it 
may detect the “synthetic” environment.  However, there is an increasing use of virtualised 
servers in modern I.T. environments and a study of 200,000 malware samples taken from 
2012 to 2014, Wueest (2015) argued that only a small number of these cases detected it was 
running within a VM (see section 2.2.4). 
In order to keep the scope of the research focused, the use of multiple operating systems (item 
[b]) was also not adopted.  Although this is relatively easy to adopt, more recent operating 
systems implement tighter security controls that hinder the use of many of the 
security/malware analysis tools.  This decision has little impact on the framework itself, as 
this is more of an implementation decision and is readily addressed by including additional 
VMs with disparate operating systems.  As before, this is placed on the list of further work 
(see section 7.4).  
The first four of Elisan’s ‘malware friendly’ measures (item [c] i to iv inclusive) were all 
adopted into the framework as these are easy to implement and contribute to establishing a 
fertile environment for malware to activate.  
The last two of Elisan’s ‘malware friendly’ measures (item [c] v and vi) were not adopted into 
the framework, as the intention is to establish the minimum behaviour of any malware 
subjected to the framework.  Furthermore, with regard to commonly exploited software (item 
[c] - v), not all users will have a given version of software installed or even at all.  In addition, 
placing files with suggestive filenames, such as ‘salaries.xls’ (item [c] - vi) is reliant upon 
guessing what a malware binary is looking for on a host. The last of Elisan’s 
recommendations (item [d]) has been adopted as it helps to address the legal requirements 
outlined in section 3.2.2. 
Sourcing malware 
To be as widely adaptable as possible, the framework was designed to accept malware from 
any source.  Each source (where appropriate) can have an import module written to obtain 
local copies of malware binaries.  For the purposes of this research a single source module 
linked to a feed provided by the website VirusTotal (2010) was used.  This was done to 
simplify the import process and to provide a large number of malware binaries from the wild 
as quickly as possible. 
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Storing and handling malware 
The storage of live malware for testing against software tools in the framework required a 
number of measures to be put in place.  The university, for example, have set specific 
requirements to permit the storage of malware on their I.T. systems (see section 3.3.1).  In 
addition, there was a need to minimise any cross-contamination between malware binaries; it 
is important that each malware binary cannot easily be accessed (or executed) by a user 
operating an implementation of the framework or by other malware binaries. 
Conversely though, the ability to extract a malware binary, place it within the appropriate test 
area and execute it in an automated fashion was required for automated testing. 
Finally, access to the library holding the malware binaries was restricted to a small number of 
users to minimise the risk of accidental or deliberate misuse. 
Metrics 
Section 2.3.2 identified several criteria that digital forensic practice is measured against.  
From these the Forensic Science Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016) 
highlighted and discussed the following measures: 
• Estimate uncertainty (Section 20.18 of the Codes) 
• Traceability of reference data sets (Section 22 of the Codes) 
• Validation of methods (Section 20.2 of the Codes) 
An estimation of uncertainty is partly achievable in the form of a statistical confidence 
interval when comparing distributions of results from two tests conducted under different 
conditions.  However, due to the complexity of calculating this measure, particularly when 
malware is involved, it was decided to not include this as a requirement within the scope of 
the PhD.  
The traceability criterion is also difficult to address, as no existing standard and generally 
accepted malware corpora has been identified. The work of Garfinkel et al. (2009) has 
produced a corpus of realistic data, but this is not specifically tailored to housing malware for 
the purposes of testing malware analysis tools.  However, a notable aspect of this research is 
that the framework was implemented and tested using a large population of real-world 
malware binaries (in excess of 350,000).  This is relatively large when compared to other 
research groups who use fewer numbers of malware binaries and will be made available to 
others seeking to undertake research on the same dataset.  
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The last of these criteria (validation of methods) is partly viable within the timeframe for the 
research.  Addressing the gap in the validation process identified in section 3.2.3, it is the 
validation of a software tool (and not the entire method surrounding its use) that is the focus 
of this research. 
Validation is defined within the glossary of the Codes of Practice and Conduct (Forensic 
Science Regulator, 2016) as a means to demonstrate that a “method, process or device is fit 
for the specific purpose intended”.  Although not specifically mentioned, the meaning of 
‘device’ could readily be applied to a software device or tool. However, it is not clear how 
such validation is performed or what measures should be used, e.g., accuracy, repeatability, 
etc.    
One measure readily available is that of error, i.e.: the difference between the expected and 
observed values.  Given the random nature of the data to be examined artefact values such as 
filenames are expected to vary much more than the quantity of artefacts produced each time a 
malware binary is executed.  Hence, the framework should compare the quantity of expected 
and observed values, rather than the values themselves.   
Validation of a tool measuring artefacts produced by malware is complicated by the fact that 
malware employs anti-forensic techniques to obfuscate the truth.  Hence ’ground truth’ is 
difficult to establish. The next best step is to compare what is reported by a tool against an 
independent and trusted source or ‘oracle’.  This will require the framework to (a) determine 
the expected value from an independent source and (b) be capable of retrieving the observed 
number of artefacts from a variety of tools applied to the framework for testing. 
The internal requirements discussed above that have been included in the framework are 
summarised in Table 3-3. The internal requirements that were not included are summarised in 
Table 3-4. 
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# Requirement Rationale 
1 Black box testing approach Use of closed source software. 
2 Malware lab requirements: 
• VM Only approach 
Resource available, shorter test times, ease of 
automation and remote control. 
3 Malware lab requirements: 
• Single operating system 
Maximise results on single, older operating 
system. 
4 Malware lab requirements: 
• Configure the OS to be malware 
friendly 
Provide a fertile environment to provide ‘best 
case’ results for tools analysed. 
5 Accept real-world malware from any 
source 
Maximise the universality of the framework 
6 Storing & handling malware:  
• Avoid cross contamination 
Minimise risk to validity of results 
7 Storing & handling malware:  
• Extract via automation 
Facilitate automation of framework for tool 
testing 
8 Storing & handling malware:  
• Restrict access to malware 
Minimise accidental or deliberate misuse 
9 Metrics: 
• Determine the expected quantity 
of artefacts from an independent 
source 
In the absence of ground truth, provide an 
independent and authoritative measure to 
compare a tool against. 
10 Metrics: 
• Read observed number of 
artefacts from a variety of tools 
under test 
Focus upon quantities rather than values to 
counter anti-forensic approach of random 
values being used. 
11 Metrics: 
• Validate tool by measuring 
difference of expected and 
observed numbers of artefacts 
Provide measure of error.  Provide an informed 
measure that addresses the confidence aspect of 
the Research Question 
Table 3-3 : Proposed internal requirements  
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# Excluded Requirement Rationale for being out of scope 
1 Pass/fail threshold • Not part of the Research Question 
• Maximise general purpose aim of framework 
• No published thresholds to compare against 
• Could change over time, quickly dating the framework  
2 White box testing • Most commercial tools are closed source 
• Insufficient skills/time of practitioners to review code 
3 Bare metal & VM 
environment 
Regarding the bare metal side of this requirement: 
• Resource intensive (multiple physical machines) 
• Slow cycle time to reset machine between tests 
• Limited throughput in a given timeframe 
• No remote management capability 
4 Multiple operating 
systems 
• More recent operating systems have tighter security 
• Fewer malware analysis tools supported 
• Less fertile environment for malware to operate  
5 Use commonly exploited 
software 
• Anticipated that not all users will have a given version 
of exploitable software, reducing validity of tests 
6 Use of honeypot 
filenames 
• Assumes the malware is looking to harvest files 
• Requires guessing what the malware is looking for 
7 Estimate of uncertainty • Partially implemented in terms of statistical confidence 
• High number of variables, so too complex to calculate  
8 Traceability • No existing standard or malware dataset identified 
9 Validation of method • Partially implemented through validation of tool 
• Including validation of process/method requires skills in 
malware analysis techniques, which the researcher does 
not have 
Table 3-4 : Excluded internal requirements 
  
Chapter 3  - Malware tool evaluation requirements  Page 80  
 
3.4 Analysis and design methodology 
The Waterfall model (Royce, 1970) has been applied to the analysis and design of the 
solution to address the Research Question.  The approach, argues Balaji and Murugaiyan 
(2012), works well where the requirements are clear beforehand.  In the case of the MATEF, 
the requirements are reasonably fixed and clear (see section 3.3).  Furthermore, the level of 
resources required to implement the model is minimal.  This is particularly beneficial, as it 
was anticipated there would be little access to or response from the practitioner community on 
an on-going basis while the framework was under development.  This would have been 
required if we used an alternative approach, such as the Agile development methodology 
(Collier, 2011). 
 
 
 
         Figure 3-2 : Waterfall analysis and design model 
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3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has identified two gaps in the field of malware forensics, namely: the lack of any 
definition of tool evaluation for malware analysis and the lack of any formal requirements for 
a technically valid malware analysis lab. 
A review of existing technical, legal and regulatory requirements was explored and where 
feasible and relevant these have been adopted into the framework as a list of requirements set 
by third parties.  We refer to these as external requirements.   
A closer examination of the research question identified several requirements, which we refer 
to as internal requirements.  
Collectively, both sets of requirements (external and internal) are chosen to both address the 
research question and set the scope of the PhD to keep it viable in the time and resources 
available. Hence, having identified these requirements, it is now possible to formulate a 
design and implementation for a Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework, which is 
described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  Designing and implementing a framework 
 
In the previous chapter the requirements for a framework to test malware analysis tools were 
developed from the research question alongside a series of existing technical, legal and 
regulatory requirements.  This chapter takes these requirements and translates them into a 
design for a framework named the Malware Analysis Tool Evaluation Framework (MATEF). 
Although requirements determine the constraints and minimum expectations of the 
framework, the aims of the framework define what it is to achieve.  Hence, starting with the 
requirements identified in the previous chapter, section 4.1 takes these requirements and 
identifies a number of aims for the framework.  The major components to achieve these aims 
are identified in section 4.2 before a discussion of their implementation is given in section 
4.3.  To evaluate how well the framework operates, the hypotheses are reviewed to assist in 
developing a testing strategy in section 4.4. This strategy is then used to inform the 
experiment design in section 4.5.  Section 4.6 concludes the chapter with a discussion of the 
analysis strategy adopted. 
4.1 Aims of the framework 
Many tools can be used during the course of a malware investigation.  Some of these tools 
make claims to be suited for malware analysis, while others do not.  The MATEF aims to 
provide a mechanism to evaluate these tools by quantifying their ability to detect artefacts 
produced by real-world malware samples (see Aim 1, Table 4-1).  
How such tools are employed for malware analysis is, according to Malin et al. (2008), 
subject to three broad analysis techniques: temporal, relational and functional analysis.  
Temporal analysis concerns the timeline of events surrounding reported activity, while 
relational analysis refers to the interaction between components of the malware and its 
environment.  Finally, functional analysis relates to the actions the malware is reported to 
have performed.   
Much of the temporal and relational analysis required with malware investigations can be 
achieved using conventional forensic analysis tools.  It is the functional analysis that the 
MATEF sought to underpin by evaluating the ability of the tools used to detect the artefacts 
produced by the behaviour of malware (see Aim 2, Table 4-1).   This behaviour typically 
manifests itself in the form of file, registry, process and network based artefacts. 
Unlike regular software that is largely predictable, malware is typically unpredictable in 
nature and routinely implements anti-analysis methods. These methods include obfuscation 
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techniques designed to give misleading results under analysis. Hence mitigation against such 
risks should be considered when drawing conclusions obtained from tool testing using 
malware, see Aim 3, Table 4-1. 
For the final research goal (see Goal 3, Table 1-2), the research needed to yield a software 
product that allowed a user to supply a candidate tool for malware analysis.  The software 
product would then assess the candidate tool against pre-defined criteria; see Aim 4, Table 
4-1.  The results of this assessment aim to inform the practitioner’s decision in the choice of 
tool used to perform malware analysis during a forensic investigation and provide 
quantifiable confidence in the reliability of the findings presented to a court of law. 
Having identified the aims of the framework, consideration was then given as to how to 
achieve these aims.  Hence, the following section seeks to identify the main components of 
the framework.  
# Aim 
1 Use real-world malware 
2 Evaluate a tool’s ability to detect malware artefacts 
3 Mitigate against anti-forensic techniques 
4 Produce software product to test tools 
Table 4-1 : Aims of the framework 
4.2 Identifying & selecting the main components of the framework 
One of the aims discussed in section 4.1 was for the framework to evaluate a software tool’s 
ability to detect artefacts, and thus monitor malware behaviour (see Aim 2, Table 4-1).  Hence 
the MATEF needed access to malware, the software tools to monitor the behaviour of such 
malware, a test environment suitable for executing the tools and malware and a management 
back-end to automate the whole process and record and analyse the results.  Furthermore, in 
order to evaluate a given tool, a means of determining the expected number of artefacts for a 
given malware binary needed to be known (see Requirement 9 Table 3-3) and easily 
retrievable, ideally from a database. 
Each of these elements is explored in the following sections, starting with the malware 
binaries themselves. 
4.2.1 Malware sample source 
In order to provide realistic results, the malware used to evaluate a given software tool needed 
to be real-world malware (a.k.a. malware ‘in the wild’), as opposed to fabricated malware 
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(see Aim 1, Table 4-1). The stored malware employs password protected zip files to minimise 
contamination risk during handling (see Requirements 6 & 8 Table 3-3).  
To satisfy the requirement to work offline (see Requirement 1, Table 3-2), malware obtained 
from any source needed to be imported locally to and stored in a malware library. 
4.2.2 Malware library 
In addition to satisfying the need to work offline (thereby providing readily available copies 
of the malware) and to simplify automation, each malware binary was to be accessible 
through a consistent file naming convention (see Requirement 7 Table 3-3). Also, in line with 
these requirements, access to this library was restricted to authorised users of the framework 
only.   
In addition to the malware binary file, information on its expected behaviour also needed to 
be stored locally as well (satisfying requirement 9 from Table 3-3).  To be made readily 
available, this information was stored in a malware database. 
4.2.3 Malware database 
The malware database needed to contain details of each malware binary held in the malware 
library (see section 4.2.2).  As a minimum, the details stored included the hash value of the 
binary and the number of artefacts created as a result of creating, modifying or deleting files 
or registry keys.  In addition, the number of ports opened and processes spawned as a result of 
executing the malware were also stored. 
To facilitate stratification of the data, the database stored Boolean properties of each malware 
binary (where available), such as whether the malware configures itself to start automatically 
upon boot or if it disables anti-virus software. 
The database itself was to be open source to ensure it is readily deployed with the framework 
and can be built and managed using automated scripts.  The management of the database, 
including the importing of malware and the testing of software tools was to be controlled by 
management scripts to facilitate automated testing across many malware binaries. 
4.2.4 Manager scripts 
The manager scripts were to perform two fundamental roles, namely overseeing the testing of 
software tools and the interaction with the malware database itself.   
The first of these required a script to initially construct the database tables and perform basic 
database management operations.  This included the capability to import details of the 
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artefacts produced when executing malware and to retrieve them during subsequent analysis 
on provision of an identifier, such as a hash value.   
The second fundamental role was to enable a user to initiate a test that operates and manages 
a bank of virtual machines (see Requirement 7, Table 3-2).  The script was to also 
automatically execute the tool under test and then the malware for a specified length of time 
before resetting the virtual machine (see Requirements 2 & 5, Table 3-3).  Following a given 
test the management script was also to extract a given tool’s log file and write it to a specified 
location in a consistent and standard format (to facilitate subsequent analysis), regardless of 
the original log file format. 
These two roles are dependent on two additional components, namely an independent source 
of malware behaviour data (referred to as the ‘Oracle’) and an environment within which to 
test the software tools.  The former is discussed in the next section (4.2.5), whilst the latter is 
addressed in section 4.2.6. 
4.2.5 The Oracle 
Due to the lack of any theoretical or easily determined ‘ground truth’, the MATEF needed to 
determine the expected quantity of artefacts from an independent source (see Requirement 9, 
Table 3-3).  The random nature of the data (malware) is such that the reported expected value 
is little more than an approximation of the ‘ground truth’.  This source, referred to as the 
‘Oracle’ could be conceivably be any one of a number of online environments, such as 
Anubis (2010), F-Secure (2011) and ThreatExpert (2011) (see Table 4-5 for a more 
comprehensive list).  The ability to determine the number of expected artefacts for a given 
malware binary when it is executed was the main requirement; see Requirement 9 in Table 
3-3. 
An important point to make here is that MATEF’s purpose was to evaluate analysis tools and 
not to submit new or ‘zero-day’ malware to any of these sandboxes.   Malin et al. (2008) 
point out that files submitted to such systems may be automatically shared with other vendors 
and third parties.  The impact of this is two-fold: First, an investigator may be submitting a 
malware sample that is targeted to the victim.  The impact of this is that hard-coded details 
such as usernames, passwords, or internal IP addresses may be inadvertently distributed.  
Secondly, the attacker who planted the malware will likely be alerted to the discovery and 
change their tactics.   Hence the use of such sandboxes for live investigations may not be 
deemed an acceptable risk.  Another significant problem with calling upon third-party 
sandboxes to identify malware behaviour is the lack of control the investigator has over the 
conditions under which the malware is executed.  
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In light of the above, the MATEF provided two key benefits for the forensic investigator: the 
ability to make an informed decision on which tool to use to perform offline malware analysis 
and the ability to customise the test environment to evaluate how the tool performs under 
different conditions, e.g.: operating systems and execution time.   
With the source of Oracle information in place providing details on the expected behaviour of 
a malware binary, it was down to the tool under test to establish what behaviour can be 
observed executing the binary.  To do this a safe and controlled environment needed to be 
provided in order to operate the tool and the malware. 
4.2.6 Test environment 
The test environment of the MATEF is one that will need to be managed via an automated 
script and have sufficient capacity to enable multiple tests to be run in parallel.  In this way 
the data collection capacity of the MATEF will increase, helping to reduce the time required 
for large scale tool testing.   
The anticipated variability of the malware under analysis may impact on the statistical power 
of the results (Smith, 2012).  Hence, by increasing the number of malware binaries analysed 
from the library the statistical power (and hence the statistical significance) of the results 
should increase. 
Closely linked to the test environment is the Internet simulation component, providing a 
networked environment containing common network services. 
4.2.7 Internet simulation 
The provision of network services (see Requirement 8, Table 3-2) provides the MATEF with 
an added level of realism to malware running within the Test Environment.  Bayer et al. 
(2009) report that over 45% of malware they examined engaged in TCP traffic, which is not 
possible without an endpoint to initiate a connection to. 
It is important this network provision is simulated to minimise any risk of the malware 
stealing any data or committing any unauthorised access to other networks (see Requirement 
1, Table 3-2).  Requests and responses are passed to and from common network services that 
are exposed to the test environment through the component. 
A significant product of the test environment (assisted with the Internet simulation) is the log 
file from a given tool under test.  To form any conclusions on a given tool, the log file it 
produces must be analysed. 
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4.2.8 Analysis component 
In order to undertake analysis of a software tool, the analysis component needed to establish 
four things.  The first of these was to establish what the tool is to be compared against.   
Previously, it was argued this should be the expected quantity of a given artefact, as opposed 
its value (see section 3.3.2). In this research, this is referred to as the Expected value.  This 
value needed to be determined by an independent source (see Requirement 9, Table 3-3).  
Secondly, the analysis component needed the capability to extract the number of artefacts 
observed (referred to as the Observed value) by the tool under test from a log file bearing a 
filename that can be determined programmatically, thus allowing multiple log files from 
different VMs and tests to coexist (see Requirement 10, Table 3-3). 
A third analysis requirement was that the analysis components must establish an assessment 
of the difference between the Expected and Observed values (see Requirement 11, Table 3-3).    
This is a critical value and subject to the aims of a given test, forms the basis of the 
comparison between tools or multiple executions of the same tool to evaluate repeatability. 
The final analysis requirement was a structured test design that was informed by one or more 
hypotheses that determined the aim of the analysis.   
Test Design 
As discussed previously (section 4.2.6) the malware to be studied using a given tool was 
anticipated to be highly variable.  In order to isolate any observed changes as a result of a test 
control measure over variability of the malware itself, the analysis process needed to separate 
the malware selected for test runs into two groups.  The first of these groups contained a list 
of the malware that exhibit variability in the numbers of artefacts observed when run under 
the same conditions.  The second group would comprise a list of the malware that produced 
the same number of artefacts when run under the same conditions, and is hence repeatable.  It 
was anticipated that any subsequent analysis would then focus upon the latter group to 
effectively filter out false positives in the data. 
From a legal perspective, the overall aim of the analysis was to identify software tools that 
were ‘reliable’ (see Requirement 3, Table 3-2).   Although open to interpretation, this can be 
pinned down a little more if the regulatory requirement for validation is also considered (see 
Requirement 4, Table 3-2).  The focus of this research was to validate a software tool as part 
of the process of validating a method. The difference between the Expected and Observed 
values was selected as the metric for this analysis, as discussed in section 3.3.2.   
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Online sandboxes for malware analysis typically offer no control over the parameters of the 
test, such as the length of time that the malware is executed.  This parameter is one that was 
easily adopted as a control measure for the test process to determine if different execution 
times produce more or fewer artefacts.  If a practitioner can determine an execution time 
beyond which there is little added benefit to their findings, this would save valuable analysis 
time.  Furthermore, the ability to quantify the impact of different execution times on the 
findings provides information to the practitioner where previously there was none.  Hence, 
the hypothesis to determine the impact of the execution time is presented in Table 4-2: 
H1.0 Changing the execution time of malware has no significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool.  
H1.1 Changing the execution time of malware has a significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool. 
Table 4-2 : Hypotheses 1 – Does changing the execution time affect how many artefacts 
are observed? 
As well as the question of how long to run a tool for before concluding no further artefacts 
will be observed, the practitioner will seek to justify their choice of tool to the court.  Hence, 
the hypothesis to determine which (if any) of two tools is able to detect a greater number of 
artefacts under the same operating conditions is presented in Table 4-3: 
H2.0 There is no significant difference on the number of malware artefacts observed by 
Tool A when compared to Tool B, under the same conditions.  
H2.1 Tool A is able to detect a significantly greater number of artefacts when compared to 
Tool B, under the same conditions. 
H2.2 Tool B is able to detect a significantly greater number of artefacts when compared to 
Tool A, under the same conditions. 
Table 4-3 : Hypotheses 2 - Which tool observes more artefacts? 
Figure 4-1 shows how the components described above are configured into the MATEF, 
together with the information flows between components.  Note boxes in grey are external 
components that sit outside the MATEF. At present the statistical analysis component is 
performed using an independent statistical analysis tool.  It is envisaged that future 
development of the MATEF will include a statistical component within the MATEF.  
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Figure 4-1 : MATEF components 
Given that statistical analysis is currently performed outside of the MATEF, the analysis 
component produces an output that can be analysed statistically by third-party software. 
In order to test and hence evaluate the MATEF design an implementation was undertaken, as 
discussed in the next section. 
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4.3 Implementing the MATEF framework 
4.3.1 Malware sample source 
Referring to requirement 7 in Table 3-3, the MATEF should be capable of accepting malware 
from a variety of sources.  Elisan (2015) identifies several sources from which malware may 
be freely obtained. These were considered as a source for the MATEF, but were rejected on 
the basis that the numbers of binaries available from these sources are relatively small and not 
easily extracted in large numbers.  Enthusiasts typically run such sources on a voluntary basis, 
resulting in sporadic support. 
Other sources of malware include Honeypots (Gashi, Sobesto, Stankovic & Cukier, 2013), 
but this approach was again discounted on the grounds that it takes time to build a large 
collection of samples. Furthermore, a solution for the MATEF is sought that minimises the 
effort on the part of data collection.  The requirement to build and commission a honeypot to 
initially gather malware binaries may discourage others from adopting the MATEF. 
A more viable approach was offered through contact with security research organisations, 
such as VirusTotal (2010).   VirusTotal provide a mechanism to feed malware submitted to 
their scanning platform through a specified email address.  Each email contains a single 
malware file attachment encrypted in a password protected zip file bearing a filename 
matching the file’s MD5 hash value.  The use of VirusTotal as a source conveniently satisfies 
requirements 6, 7 and 8 from Table 3-3.  Malware delivered via email attachments to the 
MATEF in this way is then extracted and stored in the Malware Library. 
4.3.2 Malware library 
The simplest approach to storing the malware binaries was to store them in a folder structure 
on disk with access permissions set to limit access to the files by unauthorised personnel.  
Using hash values as filenames to identify the malware, each file could also be encrypted with 
a password to both limit access and minimise accidental or deliberate cross-contamination.  
Malware located in the library was periodically sent to the Oracle (see section 4.3.5) where 
the results returned were then stored in the Malware database. 
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4.3.3 Malware database 
Implemented in SQLite (https://sqlite.org/), the Malware database is comprised of the tables 
represented in Figure 4-2 below. 
 
Figure 4-2 : MATEF Malware Database 
The database schema follows a relational database approach to model the artefacts associated 
with malware.  The rationale for organising the tables into ports, files and registry keys is that 
the framework’s aim is to evaluate tools used to detect the artefacts that typically manifest in 
the form of file, registry, process and network based artefacts (see section 4.1).  By organising 
the artefacts into these groups (tables) it simplified the process of selecting appropriate 
malware binaries to a given tool that may, for example, only be designed to detect port 
activity.  Each of the fields is summarised in Table 4-4.  
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Table 4-4 : MATEF database field list 
The one-to-many relationship between the samples table, the properties table and each of the 
artefact tables (ports, files and regkeys) meant that when a new malware binary was added to 
the database multiple properties and artefacts could be recorded against a given binary.  The 
design is extensible in that if a new artefact group were to be added, eg: remote IP addresses 
that are contacted, then a new table with the associated fields may be added to accommodate 
this new group. 
As previously mentioned in section 4.2.3, the management of the database was controlled by 
management scripts to import new samples and to facilitate automated testing across many 
malware binaries. 
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4.3.4 Manager scripts 
The manager scripts were implemented in Python as there is an extensive library of existing 
code available to build upon, such as provided by Ligh et al. (2010). The three main scripts 
are as follows: 
dbmgr.py The database manager script, builds on code developed by Ligh et al. (2010).  
The script manages the import of new malware binaries, the storage and 
retrieval of malware aretfacts and files. 
pms.py The Program Manager Script (PMS) divides the test between multiple VMs, 
each independently managed by a management script (mgr.py, see below). 
On start up, PMS determines if previously used hashes have been requested 
(for repeatability testing) or if new, randomly selected ones belonging to an 
artefact type group are to be used, see Pseudocode 1. 
mgr.py Multiple instances of this script (see Pseudocode 2) are generated by the PMS 
(see above) to oversee the operation of a single VM.  Each of these instances 
parses a hash list file associated with the VM, identifying a hash on each pass.  
Artefacts associated with this hash are identified from the malware database 
and stored in files for later analysis.  The script then copies batch files to a 
network share visible to the VM, which is then booted.  The batch files 
control the operation and timing of the tool under test.  On completion the 
tool’s log file is copied to network share before the VM is reverted in 
readiness for the next test.  
  
Chapter 4  - Designing and implementing a framework  Page 94  
 
========================================================= 
PMS.PY 
Arguments: ArtefactTypes, HashListFolder, NumBins 
 
========================================================= 
 
vmFirst  = 1 // Number of first VM to use 
vmLast  = 60 // Number of last VM to use 
 
// Get list of hashes for test 
// If HashListFolder is null, pick new hashes 
// Otherwise, uses hash files from supplied folder 
IF HashListFolder == "" 
  // Randomly select NumBins hashes, based on Artefact 
 HashList = GetSamples(ArtefactTypes, NumBins)  
 
 // Create separate hash list files, one for each VM 
  CreateHashListFiles(HashList,vmFirst,vmLast) 
ENDIF 
 
 
// Divide the testing between multiple VMs 
FOR vmNum = vmFirst to vmLast 
   
  // Filename of hash list file 
  hlFile = HashListFolder + “hashList-vm” + vmNum   
  
  RUNSCRIPT 'mgr.py' 
    WITH vmNum, hlFile, ArtefactTypes 
  
  // Stagger the VM startups to minimise load 
Sleep 10 seconds 
ENDFOR 
 
 
//Wait for all VMs to finish running 
VMRunning = Number of VMs running 
WHILE VMRunning > 0 
 VMRunning = Number of VMs running 
ENDWHILE 
 
// Preserve results 
COPY ToolLog files from TestFolder to DataFolder 
COPY List of hashes used for test to DataFolder 
Pseudocode 1 : Program Manager Script (PMS.PY) 
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========================================================= 
MGR.PY 
Arguments: vmNum, hlFile, ArtefactTypes 
========================================================= 
// Set path to a network share specific to the vmNum 
BaseFolder  = A network share location 
ShareFolder = BaseFolder + "/" + vmNum 
Count    = 0 
FOR each hash in hlFile 
 // Store artefacts of used hashes for later analysis 
  IF ArtefactTypes includes REGISTRY artefacts 
  regArtefactList = Registry artefacts for hash 
  Filename = vmNum+Count+“regArtefacts”  
   WriteToFile(Filename, regArtefactList) 
 ENDIF 
 IF ArtefactTypes includes PORT artefacts 
  portArtefactList = Port artefacts for hash 
   Filename = vmNum+Count+“portArtefacts” 
   WriteToFile(Filename, portArtefactList) 
 ENDIF 
 IF ArtefactTypes includes FILE artefacts 
  fileArtefactList = File artefacts for hash 
  Filename = vmNum+Count+“fileArtefacts” 
   WriteToFile(Filename, fileArtefactList) 
 ENDIF 
 
 Path = GetSamplePath(hash) // Get library path to MW 
  
 Copy Client batch files from Library to ShareFolder 
 Extract malware binary from Path to ShareFolder 
  
 Start VM number vmNum  
 // Wait for VM to complete booting or timeout 
 // Returns 0 if complete or -1 if timed out 
 Result = CALL WaitVmStart() 
 IF Result == 0 
  CALL WaitVMStop() // Wait for shutdown  
 Revert the VM  
 Rename Tool Log file to include the VM & Test number 
 Copy ToolLog file from VM share to TestFolder 
 Clear files from VM share 
  Increment Count 
ENDFOR 
Pseudocode 2 : Manager Script (MGR.PY) 
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4.3.5 The Oracle 
Two of the proposed requirements for the MATEF that inform the choice of Oracle were the 
need to automate the process (see Requirement 7, Table 3-3) and the ability to determine 
expected quantity of artefacts (see Requirement 9, Table 3-3).  Thus, the former required the 
Oracle to accept automated submissions of malware to its system as well as providing an 
interface to programmatically collect the results.  Furthermore, the report produced by the 
Oracle needed to be of a form to facilitate parsing by a script so the findings could be 
imported into the malware database.  The latter requirement meant that the Oracle should 
report an indication on what it observed, thereby enabling the quantity of observed artefacts 
to be calculated. 
Further to the above requirements of the MATEF, the design of the database (section 4.3.3) 
meant that the Oracle report should also include artefacts identified as either file, registry, 
network or process related artefacts (see Figure 4-2).  In addition, the design of the database 
suggested that the actions performed on these artefacts should also be reported. 
In selecting a sandbox source for use as the Oracle in this research implementation of the 
MATEF, the sandboxes listed in Table 4-5 were considered. 
The ThreatExpert (2011) sandbox was initially considered as an Oracle source for the 
MATEF, but repeated reliability issues at the time were considered a threat to the progress of 
the research.  Like ThreatExpert, the Anubis (2010) sandbox also provided a readily available 
and convenient interface to upload multiple malware samples via a script.  The ability to add 
a new module to interface to a given sandbox demonstrates the flexibility of the MATEF to 
use more than one source for the Oracle (see the database table named source in Table 4-4).  
This is important as online sandboxes can be transitory in nature and therefore not guaranteed 
to be available in the future. 
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Table 4-5 : Online malware analysis sandboxes 
4.3.6 Test environment 
The research environment provided a VMWare (VMWare, 2016) resource, available to enable 
multiple virtual machines (VMs) to be operated remotely and via a scriptable interface.  This 
allowed for the deployment of multiple VMs, each meeting the need for the use of a VM in 
the MATEF (see Requirement 7 in Table 3-2 and Requirement 2 in Table 3-3).   
Name Description 
Anubis (2010) Online malware analysis system. Enables individual executable files 
to be uploaded via a web form or bulk quantities via FTP.  Results 
are sent to a designated email address. 
Comodo Valkyrie 
(Comodo Group, n.d.) 
Provides ‘File Verdict Service’ employing different methods to 
analyse a given file. 
F-Secure (2011) Online malware analysis system. Enables executable files to be 
uploaded via web form or uploaded via FTP.  Files sent via FTP 
must also have an associated text file uploaded via the web form, 
limiting the ability to automate.  
Joebox (Joe Security, 
2017) 
Commercial online malware analysis system with a free license 
option.  Uses filtered Internet access to malware under analysis.  
Free account license does not allow different environments (eg: 
operating systems) to be specified and is limited to 10 submissions 
per day. 
Malwr (Malwr, 2016) Online system that uses the offline Cuckoo (2016) sandbox 
environment.  No option to configure test environment.  No facility 
to automate submissions available. 
Payload Security 
(Payload Security, 
n.d.) 
Online malware analysis system that can be purchased for offline 
analysis of large quantities of data.  No bulk analysis is available for 
online platform.  Environment and even user actions can be scripted 
for analysis. 
ThreatAnalyzer 
(ThreatTrack Security, 
2016) 
Online malware analysis system, formally run operated as the 
academic programme known as ‘CWSandbox’.  Now a commercial, 
subscription service. 
ThreatExpert (2011) Online malware analysis system. Enables individual executable files 
to be uploaded via a web form.  Early trials with this as an Oracle 
source found it to be unreliable at delivering reports. 
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To provide as fertile an environment for the malware as possible (to satisfy Requirement 9, 
Table 3-2 and Requirement 4, Table 3-3), the operating system needed to be subject to a 
number of vulnerabilities. Sikorski and Honig   (2012) recommend Windows XP for this 
reason.  Thus, this was selected as the operating system for the MATEF implementation. 
Each VM needed to be configured to operate on a closed network with no Internet access (see 
Requirement 1, Table 3-2).  However, to meet Requirement 8 of Table 3-2 (network service 
provision) simulated Internet services needed to be available as well. 
4.3.7 Internet simulation 
Malware typically exploits one or more Internet based protocols such as Hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) (Traore, Awad & Woungang, 2017, p. 2), Domain name system (DNS) 
(Wang, Lin, Cheng & Chen, 2017) and Internet relay chat (IRC) (Angrishi, 2017) to exhibit 
more behaviour post-infection of the host computer.  Tools such as ApateDNS (FireEye, 
2017) used for responding to DNS queries and MockServer (Bloom, 2017) used for 
responding to HTTP requests can be used to provide a simulated Internet environment.  
However, the disparity of these tools makes it harder to manage them collectively as a single 
entity in a test environment. 
A more integrated solution known as iNetSim (Hungenberg & Eckert, 2016) has been selected 
for inclusion in the MATEF as the Internet simulator.  Hungenberg and Eckert describe the 
tool as “a software suite for simulating common internet services in a lab environment, e.g. 
for analysing the network behaviour of unknown malware samples”.  The tool provides 
simulated services for several services including HTTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). 
4.3.8 Statistical analysis 
Previously, it was identified that, for a given malware binary, the Analysis component (see 
section 4.2.8) would need to establish (a) the expected quantity of artefacts; (b) the observed 
number of artefacts and (c) the difference between the expected and observed values.   
These requirements were most readily made available via a script that meets the requirements 
of (a) and is able to interrogate the malware database (via the management script).  To 
address (b), the script examines the raw log files produced by a given tool under test.  Given 
the disparity in the formats of log files from different tools, functionality such as identifying 
and counting the number of network ports opened by a tool has been abstracted in the script.  
The specifics of interpreting a given log file format were implemented in a separate script 
(termed a wrapper) that forms a plug-in for each tool under analysis.  Thus, to facilitate 
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extensibility, the introduction of a new tool requires only that the smaller wrapper script is 
produced for that tool whilst the functionality and logic of the process as a whole is held in a 
single master script (analyseMATEF.py), see Pseudocode3 below 
========================================================= 
analyseMATEF.PY 
Arguments: logFileFolder  // Folder containing log files 
  analysisType  // Type of analysis to perform 
========================================================= 
 
BASEDATA  = A network share location for all results 
CSVFNAME = “analysisCSV.csv” 
LOGPATH  = BASEDATA + logFileFolder  
CSVPATH  = BASEDATA + logFileFolder + CSVFNAME 
 
vmFirst  = 1 // Number of first VM to use 
vmLast  = 60 // Number of last VM to use 
 
csvFile = createCSVFile(CSVPATH) 
  
// Get the Log file from each VM used 
FOR vmNum = vmFirst to vmLast 
   
  // Call readTooLogFile, returning 3 values: 
  //   Res.hash   MD5 hash of binary file 
  //  Res.Expeceted  Expected number of artefacts 
   //  Res.Observed   Observed number of artefacts 
  Res = readTooLogFile(logFileFolder, vmNum, analysisType)  
  
  WriteToCSV(csvFile, Res.hash, Res.Expected, Res.Observed) 
ENDFOR 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
FUNCTION readToolLogFile(logFileFolder , vmNum, analysisType) 
 
SWITCH analysisType: 
  CASE 1: 
   // Examine each log file for a specified VM  
   // Return the MD5 hash, expected and observed 
   // number of files created by the malware 
    Result = analyseFiles(vm, logFileFolder) 
 CASE 2: 
    // Examine each log file for a specified VM  
   // Return the MD5 hash, expected and observed 
   // number of ports opened by the malware 
   Result = analysePorts(vm, logFileFolder) 
  // etc.  
ENDSWITCH 
 
RETURN Result 
Pseudocode 3 : Analyse MATEF Script (anayseMATEF.PY) 
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Regarding the difference between the expected and observed values (item (c) above), it is 
envisaged that at a later date this script will also undertake statistical analysis on this data and 
report its findings from simply running the script.  However, given the constraints of the 
research, this analysis is currently undertaken using external statistical tools, such as SPSS 
(http://www.ibm.com/spss). 
  
4.4 Testing strategy 
The discussion on test design (section 4.2.8) identified two hypotheses (see Table 4-2 and 
Table 4-3) that address the aims of this research.  Taking each of these as a control measure, 
the following statistically independent variables (IV) were identified: 
IV1 Execution time 
IV2 Analysis tool 
             Table 4-6 : Independent variables 
IV1 Execution time 
One item of metadata provided by the Oracle (see section 4.2.5) is the execution time for 
which each instance of malware is executed.  As discussed in section 4.2.8, variation of the 
execution time may result in a variation of the number of artefacts produced by the malware. 
Depending on the design and aims of the malware, different artefacts can be produced at 
different times. It is impractical to expect to observe every single artefact that might be 
produced by the malware, thus the focus here is to determine the number of initial artefacts 
created by the malware.   
The Oracle reports that the execution time varies between each malware binary, but has an 
average value of around 5 minutes.  The strategy therefore, was to deviate from this execution 
time by both increasing and decreasing the length of time each malware binary is run to 
address Hypothesis 1 (see Table 4-2). 
IV2 Analysis tool 
Two tools commonly used to study port activity on a computer under investigation are 
Process Monitor (Russinovich, 2016) and TCPVCon (Russinovich, 2011), the command-line 
version of the TCPView tool.    
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These two tools  were selected to address Hypothesis 2 (see Table 4-3), as they can both be 
controlled from the command-line.  The framework is designed to work with analysis tools 
that operate on a Windows operating system and are capable of being managed via a 
command-line interface. Hence the ability to start and terminate the tool via the command-
line as well as the ability to programmatically export a log file of the observed artefacts was 
required.  Therefore, the testing strategy chosen is to compare the number of artefacts 
detected by two software tools that meet the above requirements.   
With the testing strategy in place, the design of the experiments could then be formulated. 
4.5 Experiment design 
The MATEF implementation used for this research has 60 identical VMs available that can 
operate in parallel.  A total of eighty (80) malware binaries were applied to each VM, giving a 
total test space of 4,800 (60 x 80) malware binaries. 
These malware binaries were initially selected at random from a subset of malware binaries in 
the Malware Library that exhibit some form of network activity.  This initial random dataset 
was then applied to each of two tools for 1 minute, 5 minutes and 10 minutes and 10 seconds 
to explore the impact of this variation around the reported average execution time of the 
Oracle (see discussion on Execution time in the previous section). 
Early testing of the data collection process identified that a number of malware binaries 
produced highly variable numbers of artefacts on each execution.  To minimise the impact 
this ‘random noise’ had on the objective to measure a given tool’s ability to detect malware 
artefacts, each execution time was repeated twice.  This lead to the creation of three datasets 
of observations for a given tool; each for the same length of execution time.  Any malware 
binary that did not produce the same observed value in all three datasets was then filtered out, 
leaving a dataset of observations of malware behaviour that is considered repeatable.  This 
decision was made to minimise any error resulting from executing the malware and to 
improve the repeatability of the process, thereby aligning it more to a scientific methodology 
(see Table 1-1).  Whilst it is acknowledged that the impact of this decision is to evaluate a 
tool on only a subset of malware samples, it is argued that this does not impact on the validity 
of the framework, which remains unchanged.  However, this issue is included in the 
discussion on the limitations of the research (see section 6.5). 
As discussed earlier, Process Monitor and TCPVCon were applied to Hypothesis 1 (impact of 
execution time, see Table 4-2) and Hypothesis 2 (comparison of one tool with another, see 
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Table 4-3), as indicated in Table 4-7.  Each Test was comprised of two data collection runs, 
each running for different lengths of time. 
Experiment Test Description Hypothesis 
Experiment 1 
 
1.1 Comparing 1 minute to 5 minute 
execution times 
1 
Comparing Process Monitor at 
different execution times 
1.2 Comparing 1 minute to 10 minute 
execution times 
1 
 1.3 Comparing 1 minute to 10 second 
execution times 
1 
Experiment 2 
 
2.1 Comparing 1 minute to 5 minute 
execution times 
1 
Comparing TCPVCon at 
different execution times 
2.2 Comparing 1 minute to 10 minute 
execution times 
1 
 2.3 Comparing 1 minute to 10 second 
execution times 
1 
Experiment 3 
 
3.1 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon, 
run for 10 seconds 
2 
Comparing two tools at the 
same execution time 
3.2 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon, 
run for 1 minute 
2 
 3.3 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon, 
run for 5 minutes 
2 
 3.4 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon, 
run for 10 minutes 
2 
Table 4-7 : List of Experiments 
 
With the experimental design established, the analysis strategy was then considered. 
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4.6 Analysis strategy 
The previous section established the design of the experiments to be run.  Before considering 
how to analyse any results obtained through this method it was necessary to gain a clearer 
understanding of the nature of the data to be collected and analysed, as this informed the 
choice of applicable analysis methods available. 
4.6.1 Describing the data to analyse 
Stevens (1946) identified the relationship between what is being measured and the numerical 
values they represent.  This has since developed into what is commonly known as the Levels 
of Measurement, see Figure 4-3. 
 
    Figure 4-3 : Levels of measurement 
Each level inherits the properties of the preceding, meaning it is able to accommodate the 
type of data of the levels below it.  Furthermore, each level has associated with it a number of 
valid operations, see below.    
Level Examples Operations 
Nominal Port number,  Filename,  Registry key name =, <> 
Ordinal  Threat level of malware (eg: Low, Medium, High) =, <>, <, > 
Interval  Number of ports opened by malware =, <>, <, >, +, - 
Ratio File size of malware =, <>, <, >, +, -, *, / 
Table 4-8 : Measurement levels 
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Under this scheme, the port number of each opened port on a computer and the name of a file 
or registry key created are all examples of nominal data, based on the properties identified by 
Panik (2005).  The names and the number (in the case of port numbers) are nothing more than 
labels that refer to the artefact it represents.  There is, for example, no inherent difference 
between the network port 80 and port 443.  Although the former is commonly used for 
unencrypted web browser traffic and the latter for encrypted traffic, there is little else that can 
be determined from comparing them.  To state that one is greater than the other is or there is a 
‘difference’ of 363 between them is meaningless, as the port numbers do not represent a 
quantity.  
Both Hypothesis 1 (Table 4-2) and Hypothesis 2 (Table 4-3), examine ‘the number of 
malware artefacts’ to determine an outcome.  Hence, although the individual malware 
artefacts are nominal in nature, a count of their numbers represents a quantity.   
The quantities of artefacts produced by different malware binaries can be compared not just in 
an ordinal fashion (eg: one binary produces more artefacts than another) but also in terms of 
how much they differ (eg: one binary produces 10 more artefacts than another). Panik (2005) 
identifies this type of property as being interval data.   
Under this scheme differences on a scale are meaningful and can be compared to other 
differences on the same scale.  However, Panik points out that the zero point on the scale is 
deemed arbitrary; hence ratios of interval scale values are meaningless.  To illustrate his 
point, Panik describes the issue of comparing the skill level of two golf players.  This 
example has been adapted below to compare two software tools.  
Consider the number of ports opened by a malware binary, as observed by two tools tested 
using the MATEF.  Suppose the malware is programmed to open 3 ports on each execution 
and that the Oracle states that 2 ports are opened when the malware is executed.  When tested, 
Tool A reports that 4 ports were opened, whilst Tool B states that 5 were opened.  To answer 
the question of how good is Tool A at detecting open ports compared to Tool B depends on 
the point of reference or zero point.   If the zero point is taken to be the Oracle, then the 
absolute difference between what was expected and what was observed is 2 for Tool A and 3 
for Tool B.  It might be tempting then to suggest that Tool A is one and one-half times as 
good as Tool B at observing open ports.   
Alternatively, if the zero point is taken to be the programmed number of ports to be opened, 
then the absolute difference between what was expected and what was observed is 1 for Tool 
A and 2 for Tool B.  In this scenario, one might argue that Tool A is now twice as good as 
Tool B at observing open ports. 
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Hence, the action of observing the number of artefacts produced by malware operates at the 
interval level of measurement.  This conclusion has implications for the statistical tests that 
can be applied to this data (see section 4.6.2) and identifies the valid operations that can be 
performed upon it, see Table 4-8.    
The comparison of a pair of observed values (one for each execution time, for Hypothesis 1) 
would only provide a measure of how similar the distribution of observations are at different 
lengths of execution.  By also including the expected number of artefacts for each data point 
and calculating the absolute difference of the corresponding observed value from this, it 
becomes possible to gain a measure of the error in each observation.  Note that ‘error’ in this 
context is defined as the difference between an estimated ‘ground truth’ (as provided by the 
Oracle) and the observed value.  Plotting the frequency of these errors then produces a 
distribution of the absolute error of the observations between two execution times. 
The error value is of no relevance to either Hypothesis 1 (Table 4-2) or Hypothesis 2 (Table 
4-3).  This is because both these hypotheses seek only to compare the quantity of artefacts.  
However, recording the magnitude of the error additionally provides a measure of how well 
the tool is performing against the Oracle.  Thus each tool tested can be compared to both the 
approximated ground truth as well as other tools. 
 
4.6.2 Deciding how to analyse it 
The aim of any analysis to be performed is to address both hypotheses and ultimately the 
Research Question for this work.  Both hypotheses are concerned with ‘paired observations’, 
where the subject (in this case a malware binary) is measured before and after a change of the 
independent variable. 
Statistical tests that work with paired observations are generally divided into parametric and 
nonparametric tests.  Parametric tests are applied to data that have a known (e.g.: normal) 
probability distribution, making it relatively easy to predict a future observation.  Such data 
has fixed parameters, meaning that it is symmetrical about a central tendency and has a 
predictable spread of values.  
Where the distribution of the data is not symmetrical, such as when the data is skewed to the 
left or the right, then nonparametric tests may be more appropriate. 
A well known parametric statistical tests is the Student’s t-Test.  Field (2013, p. 165) 
describes the use of this test as being based on the assumption that the data to be analysed is 
normally distributed. 
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This assumption was not readily determinable a priori for the data in this research.  Hence 
initial pilot studies were undertaken post-hoc to perform exploratory tests to address this 
assumption prior to performing any further statistical analysis. 
4.6.3 Pilot studies to test for normality 
To determine if the distribution of the data is normally distributed, the following post-hoc 
methodology was undertaken. 
Methodology 
To mitigate any anti-analysis technique in place (see section 4.1) the initial stage of the 
methodology sought to differentiate highly variable malware binaries from those that were 
less variable and hence more repeatable.  
The approach taken follows that outlined in the section 4.5 (Experiment Design). In summary, 
the entire population in the malware library was examined by an online malware analysis 
platform, referred to in this research as the Oracle.  All the malware binaries reported to 
exhibit network port behaviour were allocated to a group.  From this group, 4,800 distinct 
malware binaries were chosen at random and allocated to a sub-group.  The malware binaries 
in this sub-group then became the subjects of the test.  This will be referred to as Dataset A. 
The following procedure was then applied, first using the Process Monitor tool to record the 
observations (Pilot Study 1) and then using the TCPVCon tool to record the observations 
(Pilot Study 2). 
Test procedure 
Each malware binary in the sub-group was executed three times for the duration of ten 
seconds, recording the number of observed ports opened by the malware.  Each binary was 
then again executed three times for the duration of one minute, again observing the opened 
ports.  This resulted in two groups of three datasets, see Figure 4-4 and Table 4-9. 
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Figure 4-4 : Pilot study dataset structure 
 
Pilot 
Study 
Test 
Run ID 
Dataset 
ID 
Description # of Malware 
Samples 
1 114 A Process Monitor, run for 1 minute 4091 
1 126 A Process Monitor, run for 1 minute 3726 
1 127 A Process Monitor, run for 1 minute 3794 
1 147 A Process Monitor, run for 10 seconds 3924 
1 148 A Process Monitor, run for 10 seconds 3743 
1 149 A Process Monitor, run for 10 seconds 3804 
2 115 A TCPVCon, run for 1 minute 3395 
2 128 A TCPVCon, run for 1 minute 3756 
2 129 A TCPVCon, run for 1 minute 3593 
2 150 A TCPVCon, run for 10 seconds 4046 
2 151 A TCPVCon, run for 10 seconds 3795 
2 152 A TCPVCon, run for 10 seconds 3958 
Table 4-9 : Pilot studies - Initial datasets 
 
Malware binaries that did not exhibit the same number of observations in all three datasets 
when executed for ten seconds were then filtered out; compare Malware 01 and Malware 04 
in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5.  Similarly, malware binaries that did not exhibit the same 
number of observations in all three datasets when executed for one minute were also filtered 
out; compare Malware 01 in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5.  Duplicate observations were then 
discarded to leave a single dataset of observations for each of the two execution times, see 
Figure 4-5 and Table 4-10. 
Chapter 4  - Designing and implementing a framework  Page 108  
 
 
Figure 4-5 : Deduplicating repeatable observations 
 
ID Dataset Name Description # of Malware 
Samples 
1 127_126_114 Process Monitor, repeatable values for 1 minute 2803 
2 149_148_147 Process Monitor, repeatable values for 10 seconds 416 
3 129_128_115 TCPVCon, repeatable values for 1 minute 1259 
4 152_151_150 TCPVCon, repeatable values for 10 seconds 632 
Table 4-10 : Pilot Studies - Repeatable datasets 
 
With the variability in the malware minimised, a post-hoc assessment was performed to 
determine if the assumption of normality is violated or not. 
To do this, each pair of datasets in Table 4-10 (grouped by tool) was combined into a single 
dataset of ‘paired observations’. This meant that all of the malware binaries with observations 
in BOTH datasets (i.e.: binaries with observations for 1 minute and 10 seconds) were copied 
to a new, combined dataset for each tool, see Figure 4-6. 
 
Figure 4-6 : Paired dataset for a tool 
At this point each tool (Process Monitor and TCPVCon) each has a single dataset of paired 
values, containing observations from execution times of 10 seconds and one minute, see 
Table 4-11. 
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ID Dataset Name Description # of Malware 
Samples 
1 ProcessMon_1min10sec Process Monitor, paired 1 min and 10 sec 333 
2 TCPVCon_1min10sec TCPVCon, paired 1 min and 10 sec 274 
Table 4-11 : Pilot studies - Tool paired observations datasets 
 
Checking for Normally distributed data 
An absolute error value was calculated from the expected and observed number of artefacts in 
each dataset.  A bi-modality was identified in both of the datasets listed in Table 4-11, see 
Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 of Pilot Study 1; also see Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10 of Pilot Study 
2.  The datasets were therefore each split into two groups, above and below the threshold of 
this bi-modality (Absolute Error of 50).  Each of the resulting subsets of data was then tested 
for Normality using the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) 
tests.   
Study Pilot Study 1 
Process Monitor 
Pilot Study 2 
TCPVCon 
Dataset K-S S-W K-S S-W 
Execution time: 1 min 
Absolute Error >=50 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Execution time: 1 min 
Absolute Error <50 
0.065 0.015 0.200 0.024 
Execution time: 10 sec 
Absolute Error >=50 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Execution time: 10 sec 
Absolute Error <50 
0.200 0.037 0.173 0.027 
Table 4-12 : Pilot studies - Normality test results showing levels of significance 
The K-S and S-W tests work by comparing the distribution against a normalised distribution.  
Hence, as Field (2013, p. 187) states, a significance value of less than 0.05 indicates a 
statistically significant deviation from a Normal distribution.  Therefore the distribution 
producing such as result can be considered to not follow a Normal distribution. 
Field goes on to argue that the S-W test has more power to detect a difference from normality 
than the K-S test.  This may account for the difference of significance values in Table 4-12. 
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Referring to Table 4-12 it can be seen that for both the 1 minute and 10 second distributions 
where the absolute error is below 50 (shown in bold in the table) the resulting distribution 
does not follow a Normal distribution, according to the more powerful S-W test.  This 
phenomenon occurs for both tools (Pilot Study 1 and 2).  This would indicate that for on-
going analysis parametric tests are not suitable and therefore nonparametric tests should be 
used instead. 
Selecting an appropriate statistical test 
Having established the need to use a nonparametric test, there remained the decision on which 
test to apply to compare these distributions.  Recall the data is comprised of dependent 
observations, i.e.: numbers of artefacts observed for a given subject at different execution 
times.  Hence, consideration needed only to be given to nonparametric tests that operate on 
dependent (as opposed to independent) samples.   
The next question to consider was how many distributions were to be compared.  Comparing 
multiple distributions together avoids familywise errors, whereby multiple Type I errors are 
introduced as a result of combining the results of multiple independent tests (Field, 2013, p. 
68).  However, tests that combine multiple distributions simply report that the distributions 
either are or are not the same.  In other words, such tests do not identify which distributions 
are different.  Hence, although such a test would address H1 (Does changing the execution 
time affect how many artefacts are observed?), it would not highlight at what execution time 
this happens.  Furthermore, the multi-modal nature of the data (see above) highlighted a 
difference in the parametric nature of the data above and below the absolute error of 50.  This 
change in the nature of the data would be lost if multiple distributions were used collectively 
instead. 
In addition, a test comparing multiple distributions would not address H2 (Which tool 
observes more artefacts?) as this hypothesis must compare distributions taken under the same 
conditions, i.e.: a single execution time. 
In conclusion therefore, a nonparametric test that compares two distributions of interval-based 
dependent variables is required. 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (Sheskin, 2011, p. 809) was selected to perform the analysis.  
This is because it is an established and appropriate statistical test for comparing distributions 
containing paired observations that are not normally distributed; or where one or more of the 
assumptions for the equivalent t test are saliently violated.  The test accepts either ordinal or 
interval data. 
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An alternative considered was the binomial sign test (Sheskin, 2011, p. 823) as this is similar 
to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank.  However, it only operates on the direction of differences and 
so ignores the magnitude of the differences.  Hence this test has less power, meaning it is less 
capable of detecting changes compared to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. 
Another alternative to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test commonly considered is the McNemar 
test (Sheskin, 2011, p. 835).  This test was discounted as it only supports nominal data and so 
would only indicate if one tool observed greater or fewer artefacts than another.  It would not 
report by how much one tool was better (or worse) than another.  Furthermore, as with the 
binomial sign test, this test has less power when compared to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, 
meaning it is less capable of detecting changes.  
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Pilot study 1 – Data produced by Process Monitor 
A dataset of observations obtained using the tool Process Monitor v3.01 was selected.  This 
data contains paired observations for malware binaries executed for both 10 seconds and 1 
minute.  The dataset contains 333 paired observations for malware binaries (N=333). 
An initial analysis of the frequency distribution was produced for each condition 
(execution time) to explore the distribution of the data in each case, see  
Figure 4-7 and  
Figure 4-8. 
 
 
Figure 4-7 : Initial Frequency Distribution (Process Monitor - 1 min) 
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Figure 4-8 : Initial Frequency Distribution (Process Monitor - 10 sec) 
 
In both cases there is a clear bi-modality in the data for absolute errors of approximately 50 or 
less.  This was confirmed by examining the frequency table produced for each of the two 
distributions. 
The dataset was therefore split into two groups, subjects with an absolute error less than 50 
and those with an absolute error of 50 or more.  Each of the four resulting subsets of data 
were then tested for Normality using the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) and 
Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) tests.  See the discussion on Checking for Normally distributed data, 
above. 
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Pilot Study 2 – Examining data produced by TCPVCon 
A dataset of observations obtained using the tool TCPVCon v3.01 was selected.  This data 
contains paired observations for malware binaries executed for both 10 seconds and 1 minute.  
The dataset contains 274 paired observations for malware binaries (N=274). 
An initial analysis of the frequency distribution was produced for each condition (execution 
time) to explore the distribution of the data in each case, see Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10. 
 
Figure 4-9 : Initial Frequency Distribution (TCPVCon - 1 min) 
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Figure 4-10 : Initial Frequency Distribution (TCPVCon - 10 sec) 
 
As before, both cases demonstrate a clear bi-modality in the data for absolute errors of 
approximately 50 or less.  This was confirmed by examining the frequency table produced for 
each of the two distributions. 
As with the Process Monitor data, the dataset was split into two groups, subjects with an 
absolute error less than 50 and those with an absolute error of 50 or more.  Each of the four 
resulting subsets of data were then tested for Normality using the standard Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff (K-S) and Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) tests.  As before, see the discussion on Checking 
for Normally distributed data, above. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has identified the aims of the MATEF design by linking back to the previously 
identified requirements.  With the design aims established, the main components of the 
framework were conceptualised to meet each of the design aims.  The main components 
identified include a source for real-world malware to provide a greater element of validity to 
the results as possible.  Also included is a component that acts as a source of ground truth 
about the malware is referred to as the Oracle.  This Oracle would determine the expected 
behaviour of a given malware binary. 
Once ingested, a malware binary is passed to two further components, namely a library to 
house the malware binaries and a database to store details concerning each binary.   
Management scripts form another significant component of the MATEF design and are 
responsible for managing the database and library along with the tests themselves, producing 
standardised log files ready for analysis. 
The component that forms the test environment is a collection of virtualised operating 
systems running in parallel.  The choice of operating system is such that it provides a fertile 
an environment as possible for malware to operate and hence provide the ‘best case scenario’ 
for tools under analysis. 
The final component is the analysis part of the MATEF.  The design of this component is 
informed by the aims of the framework as a whole (see section 4.1).  Hence the choice of 
metrics to monitor, the design of the test runs performed and the statistical analysis performed 
are all determined by the objectives.  As a result, two pairs of hypotheses have been identified 
which ask two fundamental questions: “Does changing the execution time affect how many 
artefacts are observed” (see Table 4-2) and “Which of two tools observes more artefacts 
under the same conditions” (see Table 4-3). 
The next chapter applies the methodology outlined and presents a more detailed analysis of 
the results relating to these hypotheses.   
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Chapter 5  Results and analysis 
In the previous chapter the MATEF was designed from the requirements and implemented to 
meet the identified aims using resources available to the research project.  To demonstrate its 
utility, a series of experiments were designed together with an associated analysis strategy. 
This chapter presents the results and subsequent analysis of these experiments to demonstrate 
the analysis and conclusions that can be drawn from data collated using the MATEF.  It 
should be noted that these experiments and subsequent analysis are only examples of what 
can be achieved using the MATEF.  The results of these experiments show how the choice of 
tool can determine the optimum execution time used to monitor malware. 
The chapter opens with some worked examples on how the analysis was performed (5.1).  
After this a summary of the results is presented (5.2), which is then followed by a discussion 
(5.3).  Conclusions are then drawn (5.4) and finally the chapter is summarised (5.5).  
5.1 Worked examples of analysis 
With the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test selected in the previous chapter, what follows are two 
worked examples to demonstrate how the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was applied to the 
output of two different tools.  The data for these worked examples is taken from the Pilot 
study (see section 4.6.3). 
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5.1.1 Worked example of analysis for Process Monitor 
The paired observation data for the Process Monitor tool (Dataset ID 1 in Table 4-11) was 
loaded in SPSS (IBM, 2016), see Table 5-1 for a sample of the data.  Note the hash values 
here have been shortened for brevity.  
MD5 Hash Expected  Observed 
(1min) 
Abs. Error 
(1min) 
Observed 
(10sec) 
Abs. Error 
(10sec) 
fe40…271d 751 0 751 0 751 
05b4…3ae1 3 3 0 1 2 
7ccf…e04e 9 0 9 0 9 
183e…b7a4 7 0 7 0 7 
Table 5-1 : Sample of data from dataset ProcessMon_1min10sec 
Recall from section 4.2.8 that Hypothesis 1 (H1) is stated as: 
H1.0 Changing the execution time of malware has no significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool.  
H1.1 Changing the execution time of malware has a significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool. 
 
The two absolute error values from the ProcessMon_1min10sec dataset were supplied to a 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.  This produced a rejection of the Null Hypothesis (H1.0):  
 
Figure 5-1 : Worked example 1 (Process Monitor) 
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The effect size (r) is given by: 
!  =  !!   =    2.530333   =   0.1386 
  Equation 5-1 : Effect size for Process Monitor (Pilot study) 
This means that for the Process Monitor tool, the differences between the expected and 
observed number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=427) were 
significantly different to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports 
opened during a 10 second execution time (Median=427), T = 28, p = 0.011, r = 0.1386. 
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5.1.2 Worked example of analysis for TCPVCon 
The paired observation data for the TCPVCon tool (Dataset ID 2 in Table 4-11) was loaded in 
SPSS, see Table 5-2 for a sample of the data.  As before, the hash values here have been 
shortened for brevity.  
MD5 Hash Expected  Observed 
(1min) 
Abs. Error 
(1min) 
Observed 
(10sec) 
Abs. Error 
(10sec) 
ff18…e59a 483 0 483 0 483 
4832…3537 10 2 8 0 10 
4c43…af0c 8 7 1 7 1 
5313…688e 1 1 0 1 0 
Table 5-2 : Sample of data from dataset TCPVCon_1min10sec 
As before, the two absolute error values from the TCPVCon_1min10sec dataset were 
supplied to a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.  This produced a failure to reject the Null 
Hypothesis (H1.0): 
 
Figure 5-2 : Worked example 2 (TCPVCon) 
Calculating the effect size (r) gives: 
!  =  !!   =    1.342274   =  0.0811 
    Equation 5-2 : Effect size for TCPVCon (Pilot study) 
This means that for TCPVCon the differences between the expected and observed number of 
ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=456.5) were not significantly 
different to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports opened during 
a 10 minute execution time (Median=456.5), T = 3.0, p = 0.180, r = 0.0811. 
Having described the analysis process with these two worked examples, what follows is a 
more comprehensive summary of the results. 
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5.2 Experimental results 
Prior to presenting a summary of these results here it is worth recapping the hypotheses (H1 
and H2) presented respectively in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 within section 4.2.8: 
H1.0 Changing the execution time of malware has no significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool.  
H1.1 Changing the execution time of malware has a significant impact on the number of 
malware artefacts observed by a given tool. 
Hypothesis 1 
H2.0 There is no significant difference on the number of malware artefacts observed by 
Tool A when compared to Tool B, under the same conditions.  
H2.1 Tool A is able to detect a significantly greater number of artefacts when compared to 
Tool B, under the same conditions. 
H2.2 Tool B is able to detect a significantly greater number of artefacts when compared to 
Tool A, under the same conditions. 
Hypothesis 2 
Recall the malware dataset has been partitioned into binaries identified as repeatable and non-
repeatable (see section 4.2.8).  These hypotheses are only applicable for repeatable malware. 
The experiment results follow and are summarised in Table 5-3 below: 
Table 5-3 : Results relating to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
 
Experiment Test Description Result 
1 1.1 Comparing 1 minute to 5 minute execution times of Process Monitor Retain H1.0 
 1.2 Comparing 1 minute to 10 minute execution times of Process Monitor Retain H1.0 
 1.3 Comparing 1 minute to 10 seconds execution times of Process Monitor 
Reject H1.0 
Propose H1.1 
2 2.1 Comparing 1 minute to 5 minute execution times of TCPVCon Retain H1.0 
 2.2 Comparing 1 minute to 10 minute execution times of TCPVCon Retain H1.0 
 2.3 Comparing 1 minute to 10 seconds execution times of TCPVCon Retain H1.0 
3 3.1 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon, run for 10 seconds Retain H2.0 
 3.2 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon,  run for 1 minute Retain H2.0 
 3.3 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon,  run for 5 minutes Retain H2.0 
 3.4 Process Monitor vs TCPVCon,  run for 10 minutes Retain H2.0 
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5.2.1 Experiment 1 - Comparing Process Monitor at different execution times 
To address Hypothesis 1 in Table 4-2 and determine the impact of execution time (if any) on 
the number of artefacts observed by the Process Monitor tool, the distributions were analysed 
in pairs, 1 minute vs 5 minutes and 1 minute vs 10 minutes.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
was applied to each pair of samples and produced the following results: 
Test 1.1 – Comparing 1 minute to 5 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 1 minute vs 5 minutes execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-3 : Test 1.1 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-4 : Test 1.1 Results summary 
 
The effect size (r) is given by: 
!  =  !!   
Equation 5-3 : Calculating the effect size 
      
where z is the Standardised Test Statistic and N is the number of observations. 
Thus, for Test 1.1, the effect size (r) is 
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 !  =  !!   =    1.826829   =   0.0634 
    Equation 5-4 : Effect size for Test 1.1 
These results mean that for Process Monitor the differences between the expected and 
observed number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=390) were 
identical to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports opened during 
a 5 minute execution time (Median=390), T = 10, p = 0.068, r = 0.0634. 
 
 Test 1.2 – Comparing 1 minute to 10 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 1 minute vs 10 minutes execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-5 : Test 1.2 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-6 : Test 1.2 Results Summary 
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Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 1.2 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    1.3571056   =   0.0418 
    Equation 5-5 : Effect size for Test 1.2 
These results mean that for Process Monitor the differences between the expected and 
observed number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=386.5) were 
identical to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports opened during 
a 10 minute execution time (Median=386.5), T = 22, p = 0.175, r = 0.0418. 
 
Observation 
Although both Test 1.1 and 1.2 produced a result where the null hypothesis is retained, there 
is a drop in the significance from 0.175 (Test 1.2) to 0.068 (Test 1.1), which is not far above 
the threshold of 0.05. 
In light of this observation, Process Monitor was again used to gather observations on the 
same malware, but this time executing the malware and tool for a period of 10 seconds.  The 
results are presented in Test 1.3. 
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Test 1.3 – Comparing 1 minute to 10 seconds of execution time  
The two absolute error values from the ProcessMon_1min10sec dataset were supplied to a 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.  This produced a rejection of the Null Hypothesis (H1.0):  
 
Figure 5-7 : Test 1.3 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-8 : Test 1.3 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 1.3 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    2.530333   =   0.1386 
    Equation 5-6 : Effect size for Test 1.3 
These results mean that for Process Monitor the differences between the expected and 
observed number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=427) were 
significantly different to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports 
opened during a 10 second execution time (Median=427), T = 28, p = 0.011, r = 0.1386. 
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5.2.2 Experiment 2 - Comparing TCPVCon at different execution times 
Again, to address Hypothesis 1 in Table 4-2 and determine the impact of execution time (if 
any) on the number of artefacts observed by a different tool (TCPVCon), the distributions 
were analysed in pairs, 1 minute vs 5 minutes and 1 minute vs 10 minutes.  The Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was again applied to each pair of samples and produced the following results: 
Test 2.1 – Comparing 1 minute to 5 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 1 minute vs 5 minutes execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-9 : Test 2.1 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-10 : Test 2.1 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 2.1 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    −0.447675   =  −0.0172 
    Equation 5-7 : Effect size for Test 2.1 
These results mean that for TCPVCon the differences between the expected and observed 
number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=421) were significantly 
different to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports opened during 
a 5 minute execution time (Median=421), T = 1.0, p = 0.655, r = -0.0172. 
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Test 2.2 – Comparing 1 minute to 10 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 1 minute vs 10 minutes execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-11 : Test 2.2 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-12 : Test 2.2 Results Summary 
Because the Standard Error (SE) is zero, the Test Statistics (z) cannot be calculated and thus 
the effect size cannot be determined.  Furthermore, an SE value of zero indicates the median 
of the differences between the two distributions (the 1 minute and 10 minute execution times) 
is also zero, i.e.: there is no change between the two distributions. 
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Test 2.3 – Comparing 1 minute to 10 seconds of execution time  
The results for the 1 minute vs 10 seconds execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-13 : Test 2.3 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-14 : Test 2.3 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 2.3 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    1.342274   =  0.0811 
    Equation 5-8 : Effect size for Test 2.3 
These results mean that for TCPVCon the differences between the expected and observed 
number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time (Median=456.5) were not 
significantly different to the differences between the expected and observed number of ports 
opened during a 10 minute execution time (Median=456.5), T = 3.0, p = 0.180, r = 0.0811 
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5.2.3 Experiment 3 - Comparing Process Monitor and TCPVCon  
To address Hypothesis 2 in Table 4-3 and inform the practitioner’s choice of tool, 
distributions for the same execution time from each tool were analysed for the execution 
times of 10 seconds, 1 minute, 5 minutes and 10 minutes.  The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
again applied to each pair of samples and produced the following results: 
Test 3.1 – Comparing Process Monitor and TCPVCon for 10 seconds of execution time 
The results for the 10 seconds of execution time are as follows:  
 
Figure 5-15 : Test 3.1 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-16 : Test 3.1 Results Summary 
Because the Standard Error (SE) is zero, the Test Statistics (z) cannot be calculated and thus 
the effect size cannot be determined.  Furthermore, an SE value of zero indicates the median 
of the differences between the two distributions (Process Monitor and TCPVCon run for 10 
seconds of execution times) is also zero, i.e.: there is no change between the two distributions. 
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Test 3.2 – Comparing Process Monitor and TCPVCon for 1 minute of execution time 
The results for the 1 minute of execution time are as follows.  Note in the Summary below, 
the field AbsDiff_127 refers to the absolute differences observed by Process monitor and field 
AbsDiff_129 refers to the absolute differences observed by TCPVCon.  
 
Figure 5-17 : Test 3.2 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-18 : Test 3.2 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 3.2 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    −1.908994   =  −0.0605 
    Equation 5-9 : Effect size for Test 3.2 
These results mean that when comparing Process Monitor to TCPVCon, the differences 
between the expected and observed number of ports opened during a 1 minute execution time 
were not significantly different to each other, T = 63.5, p = 0.056, r = -0.0605.  Note however, 
the significance value (p) is close to being significant, i.e.: < 0.05 in value. 
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Test 3.3 – Comparing Process Monitor and TCPVCon for 5 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 5 minutes of execution time are as follows. Note in the Summary below, 
the field AbsDiff_135 refers to the absolute differences observed by Process monitor and field 
AbsDiff_131 refers to the absolute differences observed by TCPVCon.  
 
Figure 5-19 : Test 3.3 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-20 : Test 3.3 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 3.3 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    1.414496   =  0.0635 
    Equation 5-10 : Effect size for Test 3.3 
These results mean that when comparing Process Monitor to TCPVCon, the differences 
between the expected and observed number of ports opened during a 5 minute execution time 
were not significantly different to each other, T = 3.0, p = 0.157, r = 0.0635 
  
Chapter 5  - Results and analysis  Page 132  
 
Test 3.4 – Comparing Process Monitor and TCPVCon for 10 minutes of execution time 
The results for the 10 minutes of execution time are as follows.  Note in the Summary below, 
the field AbsDiff_137 refers to the absolute differences observed by Process monitor and field 
AbsDiff_133 refers to the absolute differences observed by TCPVCon.  
 
Figure 5-21 : Test 3.4 Hypothesis Test Summary 
 
Figure 5-22 : Test 3.4 Results Summary 
Applying Equation 5-3, for Test 3.4 mutatis mutandis, the effect size (r) is 
!  =  !!   =    −1.0554   =  −0.0425 
    Equation 5-11 : Effect size for Test 3.3 
These results mean that when comparing Process Monitor to TCPVCon, the differences 
between the expected and observed number of ports opened during a 10 minute execution 
time were not significantly different to each other, T = 0.0, p = 0.317, r = -0.0425 
  
Chapter 5  - Results and analysis  Page 133  
 
5.3 Analysis and discussion 
Experiment 1 comprised of three tests relating to Hypothesis 1 (see previous section), which 
sought to determine the impact of execution time (if any) on the number of artefacts observed 
by the Process Monitor tool.  For the Process Monitor tool, the results indicated that 
execution time has no statistically significant effect on the differences between the expected 
and observed number of ports opened during execution time until the execution time is 
reduced below one minute to ten seconds.  Hence the optimal execution time to observe ports 
opened by malware using Process Monitor is between 10 seconds and one minute.  
Furthermore, there is no perceived benefit in executing Process Monitor to observe the 
number of ports opened by malware for more than one minute.  
This result contrasts with the TCPVCon tool (Experiment 2) whose results indicated that 
execution time has no statistically significant impact on the outcome under the same range of 
execution times. Hence, Hypothesis 1 cannot be generalised to all tools, as it is subject to the 
tool being used.  However, this result demonstrates that the MATEF has provided an 
empirical methodology to compare the impact of execution time on different tools.  The 
knowledge gleaned from such tests can be therefore be used by a practitioner to inform their 
choice of tool when conducting malware analysis.  Furthermore, this result means that when a 
practitioner obtains a new tool, the MATEF can be used to specify parameters, such as how 
long the tool must be run for to obtain the optimal number of artefacts. 
 
The results for Experiment 3 (Hypothesis 2) indicated that there is no statistical difference 
between using Process Monitor over TCPVCon as a tool to capture port related artefacts. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
It has been demonstrated that the MATEF can provide a systematic approach to observing 
malware artefacts under different conditions with different tools.  Several control variables 
were used during the tests conducted.  These include the operating environment, the malware 
binaries, the tools tested and the variability due to random anti-forensic techniques.  By 
controlling these variables it has been possible to isolate variations in the results reported by 
tools due to execution time.  The results identify an optimal execution time for a tool used to 
study malware artefacts as well as comparing two such tools.   
The results also indicate that changing the execution time of a tool used to monitor activity 
resulting from malware can, depending on the tool used, have an effect on number of artefacts 
observed.   
The impact of execution time on the results obtained from tools used for malware forensics 
has not been studied previously. For example, the five-phase model proposed by Malin et al. 
(2008) makes no reference to execution time (see section 2.2).  In the absence of any 
guidance or knowledge on this, practitioners would be selecting and running tools without 
any knowledge of the impact their choice of tool or execution time could have on their 
results. 
Therefore, identifying an appropriate tool can reduce the time required to observe the effect 
of malware and hence contribute towards reducing the time required to undertake a malware 
forensic investigation. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter outlined the results obtained from applying the analysis strategy presented in the 
previous chapter and presented the overall results obtained from using the MATEF.  It 
concluded that the choice of tool used could have an effect on the execution time used to 
monitor malware.  Furthermore, by formulating additional hypotheses regarding different 
aspects of malware analysis tools, the MATEF can be used to provide a basis for trusting 
malware forensic analysis. 
The next chapter will define the success criteria for the MATEF and apply this to evaluate the 
MATEF against a variety of criteria, such as the aims and requirements of the project. 
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Chapter 6  Evaluation of the MATEF 
 
In the preceding chapters the need for trusted practice in the use of software tools used in 
malware forensics has been identified.  The requirements to address this gap have been 
specified and a framework has been designed and implemented.  In addition, the use of the 
framework has been demonstrated to evaluate certain aspects of the malware analysis method 
(i.e. the impact of changing the tools used and their execution times).  It still remains to 
evaluate the framework itself both from a functional perspective against the requirements and 
a quality perspective in terms of performance and resource utilisation. 
Therefore, this chapter evaluates the MATEF against the original aims, requirements and 
research question.  The chapter opens by identifying the evaluation criteria (6.1) and defining 
what success looks like before moving on to evaluate the MATEF against the requirements 
and aims (6.2).  Evaluations in terms of performance (6.3) and the Research Question (6.4) 
are also considered before providing a discussion on the limitations of the framework (6.5).  
Conclusions and further work are presented (6.6) prior to a summary of the chapter (6.7). 
6.1 Evaluation criteria 
Prior to evaluating the framework it is useful to consider what criteria can be used to evaluate 
the level of success attained by the MATEF.  Hence, understanding what criteria should exist 
in a successful framework will be considered prior to examining each of these criteria in turn. 
A starting position to evaluate the MATEF is to consider how well it has met the 
requirements of the framework (see section 3.3) and further, how well it has achieved the 
aims of the framework (as set out in section 4.1).   
A further measure is to consider how well the MATEF has addressed the fundamental 
motivation for the research, expressed through the Research Question.  In addition, an 
assessment on the performance of the framework can be applied in terms of the speed and 
resource utilisation.  Finally, an exercise in identifying any areas of improvement in the 
design and implementation of the MATEF will be undertaken.  Wherever possible, 
mitigations for these are presented.  Each of these criteria is considered in the sections that 
follow. 
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6.2 Evaluate against framework requirements and aims 
Requirements 
The requirements for the MATEF are divided into external and internal requirements (see 
sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively).  The MATEF has been evaluated against these 
requirements, the conclusions of which are summarised in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 
respectively. 
 
# Requirement Met / Not 
met 
Rationale for decision 
1 Handling of malware and 
what it may access should 
be controlled. 
Met Malware binaries are handled via scripts on 
an internal network, isolated from the rest 
of the University/outside world. 
2 Output of tested tool must 
be admissible. 
Not met This is untested as the MATEF has not yet 
been applied to a live case. 
3 Malware analysis tool 
output must be ‘reliable’ 
Met The results of the analysis performed on the 
MATEF output are based on established 
statistical techniques. 
4 Novel methods must be 
validated 
Not met Given there is no ground truth, this is not 
easily achieved. 
5 The theory/technique should 
be peer reviewed or 
published 
Met The MATEF design, implementation and 
results are published in this dissertation 
6 Method should be a 
generally accepted 
Not met It is too early in the project’s lifecycle for 
the MATEF to have been accepted by 
others yet. 
7 Use a VM Met Virtual machines are used extensively in 
the MATEF 
8 Network service provision Met Network services are provided through a 
open source simulated network services. 
9 Use vulnerable environment Met The Windows XP operating system is used 
to provide a fertile environment for the 
malware. 
Table 6-1 : External requirements evaluation 
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# Requirement Met / Not 
met 
Rationale for decision 
1 Black box testing approach Met Closed source software tools have been 
used throughout. 
2 Malware lab requirements: 
VM Only approach 
Met Virtual machines are used extensively in 
the MATEF 
3 Malware lab requirements: 
Single operating system 
Met A single operating system has been 
implemented throughout. 
4 Malware lab requirements: 
Configure the OS to be 
malware friendly 
Met The Windows XP operating system is used 
to provide a fertile environment for the 
malware. 
5 Accept real-world malware 
from any source 
Met The MATEF can accept malware from any 
source as it simply requires the binary 
file(s) to be placed in a specified folder 
6 Storing & handling 
malware:  
Avoid cross contamination 
Met Malware files are stored in encrypted 
password protected ZIP files.  Prior to 
running a test a folder accessible to the VM 
is cleared and the malware file is decrypted 
an dcopied into this folder. 
7 Storing & handling 
malware:  
Extract via automation 
Met Malware submissions to the Oracle for 
analysis and the decryption process referred 
to above are automated via scripts. 
8 Storing & handling 
malware:  
Restrict access to malware 
Met Malware is stored in a folder with restricted 
permissions.  Furthermore, as stated above, 
each malware binary is encrypted in a 
password protected ZIP file. 
9 Metrics: 
Determine the expected 
quantity of artefacts from an 
independent source 
Met Each malware binary is submitted to the 
Oracle for analysis.  This analysis provides 
(amongst other things) the expected 
number of artefacts. 
Table 6-2 : Internal requirements evaluation 
Commencing with the external requirements summarised in Table 6-1, six of the nine external 
requirements were met.  These were achieved largely through the design of the framework.  
For example, the handling requirement (Requirement 1) is satisfied through the automated 
handling via a script (minimising the effects of human error) and the network configuration.  
Other requirements met by the design include the use of VMs (Requirement 7), network 
services provision (Requirement 8) and a fertile and vulnerable environment for malware 
(Requirement 9).   
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The design of the framework also contributed to the integration of the scientific method, 
satisfying number three of the external requirements (see Table 6-1).  The rationale of how 
this requirement has been met is outlined in Table 6-3 
# Attribute Rationale for attainment 
1 Repeatable • Tests can be re-run with the same data 
• VMs are reverted to same state 
• Use of automation minimises human error in repetition 
2 Reproducible • Framework published in this research 
• Malware library can be made available (subject to any restrictions) 
• Source code to be place on Open Research Data archive 
3 Testable • Artefacts are measurable (i.e.: quantifiable observations) 
• Malware with properties relevant to hypothesis can be selected 
4 Controllable • Test design can select: Tool, Network services, Execution time, 
Malware by property (e.g.: Network aware, Autostart on boot) 
• Design allows for use of different VM guest operating system 
5 Unbiased • Malware is randomly selected (with/without a specified property) 
• Malware can be imported from different sources 
• Modular design allows for use of different Oracle  
Table 6-3 : Rationale for trusted practice attainment 
The reproducibility attribute also satisfies the requirement that the theory/technique should be 
peer reviewed or published (Requirement 5). 
Nonetheless, three of the nine external requirements have not been met.  Arguably, this 
renders the implementation of the MATEF only a partial success.  However, a counter 
argument is that the reasons for this are primarily as a result of matters of scope and the 
fledgling nature of the MATEF as a research project, which we discuss below. 
Concerning scope, the validation (Requirement 4, Table 6-1) of any software tool used to 
examine malware is difficult, but not impossible to achieve.  Establishing ground truth 
concerning the artefacts produced by malware requires multiple forms of analysis concerning 
the capabilities of malware.  Traditionally, this is a labour intensive process and usually 
reserved only for malware that warrants a deeper understanding of its behaviour, such as seen 
with Stuxnet (Falliere, Murchu & Chien, 2011). Hence, this level of knowledge about a 
malware binary (arguably closer to ground truth) is not easily accomplished fully at scale on 
large numbers of malware, despite attempts to automate the process (Farley, 2015).  
Therefore, establishing the ground truth concerning malware behaviour is beyond the scope 
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of the MATEF, which is not a malware analysis tool but instead a framework to evaluate the 
tools used to perform malware analysis. 
The fledgling state of the research impacts on the requirement for admissibility (Requirement 
2, Table 6-1), as the MATEF is too new to have been applied to a live investigation that has 
subsequently gone to court.  Consequently, this is not a failing of the framework; it simply 
remains to be evaluated once the MATEF is applied to evidence submitted to court. 
Similarly, it is too early in the project’s lifecycle for the MATEF to have been accepted by 
other practitioners or academics within the community.  Hence, the requirement for general 
acceptance (Requirement 6, Table 6-1), is one that can only be evaluated once there has been 
an opportunity for the MATEF to be adopted for use by others. 
Turning to the internal requirements, summarised in Table 6-2, it can be seen that each of the 
internal requirements have been met.  Almost all of these requirements were satisfied through 
the design.  The framework assumes zero knowledge about the internal operation of the tools 
tested, thereby satisfying Requirement 1.  Other requirements met by design include the 
extensive use of VMs (Requirement 2), limiting the framework to a single operating system 
(Requirement 3), providing a malware friendly environment (Requirement 4) and being able 
to accept malware from any source by simply importing samples from a specified folder 
(Requirement 5).  The need to avoid cross-contamination of malware binaries (Requirement 
6) is also met through the design by using encrypted zip files and using scripts to automate 
the process of deleting all the files in a folder prior to decrypting the binary for use 
(Requirement 7).  The design of the framework also stipulates the folder structure that houses 
the malware binaries (the Malware Library, see section 4.3.2) has restricted permissions 
allocated to it.  Furthermore, the encrypted zip files containing the malware are also password 
protected (Requirement 8). 
The final internal requirement to determine the expected number of artefacts is achieved 
through both the use of an external system (the Oracle, see section 4.3.5) and a design feature 
whereby an alternative Oracle can be used in the event the chosen one is no longer available. 
The above requirements were developed to address the aims of the framework.  Hence it is 
worthwhile also considering how well these aims have been addressed.   
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Aims 
To recap, the aims from section 4.1 were: 
1. Use real-world malware 
2. Evaluate a tool’s ability to detect malware artefacts 
3. Mitigate against anti-forensic techniques 
4. Produce software product to test tools 
The first of the aims was to use real-world malware.  This aim is achieved, as the design of 
the MATEF includes the use of such malware sourced from VirusTotal (2010) (see section 
4.3.1).   
The second aim was that the MATEF should evaluate a tool’s ability to detect malware 
artefacts.  It is argued that the framework also achieves this aim, as it records a given tool’s 
observed number of artefacts against the expected number of artefacts, producing a measure 
of ‘error’.  The results from this research indicate that subsequent statistical analysis can also 
provide a measure of statistical significance when comparing errors from one set of operating 
conditions to another, e.g.: different execution times. 
Consideration for the mitigation against anti-forensic techniques forms the third aim.  Whilst 
completely meeting this aim is outside the scope of this research (see section 2.4), there has 
been room to mitigate this in part.  The discussion on proposed metrics (section 3.3.2) 
identified the use of quantities of artefacts rather than their values to avoid variation down to 
random behaviour.  Examples include counting the number of files created, instead of 
recording randomly generated filenames; and counting the quantity of ports opened instead of 
recording the number (identifier) of the port, which is again highly variable.  Hence this aim 
has been partially met. 
The final stated aim of the framework is to produce a software product to implement the 
framework into a useable product that can be put into practice.  This aim has also been met, 
due to the existence of the code and the research results, available in the Open University 
Research Data Archive.  
Having considered the requirements and aims, it is useful to identify a number of 
opportunities to develop and improve the MATEF.  The first of these is performance. 
6.3 Performance evaluation of the MATEF 
Two areas where the performance of the MATEF could be evaluated are its speed and 
resource utilisation.    
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Speed 
The MATEF has been developed from a functionality perspective and so has room to improve 
the speed with which it produces results.  For example, selecting 4,800 malware binaries to 
run in parallel across 60 VMs translates to each VM being prepared, booted, run and reverted 
80 times to execute each malware binary just once.  A list of test runs performed is provided 
in APPENDIX B where it can be seen that executing the malware for 1 minute with Process 
Monitor, for example, took an average of 15 hours and 26 minutes (or 926 minutes) to 
complete a Test Run (see Tests 127, 126 and 114).  A Test Run is defined here as the process 
of completing the testing of all selected malware binaries, which in this example is 4,800 
binaries.  This time is reproduced in column 2 of Table 6-4.  
To distribute the load on the virtual machine manager, each VM was initially started in a 
staggered fashion, using an initial delay made up of multiples of 10 seconds (denoted by ‘D’ 
in Figure 6-1).  This means that VM60 was subject to the longest delay in starting, which was 
(60-1)*10 = 590 seconds or approximately 10 minutes. 
 
Figure 6-1 : Test Run space for executing 4,800 binaries 
The time to complete the Test Run is comprised of this initial maximum delay of 10 minutes 
plus the time to execute the 80 tests that follow.  By subtracting this delay from the total Test 
Run time, it is possible to calculate the length of each of these individual tests (referred to 
here as a ‘VM Test’), see column 3 of Table 6-4. 
To illustrate this, return to the example of using Process Monitor running on VM60 to 
observe the malware for 1 minute; the Test Run (TR) time is 926 minutes (see above).  Hence 
the time to complete all 80 tests (Test time) is 926 – 10 = 916 minutes, see Figure 6-2. 
Given there are 80 VM Tests run sequentially in the Test time, each VM Test therefore 
requires 916 / 80 = 11.45 minutes to complete, see Row 3, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6-4. 
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Figure 6-2 : Example timings for Process Monitor on VM60 running for 1 min 
 
Breaking this time down further, each VM Test comprises five high level stages, see Figure 
6-3.    
 
Figure 6-3 : Breakdown of VM Test 
 
The three phases identified in Figure 6-3 are described as follows: 
Pre-Test phase (A): This is the time taken to complete the Prepare Test and Power on VM 
stages.  The former of these identifies the artefacts for the malware 
under test, locates the folder where the malware is stored in the 
Malware Library, copies this to the working folder and finally copies 
the batch files to be used by the VM to control the tool under test (see 
Pseudocode 2 in section 4.3.4).  The latter Power on VM stage simply 
considers the time taken to power on the VM. 
Duration phase (B): This is the execution time of the malware, as specified by the user, see 
column 1 of Table 6-4.   
Test 60.1.............................. DD D
Process Monitor running for 1 min on VM 60
Test 60.80.....................................
(VT) VM Test
(TR) Test Run 
Key
D = VM Start delay
10 s 10 s 10 s
Delay time = (60-1)*10 s = 590 s = 10 min
TR time = 15 hr 26 min = 926 min
Test time  =  TR time - Delay time  =  926 - 10  =  916 min
VT = Test time / Num VMs = 916 / 80 = 11.45 min
Prepare Test Power on VM Execute Tool then malware Revert VM Copy log data
Start of Test End of Test 
(B) Duration (A) Pre-Test (C) Post-Test 
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Post-Test phase (C): This is the time taken to complete the Revert VM and copy log data 
stages.  The former stage (Power on VM) simply considers the time 
taken to revert the VM.  The latter stage accounts for the time taken to 
rename the log file (to a name that identifies the VM and test number) 
and copy this log file to another folder for subsequent analysis (see 
Pseudocode 2 in section 4.3.4). 
 
Subtracting the malware execution time (marked ‘B’ in Figure 6-3) from the VM Test time 
results in the time required to complete the Pre-Test and Post-Test phases (i.e.: the sum time 
for A+C in Figure 6-3).  Applying this to the example of Process Monitor being used to 
observe the malware for 1 minute gives an elapsed time of 11.45 - 1 = 10.45 minutes for this 
sum time of A+C; see row 3, column 5 of Table 6-4.   
 
	 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
	 Tool	
Execution	
time	of	
malware	
Avg	Test	
LENGTH	
(HH:MM)	
Avg	Test	
LENGTH	
(mins)	
VM	Test	
Time	
(mins)	
Pre+Post	
Time		
(mins)	
1	 Process	Monitor	 10	sec	 13:31	 801	 10.01	 09.85	
2	 TCPVCon	 10	sec	 13:11	 781	 09.76	 09.59	
3	 Process	Monitor	 01	min	 15:26	 916	 11.45	 10.45	
4	 TCPVCon	 01	min	 13:09	 779	 09.74	 08.74	
5	 Process	Monitor	 05	min	 21:44	 1294	 16.17	 11.17	
6	 TCPVCon	 05	min	 20:37	 1228	 15.34	 10.34	
7	 Process	Monitor	 10	min	 22:48	 1358	 16.98	 06.98	
8	 TCPVCon	 10	min	 24:17	 1447	 18.09	 08.09	
Table 6-4 : Average test times 
 
Note: See the next page for a description of these column headings. 
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Meaning of column headings: 
Column Description 
1 The time duration the malware binary was executed for, depicted by stage B in 
Figure 6-3. 
2 The average of the time taken to complete THREE Test Runs under the same 
conditions.  Represented in HH:MM. 
3 As column 2, but accounts for (subtracts) the longest delay in starting VM60, i.e.: 
10 minutes.  Represented in minutes. 
4 The average time taken to complete ONE VM Test, depicted by the sum of the 
time taken to complete stages A, B and C in Figure 6-3. 
5 The time taken to complete stages A and C in Figure 6-3.  Calculated by 
subtracting column 1 from column 4.  Represented in minutes. 
The Pre-Test and Post-Test processing time (column 5 of Table 6-4) identifies what is 
approximately a 10 minute overhead per VM Test, which in Test Runs with large samples, 
adds a significant cost to the processing time.  In the best-case scenario with a zero overhead 
for a sample size this large, the Test Run time for a 1 minute VM Test would be the initial 
maximum delay of 10 minutes plus the time to execute the 80 tests (each lasting 1 minute) 
that follow, ie: 10 + (80 * 1) = 90 minutes.  
There are two areas where the VM Test time could be reduced.  The first of these would be by 
reviewing the Prepare Test stage, see Figure 6-3.  The code that operates in this stage makes 
multiple calls to the malware database to retrieve artefact information (see Pseudocode 2 in 
section 4.3.4).  The code also has a high level of logging in operation that inevitably will have 
an impact on the speed of code execution.  This code could therefore be reviewed and 
optimized. 
The second area where the Test Run time could be reduced would be to increase the number 
of VMs available for the test.  The MATEF is designed to be extensible and could thus be 
configured to use a larger number of VMs, thereby changing the testing space depicted in 
Figure 6-1.  For the same number of malware binaries to be examined, fewer than 80 VM 
Tests would need to be conducted if there were more than 60 VMs available. 
Alongside these speed issues, recall from above that the MATEF can also be evaluated in 
terms of its resource utilisation.    
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Resource utilisation 
For the MATEF to operate effectively it requires several resources. In the first instance, it 
requires a virtualised environment in which to operate.  The MATEF uses an open design to 
make it as portable as possible.  Hence although it is currently implemented within a 
VMWare solution (see section 4.3.6), any virtualised environment that can be automated via 
scripts will suffice.  The MATEF is also extensible, as subject to available resources, 
additional VMs can be added to improve performance.  
Disk space 
The disk space requirements for the MATEF are largely subject to the given implementation 
in place.  The installation used for this research consumes disk space as summarised in Table 
6.5.  
 
The artefact files comprises a list of all the artefacts expected for all of the malware in a Test 
Run and the sample path files contain the full path to the malware binary to be extracted.  
These are generated at the commencement of a Test Run and are formed from multiple 
queries made to the Malware Database.  Originally, this data was queried during the 
individual VM Tests, but this was found to slow the testing process down, hence these queries 
are now made in advance of the individual VM Tests.  
Element Disk space (Total) Disk space (per VM Test)1 
Malware binaries2	 61 GB - 
Malware artefacts DB 310 MB - 
MATEF scripts < 1 MB - 
Oracle Reports 5.1 GB - 
Tool log files3 120 GB 100 MB 
Artefact files4 - 22 MB 
Sample Path Files5 - 18 MB 
TOTAL 186.4 GB  
Table 6-5 : MATEF disk space usage 
Notes for Table 6-5: 
1 Figures based upon a 10 second VM Test using TCPVCon 
2 Refers to entire population (over 350,000) held in gzipped files 
3 Refers to the gzipped text based log files produced by each tool 
4 List of all the artefacts expected for all of the malware in a Test Run 
5 Files that contain the full path to the malware binary to be extracted 
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The Oracle 
Another resource the MATEF is dependent on is an Oracle to provide the point of reference 
for the tools under evaluation.  Again, the design of the MATEF is such that it is modular, so 
if one Oracle becomes unavailable another can be ‘plugged in’ as an alternative. 
Despite this flexibility, the supply of Oracle reports feeding into the MATEF is outside the 
scope of the MATEF design.  The Oracle provider dictates both the rate at which malware 
binaries can be submitted and the subsequent reports are provided.   This is anticipated to be 
more of a challenge when implementing a fresh installation of the MATEF where the 
malware used is such that it has not been previously stored on a MATEF framework and 
hence is not available to be shared.  This is less of an issue for an on-going and established 
implementation with a large population of malware and associated Oracle reports.  
However, this issue can be addressed either by developing an in-house Oracle or by 
integrating an existing solution, such as the Cuckoo Foundation (2016) sandbox.  
Furthermore, it may be conceivable to establish a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with an 
existing online malware analysis platform provider.   
Maintenance 
The MATEF requires several fundamental maintenance operations to perform a test and 
undertake analysis.   
From a testing perspective, there are three fundamental maintenance operations to perform a 
test and one maintenance operation to undertake analysis.  Malware must first be sourced, 
then submitted to the Oracle and finally imported into the MATEF for subsequent 
deployment during testing.  Depending on any arrangements with the source and the security 
policy in place at the organisation where the MATEF is implemented, all three of these steps 
can be automated.   
The implementation used for the first of these three operations was such that a feed of 
malware from the source VirusTotal (2010) was manually enabled for a limited time period 
and upon request only.   Furthermore, delivery of the feed was only possible via email to an 
externally hosted account, due to security restrictions in place at the University. 
Uploading the malware to the Oracle for the second operation was even more challenging for 
this research, as this essentially meant that the University would effectively be distributing 
malware outside of its own network, potentially making it liable for any issues that might 
arise if appropriate measures were not put into place.  Hence controls implemented included 
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the use of encrypted files copied to an Internet facing computer located outside the main 
network on the University’s demilitarised zone (DMZ).  Access to this location was restricted 
via credentials supplied over an SSL connection to a single authorised computer (the Oracle 
server), which then downloaded the encrypted malware from the university’s DMZ server. 
The final test related maintenance operation concerns adding a new tool to the MATEF for 
testing.  Alongside the tool binary itself, a DOS batch file must be created to initiate and 
shutdown the tool (where available) and provide any required command-line arguments.  This 
was found to be a relatively straightforward operation to implement and was only limited by 
the available command-line options available for the tool. 
From an analysis perspective, the MATEF currently requires that the output of the tool must 
be analysed to identify ‘footprints’ of given activity.  For example, the tool may differentiate 
and report differently on the creation of a new file that has resulted from a ‘Save as’ operation 
compared to a ‘File … New’ operation.  Once understood, the interpretation of the log file 
must be coded into a Python file, referred to as the tool wrapper (see Section 4.3.8). 
In practice, it was not always possible to interpret the output of a tool.  With many of the tools 
having little or no documentation provided and even less (if any) technical support, this could 
delay (or even prevent) the use of the given tool within the MATEF.  
Statistical analysis software 
As stated in Section 4.3.8, the statistical analysis component uses a script in conjunction with 
a wrapper to read the log file of the tool used in the test.   The product of this script is a 
comma separated value (CSV) file. 
The current implementation of the MATEF analyses this file using the statistical software 
SPSS (http://www.ibm.com/spss).  This is a manual process and requires skills and 
knowledge in using SPSS.  Furthermore, skills and knowledge in the interpretation of the 
statistical results are needed to obtain an informed view of the tool that has been tested.  
Much of this analysis could be automated to remove the dependence on SPSS and possibly 
some of the manual statistical interpretation of the results. 
Having considered the areas where the performance of the MATEF could be improved, an 
evaluation against the Research Question will now be considered. 
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6.4 Evaluation against the Research Question 
By way of a reminder, the Research Question in section 1.2 stated: 
Can a systematic basis for trusted practice be established for evaluating malware 
artefact detection tools used within a forensic investigation? 
How well the MATEF addresses this question can be approached by first recalling from 
section 3.3 that trusted practice is defined as the trust placed on the reliability of the evidence 
tendered.  Recall further that the Forensic Regulator’s Codes of Practice and Conduct (2016) 
provides a framework by which to establish such practice and is implemented through a 
number of requirements.  As argued in section 6.2, these requirements have largely been met. 
In terms of MATEF’s ability to evaluate malware artefact detection tools, this has been 
successful, in that a means to quantify and differentiate the results obtained from different 
software tools has been achieved.  The methodology taken can also be argued to be 
systematic in nature, as dependent variables have been identified and monitored as a result of 
making changes to independent variables throughout. 
Therefore, the MATEF provides a systematic means by which to evaluate tools and provide 
data to inform a practitioner’s decision in their choice of tools for a forensic investigation 
involving malware.  Given a scientific methodology to obtain this data was previously absent, 
the MATEF is the first to establish a methodical approach to increase the trust placed in 
software tools used in the practice of malware forensics. 
Despite these positives, there are several opportunities to develop and improve the MATEF.  
These are explored in the next section covering the limitations of the MATEF. 
6.5 Limitations of the MATEF 
This section presents what are anticipated as the main criticisms of the research.  Where 
possible, each of the criticisms highlighted is addressed.  The latter half of the section 
presents thoughts on contingencies in the event the primary research direction becomes 
unattainable. 
Representative malware population 
The implementation of the MATEF used (see Section 4.5) saw the exclusion of malware that 
was not repeatable.  This might be considered to reduce the representativeness of the malware 
used to test the tools.  Furthermore, it could also be argued that the rapid and relentless 
growth in malware means the MATEF approach does not consider a malware population that 
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is representative at the time of testing.  However, it is also argued that much of modern 
malware is adapted from existing code and so radically new behaviour is rare (de la Cuadra, 
2007).  Alzab (2015) agrees, stating that malware authors are “recycling existing malware” 
using obfuscation techniques instead of writing new code.  A study by Bayer et al. (2009) 
identified similarities of behaviour between 901,294 samples of malware.    
Furthermore, referring to the Aims of the research (Section 1.2), the research seeks to provide 
a methodology to evaluate malware analysis tools, hence updating the malware dataset prior 
to performing an analysis would address this criticism.  Thus the design and utility of the 
MATEF is independent of the choice of malware used to populate its database. 
Reproducibility concerns 
It is possible that the results for a given tool will vary between different organisations using 
this methodology.  This is not an uncommon problem and has been identified in a 
conventional computer forensics context by Garfinkle et al. (2009).  It is also recognised by 
the VIM standard (JCGM, 2008), which defines this situation in terms of reproducibility.  
Thus, rather than being a ‘problem’, this phenomenon is considered a useful by-product of the 
framework that would facilitate any future cross-lab study into reproducibility of tools. 
Oracle (third-party) dependency 
A key element of the MATEF design is the malware database and its representative content.  
The maintenance of this database is dependent on access to third-party databases storing 
artefact details in proprietary formats.   This reliance on a third-party may be identified as a 
weakness of the framework.  The intention in the design however is to build redundancy into 
the system by designing the database to be populated from multiple sources, thereby 
spreading the risk of source availability.  The disadvantage of this approach is that some 
sources provide a richer level of artefact detail than others. 
Accuracy of the Oracle  
Criticism may also be directed at the accuracy of the third party providing malware artefact 
information.  Online sandbox tools may only execute samples once and for no more than a 
maximum time duration before terminating (Bayer, Habibi, Balzarotti, Kirda & Kruegel, 
2009).  Furthermore, malware can typically behave differently each time it is run (Moser, 
Kruegel & Kirda, 2007) or not run at all if it detects a monitored environment.  There is 
therefore an unknown level of doubt or uncertainty in the accuracy of the artefacts reported 
by the third-party sandbox tool.  This can be addressed to some degree by validating results 
against well-documented malware samples such as those belonging to the Zeus family. 
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Testing against zero-day malware 
Young or zero-day malware may not be in any of the online source databases at the time a 
tool is tested.  Hence if there is a requirement to test a tool against a specific sample of 
malware identified on a suspect’s computer, this may not be possible until it has been 
submitted to one or more online analysis engines.  Under these circumstances a decision 
would need to be made to submit it to one or more online sandboxes for analysis.  However 
this decision must be taken in light of the associated risks, such as alerting the malware author 
of its discovery (see section 4.2.5).  If the analysis is being performed around the time of the 
trial, then this is likely to be many months since the alleged offence.  Under these 
circumstances, the likelihood that the malware is not been reported is much smaller.  
Alternatively, the sample could be analysed with an offline Oracle such as the Cuckoo 
Foundation (2016) sandbox. 
Having reviewed the different approaches to evaluating the MATEF, these will be brought 
together to identify further work. 
6.6 Evaluation conclusions and further work 
In the previous section it has been shown that although the MATEF meets all of the internal 
requirements (see Table 6-2), three of the external requirements (admissibility, validated and 
generally accepted) were not met, see Table 6-1.  Furthermore, whilst most of the aims were 
achieved, the anti-forensic mitigations were only partly met.  See the discussion under further 
work below. 
As set out below, there is scope for further improvement of the MATEF, however it 
nonetheless does provide a systematic means by which to evaluate tools and provide data to 
inform a practitioner’s decision in their choice of tools for a forensic investigation involving 
malware, thereby addressing the Research Question (section 1.2).  Before considering the 
areas for further work it is worth highlighting those areas where it is felt there is little or no 
room for improvement. 
Areas unlikely to be improved  
The evaluation has identified some areas of MATEF that are realistically not likely to be 
improved upon.  The inclusion of a command-line interface (CLI) to the large number of 
existing tools that do not have a CLI for both the execution of the tool and the export of its 
log file are outside the control of the MATEF.  
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Another area is the process of adding a new tool, which requires the manual inspection of the 
tool’s output to encode this logic into a wrapper file.  The lack of any standard format in the 
output of similar tools results in a diverse range of output formats from tools, each of which 
need to be linked to known input events (user actions) to interpret them correctly. 
It can be argued that these areas fall more within the implementation of the MATEF rather 
than the framework itself.  Hence their impact on the MATEF is minimal. 
Areas that could be improved 
In terms of further work, the three areas not met in the requirements are identified in Table 
6-1.  Briefly, these concern admissibility, validation and general acceptance.   
The first of these can be addressed by evaluating tools using the MATEF and then including 
the results from such tests in the evidence package produced for cases submitted to the 
Criminal Justice System.  If it is determined that the results produced by the MATEF informs 
the decision made on admissibility, then this requirement can be argued to have been met. 
The second requirement, validation, is more challenging to achieve.  To validate the output 
from the MATEF requires a ‘ground truth’ to compare the results to.  Realistically the only 
sure way to achieve this is to produce one’s own software that exhibits the same behaviour as 
malware in terms of the artefacts it produces and the manner in which they are produced, e.g.: 
employ the use of anti-forensic techniques in an attempt to hide such artefacts. 
The last of these three unmet requirements, general acceptance, is achievable with time if the 
MATEF is adopted into working practice.  As with all new developments, it is difficult to 
demonstrate wider acceptance until later in the life-cycle of the project. 
From a performance perspective, the time to complete a Test Run remains the most 
significant area for further work to make the MATEF more practical for everyday use.  
Furthermore, a more economical use of disk space would improve the resource efficiency of 
the MATEF. 
A number of processes currently performed manually could be automated to alleviate the time 
required to undertake them.  These include sourcing and importing malware, performing 
statistical analysis on the CSV files and interpreting the results.  Sourcing might be achieved 
via the deployment of honeypots or subscriptions to malware share resources, whilst the 
remainder could be implemented via scripts. 
Longer term, the MATEF could be developed to cater for graphical user interface (GUI) 
tools.  Arguably this is more of a limitation of a tool rather than the MATEF if the tool cannot 
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be automated via a script. Another long term development may be the introduction of more 
recent operating systems into the VMs as a test environment.  Although more of an 
implementation (rather than framework) development, this would present challenge on two 
fronts.  The first being that when trying to test a tool, as many of the tools will not operate in 
more recent operating systems.  Secondly, the current operating system used by the MATEF 
implementation (Windows XP) has been selected given it meets the external requirement to 
be a fertile environment for testing malware, see section 3.3.1. 
6.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter evaluated the MATEF from a number of different perspectives.  To facilitate 
this, it opened by first considering the evaluation criteria that can be applied in section 6.1.  
This identified that one approach to this is to evaluate how well MATEF has met the 
requirements of the framework, as well as how well it has achieved the aims of the 
framework, see section 6.2.  In addition to addressing the requirements and aims, the 
performance measures of the MATEF were identified and discussed in section 6.3.  This 
section largely considered the speed and resource requirements of the MATEF.  Evaluating 
the MATEF against the requirements, aims and performance measures provides grounding for 
establishing how well the MATEF has addressed the fundamental motivation for the research; 
expressed through the Research Question, see section 6.4.  The chapter drew to a close by 
first identifying the limitations of the MATEF and responding to each of these in turn.  
Following this, the chapter synthesised the findings of the above critique and presented a 
discussion on further work.  
The next chapter recaps on the preceding chapters and draws conclusions on the thesis as a 
whole. 
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Chapter 7  Conclusions 
 
We live in an increasingly interconnected world where technology is ubiquitous and much of 
our infrastructure and economy is dependent on our ability to operate in cyber space.  Since 
2011 the UK Government has continued to invest in developing the UK’s resilience to the 
cyber threat, labelled as a “Tier One risk to UK interests” (Cabinet Office, 2016).  This 
requirement to develop the UK’s capability applies not just to national security but, as Burd 
et. al. (2011) argue, to cybercrime as well.   
This research has reported how changes to how cybercrime investigations are conducted 
within the UK Criminal Justice System (CJS) have identified a number of factors that have 
led to challenges to some expert evidence submitted to criminal proceedings.  Factors such as 
the ‘Trojan defence’, unfounded trust in software tools, problems with expert evidence and 
lack of provenance are all areas where evidence submitted is open to challenge.  Furthermore, 
the now active requirement for forensic practitioners (including teams operating within the 
police) to be accredited by the Forensic Science Regulator in order to submit evidence to the 
CJS, means practitioners need to evidence their trust in tools used for investigations, 
including those involving malware. 
To address this requirement, a framework has been developed to provide empirical data on 
the ability of software tools to identify artefacts produced by malware.  To summarise the 
success of his framework, it is worth recapping on the research goals, which this framework 
addresses. 
7.1 Goals and findings 
By way of recap, the goals of the research were identified in Table 1-2 (Section 1.2) as: 
• Determine if there is there a problem with a lack of trusted practice in malware forensics 
• Identify the requirements for a solution 
• Develop a methodology for evaluating malware artefact detection tools 
It is argued that the first of these goals has been met, as evidenced by the literature review 
(Chapter 2 ).  This has provided a case for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware 
forensics. 
Chapter 7  - Conclusions  Page 154  
 
The second goal has also been met; given the research identified a number of requirements to 
develop the framework (see Chapter 3 ) and the majority of these were met (see Chapter 6 ).   
The third goal is perhaps the most significant of the goals.  It is argued that this goal of the 
research has also been met, as is demonstrated by the empirical evidence produced using the 
MATEF.    A notable aspect of this research is that the framework has been implemented and 
tested using a large population of real-world malware binaries (over of 350,000).  This is 
relatively large when compared to other research groups who use fewer numbers of malware 
binaries. For example, Gashi et al. (2009) used 1,599 malware binaries during their study on 
anti-malware engines, whilst in a study (Gashi, Sobesto, Stankovic & Cukier, 2013) they used 
less than half this amount (900). Zolkipli and Jantan (2011) used a sample size of just 5 
binaries in their study on malware behaviour. 
Despite the success of this research, it is recognised that there are areas for improvement. 
7.2 Critical review of thesis 
Two primary criticisms can be levelled at this thesis.  These are a limitation in terms of (a) 
scope and (b) methodology.  These areas will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
7.2.1 Scope limitations 
This thesis has been limited by its scope to: 
1. Quantity of artefacts observed when evaluating tools and not their values. 
2. Support for only evaluating Command-line interface (CLI) tools 
This limited scope of the thesis may suggest that its findings are limited as well.  However, 
the reduced information available from observing quantities and not values does not prevent a 
comparison being made between the expected and observed quantities.  Furthermore, this 
approach reduces the number of random variables from 2 to 1, as any variation in values is 
ignored by this approach.   
The support for CLI tools only again does not prevent a comparison being made between the 
expected and observed quantities, as at this time it only restricts which tools can be evaluated 
in this way.  In a time of growing quantities of data to process, the lack of command-line 
support by a tool to facilitate automation is more of a limitation of the tool than of the 
MATEF. 
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Despite these limitations in scope, the ability to compare expected and observed values is still 
honoured and hence satisfies the Research Question.  Furthermore, this research is still useful 
in that the findings: 
• Provide a means by which to evaluate tools in a malware environment, where 
previously there was none. 
• Add to common body of knowledge on software evaluation within the relatively 
young malware forensics field. 
7.2.2 Methodology limitations 
Critics of the MATEF may argue the use of another tool (in this case an online sandbox) to 
determine the expected numbers of artefacts does not provide an accurate representation of 
the true numbers of artefacts to be expected from executing a given malware binary.  Others 
may go further and suggest that it is not possible to obtain such a figure, due to the random 
nature of the malware. 
In response to these criticisms, random variations that manifest themselves when determining 
an approximated ground truth (as discussed in section 4.2.5) are inherently challenging to 
overcome.  However, the effect of these variations are minimised by performing multiple test 
runs and taking an average of the number of observed artefacts, see Table 6-4.  Furthermore, 
Hubbard (2014, p. 162) points out that if there is a lot of uncertainty in a quantity, then very 
little data is needed to reduce the uncertainty significantly.  In other words, gaining a little 
knowledge about how a tool copes with observing malware where previously there was a high 
level of uncertainty is a significant advance in our understanding of that tool.  Hence, 
producing an estimate of the expected number of artefacts to be observed significantly 
reduces the uncertainty in what is expected from subsequent observations.   Consequently, a 
reduction in uncertainty leads to an increase in trust (Bell, 2017, p. xix), hence this approach 
addresses the Research Question. 
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7.3 Contributions 
This research contributes to the common body of knowledge in the area of software tool 
evaluation in a malware forensics setting.  The main contribution is that it is the first to 
provide a framework to facilitate the empirical evaluation of a tool’s ability to detect malware 
artefacts under different operating conditions.  To recap from section 1.2, the Research 
Question states: 
Can a systematic basis for trusted practice be established for evaluating malware 
artefact detection tools used within a forensic investigation? 
To address this question the following related sub-questions were investigated:  
1. To what extent is there a case for a lack of trusted practice? 
2. What are the requirements for evaluating malware artefact detection tools? 
3. Do the conditions under which tools and malware operate have an effect on the 
ability to observe malware behaviour? 
4. Are observations of malware behaviour impacted by the practitioner’s choice of tool? 
5. What factors can be used to evaluate the performance of the methodology and hence 
identify areas of improvement. 
To begin with, exploratory evidence in the literature review (Chapter 2 ) has provided a case 
for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware forensics (research sub-question 1 above). 
Another contribution is the systematic identification of a set of requirements for establishing 
trusted practice in the use of malware artefact detection tools (research sub-question 2 above).   
Two further contributions come from empirical evidence generated by the tools tested during 
this research.  The first of these compares how two different tools operate under different 
conditions (research sub-question 3 above), identifying an optimal execution time for a given 
tool. Secondly, empirical data is provided showing how these tools perform when compared 
with each other under the same operating conditions (research sub-question 4 above). 
An additional contribution is provided from the empirical evidence gathered on the 
performance of this framework, enabling areas of improvement to be identified (research sub-
question 5 above).   
More generally, the MATEF provides a systematic methodology for practitioners to apply to 
new or unfamiliar tools that will allow them to specify parameters, such as how long the tool 
must be run for to obtain the optimal number of artefacts.   
Chapter 7  - Conclusions  Page 157  
 
In summary, the contributions of this thesis can be summed up to be: 
1. Confirmation for case for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware forensics, 
evidence from the literature review.  
2. A framework to facilitate the production of empirical evidence of a tool’s ability to 
detect malware artefacts under different operating conditions, evidenced by the 
design and implementation of the MATEF, Chapter 4  
3. A set of requirements for establishing trusted practice in the use of malware artefact 
detection tools, evidenced by Chapter 3  
4. Empirical evidence generated identifying the optimal execution time for a given tool 
when observing malware artefacts, evidenced by Chapter 5  
5. Empirical evidence that the choice of tool can impact on the number of artefacts 
observed, evidenced by Chapter 5  
6. Empirical evidence of the performance of this framework, evidenced by section 6.3. 
7. A systematic methodology for practitioners to specify operating parameters (such as 
how long the tool must be run for) when obtaining new or unfamiliar tools. 
7.4 Further work 
The evaluation of the research (see section 6.6) identified a number of areas for further work.  
The first of these was that if the MATEF was extended to include its own Oracle analysis 
platform the issue surrounding the rate of submission of malware to and subsequent delivery 
of reports would be overcome.  Another area identified that would extend the scope of the 
MATEF significantly would be the support for tools that do not support a CLI.  Also 
proposed for further work were the admissibility, validation and general acceptance 
requirements (see Table 6-1) that were not met by this research. 
Performance issues were also identified as areas where further work could be undertaken.  
The time to complete a Test Run and a more economical use of disk space were singled out as 
specific areas of improvement. 
The use of both bare metal and virtual machines together to test malware analysis tools is a 
recommended malware analysis lab requirement (see section 3.3.2) and would be of benefit 
for testing tools where the malware binary is aware of a virtualised environment and so 
behaves differently.  However, consideration should be given to the impact this approach 
would have on the speed of testing, which would be slower to allow physical machines to be 
reset between tests. 
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The process of evaluating a malware analysis tool to observe malware on different operating 
systems is not an extension of the MATEF; this is because the framework is conceptually the 
same, regardless of the implementation.  However, by implementing the framework on 
different VM platforms in parallel, the results obtained will more inclusive and further help to 
inform the practitioner in their choice of tool, regardless of the operating system in place on a 
suspect’s computer. 
A number of processes that are currently manually performed were also considered for further 
work.  These include sourcing and ingesting malware into the MATEF platform, statistical 
analysis operations on CSV files derived from tool log files and interpreting the results.   
7.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter opened by revisiting the goals of the research and considering the extent to 
which these have been met.  Of particular note was the size of the dataset used in the research, 
which is significantly larger than those used in other studies. 
A critique of the thesis followed and examined the scope and methodologies of the research.  
A case for using quantities rather than values in observations was made to minimise the 
effects of random variations and thereby increase the level of trust in the data.  The issue of 
supporting only command-line interface (CLI) tools was also discussed.  Whilst 
acknowledging the limits this placed on the MATEF’s scope it was argued this was more of a 
limitation of the tools being tested than the MATEF itself. 
The difficulties of determining ‘Ground Truth’ were identified and the method used to 
estimate this discussed, concluding that the approach reduces uncertainty and thereby increase 
trust in the results obtained. 
The chapter closed with a review and summary of the contributions made by this research, 
followed by suggestions for further work. 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis we have provided a case for a lack of trusted practice in the field of malware 
forensics.  To address this, we identified the gap between current practice and the regulatory, 
legal and technical requirements. We further went on to design a framework designed to 
systematically address the gap and apply scientific principles to the testing of malware 
analysis tools.  A prototype was built to implement the framework and used to test tools on a 
large corpus of malware. 
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Whilst it is acknowledged there are limitations of the prototype implemented in terms of 
scope and the establishment of ground truth (see section 7.2), such limitations do not affect 
the framework itself.  Indeed, since there is no generally accepted scientific methodology  to 
evaluate tools used in malware analysis, we believe that the work presented in this thesis to 
develop a framework based on such methodology goes some way towards addressing the lack 
of trust in tools used in the field of malware forensics.  Moreover, the empirical data 
presented in the thesis has highlighted the optimal execution time of a tool under test.  Hence, 
controls such as this can inform a subsequent procedure, which is then arguably underpinned 
with scientifically established empirical data.  
Furthermore, providing a methodology to evaluate a malware analysis tool where previously 
there was none goes some way to reducing the uncertainty in the output of the tool.  A 
reduction in uncertainty, in turn, increases the trust placed in the practice of using that tool. 
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The following sources were used to perform the literature review for this research. 
Source type Source 
Databases IEEE 
 
Science Direct 
 
Lexis-Nexis 
 
Springer-link 
 
Taylor and Francis 
 
Scopus 
Social media http://www.icerocket.com/ 
 
http://www.h-net.org/ 
Mail lists HTCC 
 
http://lsoft.com/lists/list_q.html 
 
http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/ 
Discussion groups/Usenet https://groups.google.com/forum/#!browse 
 
http://nzbindex.com/ 
Official reports/transcripts http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ 
 
www.official-documents.co.uk 
 
http://europa.eu/ 
 
www.statistics.gov.uk 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
Datasets https://data.gov.uk/ 
Dissertations Proquest (via OU library) 
 
http://oaister.worldcat.org/ - filter on Thesis 
Search engines http://oaister.worldcat.org/ 
 
Google scholar 
Forums http://boardreader.com/ 
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